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Abstract
This thesis consists of three chapters. They explore develop and estimate economic models to analyze
questions of interests to public policies.
Chapter 1 develops and estimates a spatial general equilibrium job search model to study the effects of local
and universal (federal) minimum wage policies. In the model, firms post vacancies in multiple locations.
Workers, who are heterogeneous in terms of location
and education types, engage in random search and can migrate or commute in response to job offers. The
model is estimated by combining multiple databases including the American Community Survey (ACS) and
Quarterly Workforce Indicators (QWI). The estimated model is used to analyze how minimum wage policies
affect employment, wages, job postings, vacancies, migration/commuting, and welfare. Empirical results show
that minimum wage increases in local county lead to an exit of low type (education<12 >years) workers and
an influx of high type workers (education>12 years), which generates negative externalities for workers in
neighboring areas. The model is used to simulate the effects of a range of minimum wages. Minimum wage
increases up to $14/hour increase the welfare of high type workers but lower the welfare of low type workers,
expanding inequality. Increases in excess of $14/hour decrease welfare for all workers. Two counterfactual
policies are further evaluated under this framework: restricting labor mobility and preempting local minimum
wage laws. For a certain range of minimum wages, both policies have negative impacts on the welfare of high
type workers, but benecial effects for low type workers.
Chapter 2 poses a dynamic discrete choice model of schooling and occupational choices that incorporates
time-varying personality traits, as measured by the so-called "Big Five" traits. The model is estimated using the
Household Income and Labor Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) longitudinal dataset from Australia.
Personality traits are found to play a critical role in explaining education and occupational choices over the
lifecycle. The traits evolve during young adult years but stabilize in the mid-30s. Results show that individuals
with a comparative advantage in schooling and white-collar work have, on average, higher cognitive skills and
higher personality traits, in all ve dimensions. The estimated model is used to evaluate two education policies:
compulsory senior secondary school and a 50% college subsidy. Both policies are found to be effective in
increasing educational attainment, but the compulsory schooling policy provides greater benets to lower
socioeconomic groups. Allowing personality traits to evolve with age and with years of schooling proves to be
important in capturing policy response heterogeneity.
Chapter 3 develops and estimates a model of how personality traits affect household time and resource
allocation decisions and wages. In the model, households choose between two behavioral modes: cooperative
or noncooperative. Spouses receive wage offers and
allocate time to supply labor market hours and to produce a public good. Personality traits, measured by the
so-called "Big Five" traits, can affect household bargaining weights and wage offers. Model parameters are
estimated by Simulated Method of Moments using the
Household Income and Labor Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) data. Personality traits are found to be
important determinants of household bargaining weights and of wage offers and to have substantial
implications for understanding the sources of gender wage disparities.
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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS IN LABOR ECONOMICS
Weilong Zhang
Petra E. Todd
This thesis consists of three chapters. They explore develop and estimate economic models
to analyze questions of interests to public policies.
Chapter 1 develops and estimates a spatial general equilibrium job search model to study
the effects of local and universal (federal) minimum wage policies. In the model, firms
post vacancies in multiple locations. Workers, who are heterogeneous in terms of location
and education types, engage in random search and can migrate or commute in response to
job offers. The model is estimated by combining multiple databases including the Ameri-
can Community Survey (ACS) and Quarterly Workforce Indicators (QWI). The estimated
model is used to analyze how minimum wage policies affect employment, wages, job post-
ings, vacancies, migration/commuting, and welfare. Empirical results show that minimum
wage increases in local county lead to an exit of low type (education<12 years) workers and
an influx of high type workers (education>12 years), which generates negative externalities
for workers in neighboring areas. The model is used to simulate the effects of a range of
minimum wages. Minimum wage increases up to $14/hour increase the welfare of high type
workers but lower welfare of low type workers, expanding inequality. Increases in excess of
$14/hour decrease welfare for all workers. Two counterfactual policies are further evaluated
under this framework: restricting labor mobility and preempting local minimum wage laws.
For a certain range of minimum wages, both policies have negative impacts on the welfare
of high type workers, but beneficial effects for low type workers.
Chapter 2 poses a dynamic discrete choice model of schooling and occupational choices that
incorporates time-varying personality traits, as measured by the so-called “Big Five” traits.
v
The model is estimated using the Household Income and Labor Dynamics in Australia
(HILDA) longitudinal dataset from Australia. Personality traits are found to play a critical
role in explaining education and occupational choices over the lifecycle. The traits evolve
during young adult years but stabilize in the mid-30s. Results show that individuals with a
comparative advantage in schooling and white-collar work have, on average, higher cognitive
skills and higher personality traits, in all five dimensions. The estimated model is used to
evaluate two education policies: compulsory senior secondary school and a 50% college
subsidy. Both policies are found to be effective in increasing educational attainment, but
the compulsory schooling policy provides greater benefits to lower socioeconomic groups.
Allowing personality traits to evolve with age and with years of schooling proves to be
important in capturing policy response heterogeneity.
Chapter 3 develops and estimates a model of how personality traits affect household time
and resource allocation decisions and wages. In the model, households choose between
two behavioral modes: cooperative or noncooperative. Spouses receive wage offers and
allocate time to supply labor market hours and to produce a public good. Personality traits,
measured by the so-called “Big Five” traits, can affect household bargaining weights and
wage offers. Model parameters are estimated by Simulated Method of Moments using the
Household Income and Labor Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) data. Personality traits are
found to be important determinants of household bargaining weights and of wage offers and
to have substantial implications for understanding the sources of gender wage disparities.
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CHAPTER 1 : Distributional Effects of Local Minimum Wage Hikes: A Spatial Job
Search Approach
Weilong Zhang
1.1. Introduction
Traditional minimum wage studies estimate local labor market employment and wage ef-
fects by comparing a group that experienced the minimum wage change to a similar group
in nearby region that did not experience a change.1 This approach can be problematic when
local minimum wage changes are large, because substantial local minimum wage increases
likely induce labor mobility and have spillover effects on neighboring areas.2 A full ac-
counting of minimum wage effects must take into account workers from all affected areas.3
Furthermore, when faced with higher labor costs, firms may substitute lower productivity
workers with higher productivity ones to keep profitable (Horton, 2017). Therefore, some
workers may benefit from minimum wage increases, while others are adversely affected. This
paper studies the distributional and welfare effects of local and universal (federal) minimum
wage policies taking into account worker heterogeneity, spatial mobility, and minimum wages
of varying magnitudes.
To this end, I develop a spatial general equilibrium model that extends Flinn (2006) to a
spatial search context. The economy consists of two adjacent regions, similar to the cross-
border contiguous county pairs in Dube et al. (2016). Workers are differentiated by their
types and locations.4 They receive job offers from local firms and from firms in a neighboring
1There is an ongoing debate concerning the effect of minimum wages on employment. See Card and
Krueger (1994, 2000); Dube et al. (2007, 2010, 2016); Neumark (2001); Neumark et al. (2014a,b); Jardim
et al. (2017).
2Recent studies have documented increased labor mobility induced by minimum wage changes, especially
for low skilled workers (Monras, 2015; McKinnish, 2017).
3As of September 2017, 39 counties and cities have passed new minimum wage laws according to the UC
Berkeley Labor Center. 23 out of 39 cities/counties have passed minimum wages of $15 or more, while the
current federal minimum wage remains at $7.25. See http://laborcenter.berkeley.edu/minimum-wage-living-
wage-resources/inventory-of-us-city-and-county-minimum-wage-ordinances/for more details.
4Ideally, type could be a summary statistic to rank workers expected productivity. I empirically use
educational attainment as a proxy for worker types. Low type represents high school dropouts while high
type represents high school graduates or more. According to 2015 the Current Population Survey (CPS),
1
county. Workers accept a local offer if its value exceeds the value of unemployment. When
considering offers from neighboring regions, workers require extra compensation to offset
migration/commuting costs. Firms decide in which counties to post vacancies, where the
number of vacancies is determined by a free entry condition. Given the assumption of
random search, heterogeneous workers in all locations are contacted by firms at identical
rates. An individual’s productivity when meeting a firm is determined by his/her type and
an idiosyncratic random matching quality. The bargained wage is determined by a surplus
division rule, subject to the minimum wage constraint, which left-truncates the original
wage distribution (Flinn, 2006). The new wage structure is a continuous distribution with
a mass point at the minimum wage level.
I estimate this spatial job search model using a Simulated Method of Moments estima-
tor that combines county-level data moments from various sources. The migration and
commuting flows are obtained from the American Community Survey (ACS). Local labor
market conditions (hiring rates, separation rates and employment rates) are obtained from
Quarterly Workforce Indicators (QWI) survey. The payroll share of firms’ expenditures,
and the ratio of job postings to workers come from the Economics Wide Key Statistics
(EWKS) and the Conference Board Help Wanted Online (HWOL).
This model provides a framework to access the effects of minimum wage increases of a range
of magnitude. Previous studies have focused on the most disadvantaged workers, without
considering the welfare consequences for high type workers. To study the impacts of min-
imum wage increases for heterogeneous workers, my model incorporates four important
effects. First, conditional on being employed, workers receive a higher wage from the same
matches (the “wage enhancement effect”). Second, a minimum wage increase also causes a
disemployment effect, because it dissolves marginally acceptable matches (the “disemploy-
ment effect”). Low type workers are more likely to be the marginally hired worker. Third,
when firms are mandatory to pay workers more, they receive a smaller fraction of the sur-
5.8 percent workers are paid an hourly rate at or below federal minimum wage for the low type group, while
this rate drops to 2.9 percent for the high type group.
2
plus from same matches (the “share reduction effect”). Fourth, the probability of filling
the vacancy with a high productivity worker increases in the higher minimum wage county
but decreases in its neighboring county (the “worker relocation effect”). The incentive for
firms to post vacancies is reduced in both counties, but especially in the county that does
not change its minimum wage, due to negative spillover effects.
My analysis yields three main results. First, local minimum wage hikes have contrasting
impacts on differentiated workers, expanding the inequality between low type and high
type workers. Low type workers are adversely affected by higher minimum wages, primarily
due to greater disemployment effect. For high type workers, the wage enhancement effect
dominates the disemployment effect when the minimum wage level is less than $14, above
which the countervailing disemployment effect start to dominate. Therefore, the welfare of
high type workers displays a hump shape with a peak at $14/hour. When simulating the
welfare difference of a range of minimum wages, the inequality between high and low type
workers grows as the local minimum wage increases and reaches its peak at $15.
Second, I use the estimated model to evaluate two policies: restricting labor mobility and
preempting local minimum wage laws.5 For a range of minimum wage values, I find that the
welfare of high type workers is negatively impacted, but both policies have beneficial effects
for low type workers. In the experiment of restricting spatial labor mobility, the low type
workers in neighboring counties prefer two labor markets to be isolated when local minimum
wage increases are large (above $10), because the cost of lost working opportunities is
fully compensated by the benefit of eliminating spillover externalities. In the experiment
of preempting local minimum wage laws, I compare local minimum wage changes with
universal minimum wage changes. I find that low type workers prefer universal minimum
wage hikes over local minimum wage hikes when the minimum wage change is moderate
(below $14.5). The benefit of reducing spillover externalities outweighs the cost of a larger
5The minimum wage preemption laws prohibit cities from enacting their own minimum wage laws. As
of July 6, 2017, 25 states have passed such laws. See http://www.nelp.org/publication/fighting-preemption-
local-minimum-wage-laws/ for a more comprehensive policy review.
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disemployment effect.
Third, I find the disemployment effect of a minimum wage increase is underestimated if one
ignores labor mobility. On one hand, low educated workers tend to move away in response
to a minimum wage increase and thus “disappear” from the “treated” county. On the other
hand, they “reappear” in the neighboring area, contaminating the control group. I obtain
with the model an estimate of the elasticity of employment with respect to the minimum
wage equal to -0.073; ignoring labor mobility cuts this value in half to -0.034. The bias is
most severe for counties with higher fractions of mobile workers.
My paper contributes to four broad strands of the literature. First, it is the first paper
highlighting the negative spillover effects created by local minimum wage policies. There
are a few recent papers documenting worker migration/commuting decisions are responsive
to local minimum wage changes (Monras, 2015; McKinnish, 2017). However, this is the
first paper linking labor flows with negative externalities for neighboring area workers. The
insight that local policies may create externalities in the neighboring area through policy-
induced migration is also discussed in the fiscal-federalism literature. For example, Serrato
and Zidar (2016) studies the incidence of state corporate taxes on the welfare of workers,
landowners and firm owners. In their model, a state tax cut reduces the tax liability
and the cost of capital, attracting more establishments to move in. Cohen et al. (2011)
studies the effects of marginal tax rates on migration decisions in the U.S., while Young
and Varner (2011) and Moretti and Wilson (2017) focus on the geographic locations of top
earners. Although policy-induced migration has already drawn significant attentions in the
tax competition literature, my paper is the first application in the minimum wage context.
My paper also contributes to the structural minimum wage literature. It extends Flinn
(2006) by allowing for location-specific minimum wages and spatial mobility. Previous
minimum wage studies usually assume one universal minimum wage for the whole labor
market. (Eckstein and Wolpin, 1990; Van den Berg and Ridder, 1998; Flinn, 2006; Mabli
and Flinn, 2007; Eckstein et al., 2011; Flinn and Mullins, 2015; Flinn et al., 2017) By
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extending the framework to multiple connected sub-markets, my model is able to incorporate
geographical minimum wage variation for identification and evaluate the externalities of
local minimum wage laws. The spatial search framework in my paper is similar to that
of Meghir et al. (2015), which develops an equilibrium wage-posting model with formal
and informal sectors. Their paper focuses on firm heterogeneity while I focus on worker
heterogeneity. Other relevant spatial equilibrium frameworks include Coen-Pirani (2010);
Baum-Snow and Pavan (2012); Kennan and Walker (2011); Schmutz and Sidibe (2016).
By embedding local minimum wage policy into a spatial equilibrium model, my model
allows examination of the effects of minimum wages on labor mobility, local employment,
migration, wages and welfare.
This paper also explores the methodological implications for minimum wage studies that use
adjacent counties as the control group. Starting with Card and Krueger (1994), cross-border
comparisons became a popular method of studying the employment effects of minimum
wage increases. For example, Dube et al. (2007, 2010, 2016) generalize this strategy to all
contiguous county pairs and find small disemployment effects, consistent with Card and
Krueger (1994). Although the cross-border design is persuasive, because of the geographic
proximity between the treatment and control areas, there are concerns about the assumption
that adjacent counties are unaffected, particularly when the minimum wage discrepancy
between counties is large. I find that ignoring labor mobility leads to an underestimation
of disemployment effects for two reasons. First, the unemployed workers move out of the
“treated” area when they can not find jobs, and second, they move into neighboring areas,
contaminating the control group.
Lastly, this paper contributes to the recent local labor market policy literature, emphasizing
the potential externalities caused by place-based policies.6 I show that low type workers,
who are the intended beneficiaries of minimum wage policies, are actually worse-off after
minimum wage increases. The estimates of moving cost confirms that taking the neighboring
6See Glaeser et al. (2008) and Enrico (2011) for reviews. Other recent papers include Kline (2010); Busso
et al. (2013); Kline and Moretti (2013)
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job is costly in general, which is consistent with the finding in Manning and Petrongolo
(2017). While their paper argues that the probability of a random distant (at least 5km
away) job being preferred to random local (less than 5km away) job is only 19% based on
data from UK. Using county-level U.S. data, I find a slightly higher probability of 22.2%.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section presents a spatial job search
equilibrium model. Section 3 describes the multiple data sources I will use to estimate the
model. Section 4 discusses the identification and estimation strategy. Section 5 present the
estimation results. Section 6 discusses the counterfactual experiments. Section 7 concludes.
1.2. Model
I develop a dynamic spatial search model where individuals live and work in one of the
paired counties (j , j ′). A job seeker in one county may receive either a local offer or a
neighboring offer at certain rates. When a worker meets a firm in county j , they bargain
over the wage subject to the minimum wage policy in county j . Local minimum wage
changes would potentially affect labor market conditions in the neighboring county due to
labor mobility.
1.2.1. Framework
I consider a continuous time model, where infinitely lived, risk neutral workers maximize
their expected utility (income) with discount rate ρ. The economy consists of two adjacent
local markets, a pair of counties (j , j ′). The economy has a fixed number of potential workers
with different types a. N(a, j) represents the number of workers with type a in county j .
Type is discrete, taking n different values a ∈ A = {a1, ..., an}.7 The number of workers
for each type is exogenous. However, their working and living status are determined by
the endogenous job searching process. U(a, j), L(a, j), and (a, j) represent the number of
unemployed workers, local workers, and mobile workers with type a in county j . I focus on
job search and labor mobility behavior in the steady state.
7For computational tractability, I consider two types: high (ah) and low (al) in the empirical analysis.
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1.2.2. Worker’s problem with wage w
A job seeker of type a in county j may receive wage offers from county j or j ′. Upon meeting
a firm, the productivity is given by
y = aθ
where θ is the random matching quality, which is assumed to be an i.i.d. draw from the
distribution function G (θ).8 Given the job offers from the local county arrive at rate λj and
the job offers from the neighboring county arrive at rate λj ′ , the value of unemployment
can be written recursively as:
ρVu(a, j) = abj︸︷︷︸
(1) flow value
+λj
∫ ∞
mj
{Ve(w , j)− Vu(a, j)}+dF (w |a, j)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(2) option value of accepting a local offer
+ λj ′
∫ ∞
mj′
{Ve(w , j ′)− c(a, j)− Vu(a, j)}+dF (w |a, j ′))︸ ︷︷ ︸
(3) option value of accepting a neighbouring offer
(1.1)
The notation {x}+ ≡ max{x , 0}. mj represents the minimum wage level in county j. In
the continuous time setting, at most one job offer arrives in each moment. Equation 1.1
decomposes the value of unemployed workers into three components: (1) abj represents the
flow utility of unemployment;9 (2) the option value when a local offer with wage w is better
than staying unemployed; (3) the option value when an offer with wage w from neighboring
county, net of the the moving cost c(a, j), is better than staying unemployed.
Following Baum-Snow and Pavan (2012) and Schmutz and Sidibe (2016), I use the moving
cost c(a, j) as the key function to distinguish the local labor market from the neighboring
labor market. If c(a, j) = 0, the workers in county j and county j ′ will have exactly the
8The assumption that the flow productivity yij = aiθj is the multiplicity of a firm type θj and a worker
type ai is standard in the literature (Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002); Cahuc et al. (2006)). Following this
spirit, the distribution of matching productivity should be location-specific (firm-specific) Gj(θ). Since labor
market conditions in county pairs should be similar, I assume the matching productivity Gj(θ) is the same
for these two counties.
9The assumption that a worker’s unemployment utility ”at home” abj and productivity at work aθ are
both proportional to type a is widely used in the literature. e.g. Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002); Flinn and
Mullins (2015).
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same working opportunities, which means paired counties are essentially one united labor
market. If c(a, j) = +∞, the paired counties are totally isolated markets. As pointed out by
Schwartz (1973) and Greenwood (1975), this moving cost summarizes both the psychic cost
of losing local social connections with family and friends and the physical transportation
cost, which depends on the moving distance. The specifically parametric form of the moving
cost will be shown in section 1.4.1.
I assume no on-the-job search. Therefore, the worker who accepts a job with wage w will
never voluntarily quit the current job. Thus the existing matches only dissolve with a
constant exogenous rate ηj . The value of employment, V
e
t , has the the following form
10:
Ve(w , a, j) =
w + ηjVu(a, j)
ρ+ ηj
(1.2)
1.2.3. Bargaining with a minimum wage constraint
In this section, I specify how the wage between the worker and the firm is determined. I first
consider the case without a minimum wage. If a worker with type a meets a firm in location
j and draws a matching quality θ in period t, the bargained wage is assumed to be derived
from a Nash bargaining solution. The wage ŵ(a, j , θ) maximizes the weighted product of
the worker’s and firm’s net return from the match. To form the match, the worker gives
up the value of unemployment Vu(a, j), and the firm gives up the unfilled homogeneous
vacancy, which has zero value according to the free entry condition.11
ŵ(a, j , θ) = arg max
w
(Ve(w , a, j)− Vu(a, j))αj Vf (w , a, θ, j)1−αj
10The derivations of equations 1.1 and 1.2 are described in Appendix 1.8.1.
11I do not model different outside options for local workers and mobile workers for two reasons. First, it
is unclear whether moving costs are a credible “threat point” for mobile workers because they have to pay
the moving cost before they can work in the other county. Second, due to menu costs, it is not economic for
firms to make a separate wage offers for mobile workers who are a minority of new hires.
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where location specific bargaining weight αj is strictly between 0 and 1, representing the
relative bargaining strength of the labor side. Vf is the present value of the filled vacancy
for the firm. As derived in Appendix 1.8.2, the bargained wage offer function is:
ŵ(a, j , θ) = ρVu(a, j) + αj(aθ − ρVu(a, j)) (1.3)
The interpretation of this bargained wage is intuitive. The workers receive their reservation
wage ρVu(a, j) and a fraction of bargained share αj of the net surplus of the current match,
which is the total production aθ minus what workers give up ρVu(a, j).
Following Flinn (2006), the introduction of a minimum wage in area j is treated as a “side
constraint” to the original bargaining problem.
w(a, j , θ) = arg max
w≥mj
(Ve(w , a, j)− Vu(a, j))αj Vf (w , a, θ, j)1−αj
The minimum wage constraint w ≥ mj is imposed by local policy maker and applies to all
potential job matches. Before considering the case when the minimum wage binds, I solve
for the critical value of matching quality where the worker receives exactly the minimum
wage based on the original surplus decision rule (Equation 1.3).
θ̂(a, j) =
mj − (1− αj)ρVu(a, j)
aαj
If θ̂(a, j) ≤ mja , the minimum wage has no effect on the bargained wage because the reser-
vation value is so high that all acceptable matches for workers actually give them wages
equal or larger than mj . (i.e. aθ
∗(a, j) ≥ mj). If θ̂(a, j) >
mj
a , the minimum wage is binding
when θ ∈ [mja , θ̂). The firms in this scenario would pay workers mj , which is more than the
worker’s “implicit” reservation wage ŵ(a, j , θ). Although payroll expenditure expands, it is
still in firms’ best interests to hire these workers, because destroying the jobs would reduce
profits to zero. The binding minimum wage creates a wedge between the worker’s wage and
their “implicit” reservation wage, making the latter unobservable. Following Flinn (2006), I
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introduce the reservation matching quality θ∗(a, j), which is the lowest matching quality of
a local match that a worker with type a will accept. In other words, the worker is indifferent
between accepting a local job with matching quality θ∗(a, j) and staying unemployed.
V e(ŵ(a, j , θ∗(a, j)), a, j) = V u(a, j)
θ∗(a, j) =
ρVu(a, j)
a
This reservation matching quality would be “implicit” in the case when the minimum wage
binds (mj > ρVu(a, j)).In this way, I obtain an affine mapping between the cumulative
distribution of the matching quality, G (θ), and the cumulative wage distribution F (w |a, j):
ft(w |a, j) =

(aα)−1g(θ̃(w ,a,j))
G̃(
mj
a
)
G̃(θ̂(a,j))−G̃(
mj
a
)
G̃(
mj
a
)
0
w > mj
w = mj
w < mj
(1.4)
where f (w |a, j) is the probability distribution function(PDF) of F (w |a, j), g(θ) is the PDF
of G (θ), and G̃ (θ) = 1−G (θ) is the complementary function of the cumulative distribution
function G (θ). θ̃(w , a, j) =
w−(1−αj )ρVu(a,j)
aαj
denotes the matching quality whose bargained
wage is equal to w . The observed wage distribution consists of a point mj with mass
G(θ̂(a,j))−G̃(
mj
a
)
G̃(
mj
a
)
and a continuous function (assuming G (θ) is continuous) when θ > θ̂. Thus
the bargained wage can be summarized as:
w(a, j ,θ) = max{mj ,αjaθ + (1− αj)ρVu(a, j)} (1.5)
It is worth to point out that a binding minimum wage affects the wages of all workers,
but through different channels. For the workers with matching quality θ ∈ [mja , θ̂(a, j)), the
minimum wage directly benefits them by boosting their wage to mj . For workers with even
higher matching quality θ ∈ [θ̂(a, j),∞), the minimum wage changes their value of unem-
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ployment ρVu(a, j).
12 To summarize, introducing the minimum wage as a side restriction
on Nash-bargained wages converts a continuous underlying productivity distribution into a
mixed continuous-discrete accepted wage distribution, with a mass point at the minimum
wage.
1.2.4. Migration/commuting trade-off
Next, I characterize the spatial strategies of the workers. To capture the different types of
labor mobility observed in the data, I distinguish commuting from migrating by specifying
a choice-specific moving cost cch(a, j), h = {0, 1}. The timing is as follows: (1) an offer
from neighboring area j ′ arrives at rate λj ′ . (2) After the matching quality θ is realized,
the worker decides to accept/reject the offer based on the trade-off between the wage offer
w(a, j ′, θ) net of the ex-ante moving cost c(a, j) and the value of unemployment, Vu(a, j).
(3) If the worker accepts the offer, the preference shock εh is realized and the worker chooses
whether to commute or migrate.
A worker with type a continues to receive job offers from the neighboring county at rate λj ′ .
The expected moving cost c(a, j), is a function of the worker’s type and location-specific
characteristics. Following Schmutz and Sidibe (2016), I introduce a “implicit” mobility
compatible indifferent matching quality θ∗∗(a, j), fulfilling the following condition:
Vu(a, j) + c(a, j) = Ve(θ
∗∗(a, j), a, j ′)
where j represents the worker’s place of residence and thus j ′ will be the worker’s place of
work. The worker will accept the neighboring offer if and only if the matching quality of
the offer exceeds the mobility compatible threshold θ ≥ θ∗∗(a, j). This match will also be
sustainable for firms as long as θ ≥ mj′a . To summarize, the worker whose residence is in
county j will accept a neighboring offer if and only if θ ≥ max{mj‘a , θ
∗∗(a, j)}.
12However, the sign of this change is ambiguous, depending on the trade-off between the increase of
expected income and the reduction of expected working opportunities.
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After accepting the neighboring offer, workers have two alternatives. They can either work
as migrants (h = 1), pay a lump-sum cost cch=1(a, j), and become a native worker in
county j ′ or work as commuters (h = 0) and pay a recurring commuting cost cch=0(a, j).
I use cch(a, j) to represent the lump-sum equivalent cost. The choice-specific moving cost
cch(a, j) is a function of both the worker’s type and physical distance between counties, as
well as the cost differences of house renting between paired counties. Its exact parametric
form will be discussed in Section 1.4.1.
In additional to the moving cost cch(a, j), workers also receive an unobserved preference
shock εh. The workers thus choose their lowest cost mobility option, h(a, j):
h(a, j) =

0
1
if εa0 − cc0(a, j) > εa1 − cc1(a, j)
if εa0 − cc0(a, j) ≤ εa1 − cc1(a, j)
Assuming the preference shock εah follows an i.i.d. type I extreme value distribution with
a location parameter 0 and a common scale parameter σa, then the ex-ante expected cost
has the following analytic formula (Rust 1987):
c(a, j) = max{εa0 − cc0(a, j), εa1 − cc1(a, j)}
= σh log(
∑1
h=0 exp(−cch(a, j))/σa) + σaγ
The probability of each choice is specified as:
Ph(a, j) =
exp(−cch(a, j)/σa)
exp(−cc0(a, j)/σa) + exp(−cc1(a, j)/σa)
(1.6)
1.2.5. Worker’s optimal strategies
The worker’s optimal strategies consists of the local job taking strategies and sequential
strategies for the neighboring job offers. The local decision is fully described by the implicit
reservation matching quality θ∗(a, j), while the moving decisions are summarized by both
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the implicit mobility compatible matching quality θ∗∗(a, j) and migration/commuting choice
probability Ph(a, j).
Proposition 1. OPTIMAL STRATEGIES
For unemployed workers of type a in county j, the optimal strategy is:
• accept any local job with matching quality higher than max{θ∗(a, j), mja }
• accept any neighboring job with matching quality higher than max{θ∗∗(a, j), mj′a }
– with probability P1(a, j), the workers choose to commute
– with probability P0(a, j), the workers choose to migrate
In the last part of this section, I describe the fixed point equation system that is used to
solve for θ∗(a, j) and θ∗∗(a, j). By applying both the reservation matching quality θ∗(a, j)
and mobility compatible matching quality θ∗∗(a, j) to Equation 1.1, I get the following
system of equations:13
aθ∗(a, j) = abj︸︷︷︸
(1) Flow utility
+
λj
ρ+ηj
[I (θ∗(a, j) <
mj
a
)(mj − aθ∗(a, j))
(
G̃ (θ̂(a, j))− G̃ (
mj
a
)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(2) Local offer with wage mj
+
∫
max{θ̂(a,j),θ∗(a,j)}
aαj(θ − θ∗(a, j))dG (θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(3) Local offer with wage wj > mj
]
+
λj′
ρ+ηj′
[I(θ∗∗(a, j) <
mj ′
a
)(mj ′ − aθ∗(a, j ′))
(
G̃ (θ∗∗(a, j))− G̃ (
mj ′
a
)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(4) Neighbouring offer with wage mj′
+
∫
max{θ̂(a,j ′),θ∗∗(a,j)}
aαj(θ − θ∗(a, j ′))dG (θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(5) Neighbouring offer with wage wj′ > mj′
+
(
ρ+ ηj ′
)
(
a(θ∗(a, j)− θ∗(a, j ′))
ρ
+ c(a, j))G̃ (θ∗∗(a, j))︸ ︷︷ ︸
(6) The unemployed value difference between staying/moving
]
(1.7)
13The derivation of equation 1.7 can be found in Appendix 1.8.3
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with
θ̂(a, j) =
mj−(1−αj )aθ∗(a,j)
aαj
θ̂(a, j ′) =
mj′−(1−αj′ )aθ∗(a,j ′)
aαj′
θ∗∗ : Vu(a, j) + c(a, j) = Ve(θ
∗∗(a, j), a, j ′)
In equation 1.7, the value of the implicit matching quality aθ∗(a, j) consists of six compo-
nents: (1) the instant flow utility ab when unemployed; (2) the expected value associated
with a local offer with binding minimum wage mj ; (3) the expected value associated with
a local offer with wage wj > mj ; (4) the expected value associated with an acceptable
neighboring offer with binding minimum wage mj ′ ; (5) the expected value associated with
an acceptable neighboring offer with wage wj ′ > mj ′ ; (6) the unemployed utility difference
between staying and moving, which includes both the moving cost c(a, j) and the change of
the option value of being unemployed aθ∗(a, j)− aθ∗(a, j ′).
The intuition of equation 1.7 is straightforward. The value difference between accepting
the lowest acceptable job and remaining unemployed aθ∗(a, j)− abj reflects an opportunity
cost, which is perfectly compensated by the expected premium of finding a better job in the
future. This job could either be a local one or a neighboring one after paying the moving
cost c(a, j).
1.2.6. Endogenous contact rate
In this section I consider how the contact rates λj , j = 1, 2, are determined in general
equilibrium. I assume that firms randomly encounter workers with the same probability.
This assumption captures the idea that workers applying for the same position may have
different productivity but are easily to substitute with each other. I adapt the Mortensen
and Pissarides (1994) framework and allow firms to post vacancies Kj in county j with
constant marginal cost ψj which is open to all workers in both counties. The matching
technology is assumed to be constant returns to scale. Let N =
∑
a∈A(U(a, j) + U(a, j
′)) be
the number of all job seekers in the economy, where U(a, j) is the number of unemployed
workers with type a in county j . If the firms in county j creates Kj vacancies, then the total
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number of potential matches created in county j , Mj , is given by
Mj = N
ωjK
1−ωj
j
where ωj is the matching elasticity parameter in market j .
I use a Cobb-Douglas matching function with constant return to scale and total factor pro-
ductivity equal to 1. It then only requires one parameter ωj to characterize the heterogeneity
of matching functions in each local labor market j .
The contact rate per job in county j , qj(kj), can be represented as:
qj(kj) = k
ωj
j
where kj =
N
Kj
captures the market tightness. The correlation between market tightness
and job arrival probability λj is
λj = kj(Kj ,N)
ωj−1 (1.8)
It is important to emphasize that although workers in both counties have the exact same
opportunities to meet with the same firm, their willingness to accept the same job is different
due to moving costs. For workers living in the neighboring county, they are more picky about
neighboring jobs because the job premium has to compensate for the additional moving cost.
The total number of matches created by the firms in county j is:
Total Hires =
Mj
N
∑
a∈A
U(a, j)G (max{θ∗(a, j), mja })︸ ︷︷ ︸
Local Hires
+U(a, j ′)G
(
max{θ∗∗(a, j ′),
mj
a
}
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Neighboring Hires

The firm’s value of a match can be represented as:
Vf (θ, a, j) =
aθ − w(a, θ, j)
ρ+ ηj
(1.9)
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The expected value of creating a vacancy for firms Vv in county j is:
Vv = −ψj +
kj(Kj ,N)
ωi
N
∑
a∈A
U(a, j)
∫
max{θ∗(a,j),
mj
a
}
Vf (θ, a, j)dG(θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Profit from local workers
+U(a, j ′)
∫
max{θ∗∗(a,j′),
mj
a
}
Vf (θ, a, j)dG(θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Profit from neighboring workers

Assuming each county has a population of potential entrants with an outside option equal
to 0, firms will continue to create vacancies until the expected profit is equal to 0, Vv = 0.
Under the free entry condition (FEC), the endogenous contact rate is determinate by the
following equation
ψj =
kj(Kj ,N)
ωi
N
∑
a∈A
[
U(a, j)
∫
max{θ∗(a,j),
mj
a
}
Vf (θ, a, j)dG(θ) + U(a, j
′)
∫
max{θ∗∗(a,j′),
mj
a
}
Vf (θ, a, j)dG(θ)
]
(1.10)
1.2.7. Definition of a steady-state spatial equilibrium
Let θ ∈ R+, a ∈ A = {a1, a2, ..., an}, j ∈ J = {1, 2}, and let S1 = R+ × A × J and
S2 = A× J. Let B(R+) be the Borel σ−algebra of R+ and P(A), P(J) the power sets of A
and J, respectively. Let ℵ = B(R+)×P(A)×P(J), and M be the set of all finite measures
over the measurable space (S1,ℵ)
Definition 1.2.1. A steady-state spatial equilibrium is a set of individual functions for
workers Vu : S1 → R+ and Ve , θ∗, θ∗∗,Ph : S2 → R+, a set of the functions for firms
Vf : S1 → R+ and {Kj}j=1,2, a set of contact rates {λj}j=1,2 and wage rates w : S1 → R+
and a set of aggregate measures of different working status U, L,M : S2→ R+, the following
conditions hold:
1. Worker’s problem: given the contact rate, wage and initial condition, Vu and Ve are
the solutions of Eqs. 1.1 and 1.2, respectively. The optimal strategies θ∗, θ∗∗ are
described in Proposition 1 and {Ph}h=0,1 are described in Eq. 1.6. The functions
{Vu,Ve , θ∗, θ∗∗,Ph} are measurable with respect to ℵ.
2. Firm’s problem: given the contact rate, wage and initial condition, Vf is solved by
Eq. 1.9 and Kj is solved by Eq. 1.10.
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3. The bargained wage: the bargained wage with a minimum wage constraint is defined
by Eqs. 1.4 and 1.5.
4. Endogenous contact rate (labor market clear): the contact rate λj is solved by Eq.
1.8.
5. The aggregate measures of working status keep constant
λj
(
U(a, j)G̃(max{θ∗(a, j), mj
a
}) + U(a, j ′)P0(a, j ′)G̃(max{θ∗∗(a, j ′),
mj
a
})
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Inflow to L
= L(a, j)ηj︸ ︷︷ ︸
Outflow from L
U(a, j)
(
λj G̃(max{θ∗(a, j),
mj
a
}) + λj′ G̃(max{θ∗∗(a, j),
mj′
a
})
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Outflow from U
= L(a, j)ηj + M(a, j)ηj′︸ ︷︷ ︸
Inflow into U
λjU(a, j
′)P1(a, j
′)G̃(max{θ∗∗(a, j ′), mj
a
}))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Inflow to M
= M(a, j)ηj︸ ︷︷ ︸
Outflow from M
1.3. Data and descriptive statistics
This paper primarily uses two data sets: the Quarterly Workforce Indicators (QWI) for local
labor market information and the American Community Survey (ACS) for labor mobility
information. QWI provides the number of job stocks and flows, and average earnings
by industry, worker demographics, employer age, and size. The QWI comes from the
Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) linked employer-employee micro data,
which are collected through a unique federal-state sharing collaboration between the U.S.
Census Bureau and state labor market agencies.14 Compared to the CPS and JOLTS, the
QWI has near-universal worker-employer paired information, covering 96% of all private-
sector jobs. Second, QWI provides worker-side demographic information such as age, sex,
race/ethnicity, and education.15 This feature allows me to analyze the demographics of
a particular industry or specific local market.16 Lastly, QWI has labor flow information,
14Data for Massachusetts, Puerto Rico, and the US Virgin Islands are still under development.
15Workers are identified by their Social Security number and linked with a variety of sources, including the
2000 Census, Social Security Administrative records, and individual tax returns to get their demographic
information.
16While CPS contains similar information based-on household surveys, it generates small sample sizes
when analyzing individual industries or areas.
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including hires, separations, and turnovers, which are important because the direct impacts
of minimum wage hikes are on job turnovers rather than employment stocks.17I focus on
2005-2015 primarily because the states missing from QWI before 2005 are not random -
smaller states are under-represented. By 2005, all states except Massachusetts have joined
the QWI program.18
In addition to QWI data, I also use the ACS from 2005-2015 to identify the commuting
and migration flows between different jurisdictions.19 Commuters are defined as people
whose place of work is different from their place of residence, while migrants are defined as
those who have changed their place of residence in the past year, according to the ACS. The
basic geographic units in the ACS are “Public Use Micro Areas”(PUMAs) which are special
non-overlapping areas that partition each state into contiguous geographic units containing
between 100,000 to 300,000 residents. There were a total of 2,071 PUMAs in the 2000
census.
1.3.1. Contiguous border county pairs and their associated geographic minimum wage vari-
ations
Following the contiguous county-pair design proposed by Dube et al. (2010, 2016), I divide
all counties in the U.S. into two sub-samples: counties that border another state (border
counties), and counties that do not (interior counties). Out of 3,124 counties, 1,139 counties
are border counties and I construct 1,181 unique pairs.20 Figure 1 shows the locations of all
counties along with their associated minimum wage policies. Between 2005 and 2015, there
were 332 minimum wage adjustments (see 13 for details of minimum wage policies). While
78 changes are driven by the federal minimum wage law, the Fair Minimum Wage Act of
2007,21 the other 164 events were due to state ordinances. Two observations are highlighted
17See Dube et al. (2010, 2016) for detailed discussions.
18Massachusetts does not join the QWI until 2010.
19I combine the 2005-2007, 2008-2010, and 2011-2015 ACS.
20Counties may border more than one county in the adjacent state, resulting in more pairs than border
counties.
21The Act raised the federal minimum wage in three stages: to $5.85 60 days after enactment (2007-07-24),
to $6.55 one year after that (2008-07-24), then finally to $7.25 one year after that (2009-07-24).
18
Figure 1: Frequency of Minimum Wage Adjustments for Border Counties (2005-2015)
Border counties (Obs: 1139)
Times of minimum wage changes during year 05−15
Change 11 or 12 times (3.92%)
Change 9 or 10 times (11.76%)
Change 7 or 8 times (5.88%)
Change 5 or 6 times (31.38%)
Change 3 or 4 times (47.06%)
 
Interior states (Obs: 1971)
on the map. First, border counties frequently adjust their minimum wages. Between 2005
and 2015, all counties (except for those in Iowa) changed their local minimum wage at least
three times, which gives me adequate variation to identify the effects of minimum wage
hikes. Second, western counties are larger than other counties. Thus, the workers in those
counties may suffer higher moving costs when working in a neighboring county.
In a given year, about half of the county pairs have different minimum wages. These differ-
ences average about 10%, but there is substantial heterogeneity across years (see Table 1).
Overall, the substantial variation between county minimum wages is useful for identifying
the effect of minimum wage hikes.
1.3.2. Migration and commuting flows
I use the American Community Survey (ACS) Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) data
between 2005-2015 to distinguish commuters and migrants. Each respondent provides infor-
mation about their place of residence one year ago, their current residence, and their current
working address. To perform policy analysis, I convert PUMAs into pseudo-counties using
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Table 1: Differences in County Pair Minimum Wages (2005-2015)
Year Share of pairs with Percent difference
minimum wages in minimum wages
differential
2005 27.6% 18.6%
2006 33.6% 19.1%
2007 66.0% 15.6%
2008 63.7% 11.1%
2009 52.2% 8.7%
2010 31.8% 5.8%
2011 36.2% 6.0%
2012 37.8% 7.7%
2013 44.1% 7.4%
2014 49.0% 8.6%
2015 68.5% 9.4%
Average 46.4% 10.7%
the Michigan Population Studies Center PUMA-to-County crosswalk.22
To construct a sample of workers most sensitive to minimum wage changes, I restrict my
sample to individuals between 16 and 30 that live in the continental U.S. and are not
currently in the military. I divide this sample into two groups based on education: the low
educated group (high school dropouts group) and the high educated group (the high school
graduates and above). These restrictions are commonly used in the literature because young
people and least-educated people are more likely to be minimum wage workers (Deere et al.
(1995); Burkhauser et al. (2000); Neumark (2001)). If the minimum wage effect is not
significant for this group, then it is unlikely to be significant for other groups.
Local governments prioritize their residents over residents of neighboring counties and as
a result, I carefully distinguish between migrants (who have moved out of a county) and
commuters (who might work in neighboring counties). Descriptive statistics for both com-
muting outflows to other states and migration inflows from other states are provided in
22I do this for two reasons. First, since PUMAs are population-based, they are not natural jurisdictions
for local policy analysis. In urban areas, a single county may contain multiple PUMAs. For example, Los
Angeles County, California is comprised of 35 PUMAs. Likewise, a PUMA will consist of several counties
in less population areas. Second, I want to match the ACS to county-based statistics from the QWI. See
Appendix 1.10.2 and http://www.psc.isr.umich.edu/dis/census/Features/puma2cnty/for details.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics of Migrants and Commuters (2005-2015)
Interior counties Border counties Difference
Count Rate Count Rate Count Rate
ALL workers
Migrants Mean 231 0.040 266 0.051 35.0 0.011
S.D. 749 0.038 829 0.047 (8.96) (0.0005)
Commuters Mean 44.9 0.019 210 0.066 165 0.047
S.D. 138 0.078 718 0.127 (6.48) (0.0013)
Low educated group
Migrants Mean 28.5 0.024 31.5 0.030 3.00 0.006
S.D. 95.4 0.033 87.2 0.040 (1.01) (0.0004)
Commuters Mean 4.49 0.021 20.1 0.047 15.6 0.026
S.D. 20.2 0.090 74.7 0.118 (0.681) (0.0012)
High educated group
Migrants Mean 203 0.045 235 0.058 22.0 0.013
S.D. 674 0.043 770 0.053 (8.25) (0.0005)
Commuters Mean 40.4 0.031 189 0.070 149 0.039
S.D. 125 0.097 656 0.130 (5.92) (0.0013)
Observation 22,033 12,518
Data Source: ACS. Note: All statistics are reported at the county level. The count of migrations reports the number
of individuals in each county whose place of residence last year differs from the place this year. The rate (a value
between 0 and 1) is the percent of migrants in the local population. The count of commuters is the total number of
workers whose state of work differs from the state of current residence. The rate (a value between 0 and 1) represents
the percent of these commuters among the people who are currently in the labor force. Difference is border minus
interior. * for 10%. ** for 5%, and *** for 1%.
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Table 2.23 Migrants are defined as individuals whose county of residence last year differs
from their current county of residence. Commuters are defined as workers whose state of
work differs from their state of residence. The rate (a value between 0 and 1) represents the
share of commuters in the labor force. All statistics are on county-level and are grouped
by whether they are border or interior counties. Border counties have higher migration and
commuting rates, likely because commuting and moving costs are lower (See Table 2)
I further estimates some regression models to explore how migration flows and commuting
flows respond to the local minimum wage hikes. The results suggest that low educated
workers tend to move away from rather than move towards counties with minimum wage
increases, either by commuting or migration. In contrast, the high educated workers, who
are served as the control group, are less responsive to the minimum wage changes. And
these mobility patterns are robust to the following sensitivity analysis: (1) use alternative
migration flows based on addresses on the income tax returns provided by the Internal Rev-
enue Service (IRS); (2) using only the minimum wage changes caused by federal minimum
wage laws; (3) restricting to county pairs whose centriods are within 75 kilometers. The
detailed regression results are reported in Table 11 in Appendix 1.9.1.
1.3.3. Local labor market outcomes
From the QWI, I extract four quarterly variables: average monthly earnings, employment,
hire rates, and separation rates. To make the QWI sample comparable to the ACS sam-
ple, I restrict worker’s age to be between 19-34.24 Labor force participation is extracted
independently from the ACS. Overall, border and interior counties are similar across labor
market statistics (Table 3).
23The other two potential measures of labor mobility patterns are commuting inflows and migrating
outflows. They are in principle able to be calculated by summarizing all workers who migrate from/commute
into the targeted PUMA in the sample. However, this calculation suffers from serious measurement error
because the migrants from the particular PUMA and the commuters working in the particular PUMA are
a small minority in other PUMAs and thus unlikely to be sampled.
24The division of age groups in QWI are 19-21, 22-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, and 65-99. To match
with the selected ACS sample whose ages are between 16-30, I combine the first four age spans 14-18, 19-21,
22-24, and 25-34.
22
Table 3: County-Level Labor Market Summary Statistics (2005-2015)
Interior counties Border counties
Mean SD Mean SD
Monthly earnings 1932 739 1930 739
Employment 14883 54878 13045 45968
Separation rates 0.299 0.111 0.301 0.103
Hire rates 0.326 0.171 0.326 0.128
Labor force participation rate
All 0.618 0.199 0.623 0.197
High educated 0.701 0.222 0.704 0.219
Low educated 0.394 0.161 0.399 0.162
Note: All statistics are quarterly and from Quarterly Workforce Indicators except labor force
participation, which is from the American Community Survey. Monthly earnings are in nom-
inal dollars.
In Appendix 1.9.1, I estimates a regression models following Dube et al. (2007) and Dube
et al. (2016) to examine the magnitude of disemployment in response to minimum wage
increases. When using a common time fixed effect in column (1) in Table 11, the estimated
disemployment elasticity is -0.068. However, this disemployment effect shrinks to -0.039 in
column (2) when I replace the common time fixed effect with a pair-specific time fixed effect
as the control. I attribute this change to the existence of spatial spillover effect. After the
local county increases its own minimum wage, unemployed workers may seek their jobs in the
neighboring county (either by migration or by commuting), which causes disemployment in
the neighboring county. As a result, this spillover effect generates a common trend between
counties in one pair. When this pair-specific co-movement is controlled by the pair-specific
time effect, the estimates of local disemployment effect become less substantial.
1.4. Estimation strategy
1.4.1. Parametrization
To estimate the model, I need to make parametric assumptions for the types and moving
costs. To be consistent with the data, I assume workers are of two types: ah and al . High
type workers are workers with high school diplomas and above while low type workers are
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high school dropouts. The proportion of these two types of workers are ph and pl .
I assume moving costs depend on a linear combination of worker’s type a, the physical
distance djj ′ as well as the amenity difference γj − γj ′ between the two counties.
cch(a, j) =

β0j + β0ddjj ′ + β0aI (a = ah) + β0γ(γj − γj ′)
β1j + β1ddjj ′ + β1aI (a = ah) + β1γ(γj − γj ′)
if h = 0
if h = 1
(1.11)
Equation 1.11 follows the standard gravity equation for migration. βhj measures the relative
openness of labor market j , which is county-specific and differs by the mobility choice h.
The different impacts of distance on migrants and commuters are captured by β0d and
β1d .
25 I also assume the moving costs to be differ by types a. The coefficientsβ0a and β1a
represent the additional costs paid by high type workers. Lastly, I attribute the asymmetry
between the cost cch(a, j) and the cost cch(a, j
′) to different housing rental prices γj and γj ′ ,
which are proxies of local living cost.
Assuming parametric distribution for matching quality is necessary for identification pur-
poses. As Flinn and Heckman (1982), only a certain class of distributions satisfies the
“recovery condition” necessary for identification. Following Flinn (2006) and Flinn and
Mullins (2015), I assume the matching quality distribution G (θ) follows a log-normal distri-
bution. Given the above assumptions, the economy is characterized by the vector S which
combines a set of general parameters and a set of county-specific parameters.
S = {ρ,µG ,σG , ah, al ,β0d ,β0a,β0r ,β1d ,β1a,β1γ ,σ0,σ1} General⋃
{mj(n), bj(n), ηj(n),ψj(n),αj(n),ωj(n), γj(n), djj′(n),β0j(n),β1j(n), ph(n), pl(n)}(j ,n)∈{1,2}×N County
The county-pair specific parameters are unique for every n ∈ N, while the general param-
eters are shared by all counties. Although the general parameters simplify the estimation,
the model remains computationally demanding if the county-pair specific parameters are
recovered non-parametrically. For tractability, I impose random coefficient assumptions the
25While the distance between centroids is only a proxy for the real commuting time between two counties,
some evidence shows the correlation between these two measures is quite high (Phibbs and Luft (1995);Boscoe
et al. (2012)).
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unobserved county-specific variables sj(n) ∈ {bj(n),ψj(n),β0j(n),β1j(n)}.26 Given the close
connection between the paired counties, I draw s1(n) and s2(n) from a multivariate normal
distribution modeled for each sj(n) ∈ {bj(n),ψj(n),β0j(n),β1j(n)}:
 xs1
xs2
 ∼ N

 µs
µs
 ,
 σ2s1 ρsσs1σs2
ρsσs1σs2 σ
2
s2


where the correlation ρs captures the similarity between these two counties. The random
variables sj(n), j = 1, 2 are the mapping from the n − th draw of the following one-to-one
mapping F (which is 6×1),
 b1
b2
 ∼ N

 µb
µb
 ,
 σ2b ρbσ2b
ρbσ
2
b σ
2
b

 logψ1
logψ2
 ∼ N

 µψ
µψ
 ,
 σ2ψ ρψσ2ψ
ρψσ
2
ψ σ
2
ψ

 β0
β1
 ∼ N

 µβ0
µβ1
 ,
 σ2β0 ρβσβ0σβ1
ρβσβ0σβ1 σ
2
β1


Thus, the joint distributions of these six variables are fully characterized by 11 parame-
ters: 4 means, µs ; 4 variances, σ
2
s ; and 3 correlations, ρs . These parameters (µs ,σs , ρs : s ∈
{b,ψ,β0,β1}), in addition to those general parameters {ρ,µG ,σG , ah, al ,β0d ,β0a,β0r ,β1d ,β1a,β1γ ,σ0,σ1},
constitute the primitive parameters Ω of the model.
1.4.2. The method of simulated moments
My model is estimated by the method of simulated moments (MSM). When combining mo-
ments from multiple databases, MSM is a more natural estimation approach than maximum
likelihood estimation (MLE).
Given Ω, I draw the unobserved variables
{
brj ,ψ
r
j ,β
r
0j ,β
r
1j
}
j=1,2 R times from the distri-
26The other county-specific parameters {mj(n),αj(n), γj(n), ηj(n), djj′(n), ph(n), pl(n)} j=1,2 are directly ob-
served in the data.
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butions of F for each county pair n. Combined with other observed county-level variables{
mj(n),αj(n), γj(n), ηj(n), djj ′(n), ph(n), pl(n)
}
j=1,2 and general parameters {ρ,µG ,σG , ah, al ,
β0d ,β0a,β0r ,β1d ,β1a,β1γ ,σ0,σ1}, I then compute the vector of moments M̃N,R(Ω) from the
simulation. Model parameters are estimated by minimizing the weighted difference between
those simulated moments M̃N,R(Ω) and the actual data moments MN , using the following
quadratic distance function
Ω̂N,R,W = arg min
Ω
(
(MN − M̃N,R(Ω))′WN(MN − M̃N,R(Ω))
)
where MN denotes the data moments for all county pairs in the data set, and M̃N,R(Ω)
represents the simulated moment evaluated at Ω based on R simulations of N county pairs.
WN is a symmetric, positive-definite weight matrix constructed using the resampling method
of Del Boca et al. (2014). In particular, the resampled moment vector MgN , g = 1, ...,Q is
calculated by bootstrapping the original data Q times.27 Then, the weight matrix is the
inverse of the covariance matrix of MN :
Wn = Q
−1
 Q∑
g=1
(MgN −MN)(M
g
N −MN)
−1
Del Boca et al. (2014) show the consistency of this type of estimator for large simulations,
plimR→∞M̃N,R(Ω0) = MN(Ω0).
28 Given identification and these regularity conditions,
plimN→∞plimR→∞Ω̂N,R,W = Ω for any positive definite W
1.4.3. Identification and selection of moments
My model is not nonparametrically identified, for reasons related to those given in Flinn and
Heckman (1982) and Flinn (2006). However, it is useful to briefly discuss the identification
27In practice, I set Q equal to 200.
28Compared with directly calculating the optimal weighting matrix, this method simplifies computation
significantly. Altonji and Segal (1996) discuss that gains from using an optimal weighting matrix may be
limited.
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in the model of Flinn (2006) given its close relationship with this paper. The model in Flinn
(2006) can be regarded as a special case of my model when there is only one type of worker
(al = ah), one pair of counties and no labor mobility (M(a, j) = 0). The only job search
decision for the worker is θ∗. Even in this specific case, the model is still unidentified because
accepted wage and duration information is not enough for nonparametric identification. He
further shows that a center class of parametric distributional assumption G , referred to as
the “recoverability condition”, is required.29 In my model, given the assumed log-normal
distribution of matching quality, all parameters are identified except for the set of discount
factor and unemployment utility(ρ, b) because those parameters enter into the likelihood
function through the critical value θ∗. Parameters b, η,G ,λ will be identified given a fixed
value of discount factorρ. Although I use the moments-based estimator rather than the
likelihood-based estimator in Flinn (2006), their identification argument can be carried
over in this paper given the same log-normal distribution assumption of θ and ex-ante fixed
value of ρ.30
This paper extends Flinn (2006) in two dimensions by incorporating multiple worker types
and multiple connected markets. As a result, instead of one critical value θ∗, individuals
make two optimal decisions: accept local offer if θ ≥ θ∗(a, j) and accept neighboring offer
if θ ≥ θ∗∗(a, j). Now I focus my attention on the log-wage distribution in one local county
j . There are four different group of workers: high type natives, low type natives, high
type movers, and low type movers. Given Equation 1.3, the log-wage distribution of local
workers and the distribution of mobile workers only differ in the truncated values of their
distributions. Besides the truncated log normal distribution, there is also a mass point as
the left end at value mj when the minimum wage is binding. As a result, the log wage
distribution R should be a left truncated normal distribution with a potential mass point
at its left end. We use R0 to represent the distribution for natives and R1 to represent the
29A comprehensive discussion about this “recoverability condition” can be found in Flinn and Heckman
(1982).
30The identification depends on the proper selection of moments to characterize the wage distribution. I
discuss this in Table 4.
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distribution for movers.
Natives logw(θ, a, j) ∼ R0(logw ; a,µθ,σθ,αj ,mj , θ∗)
Movers logw(θ, a, j) ∼ R1(logw ; a,µθ,σθ,αj ,mj , θ∗, θ∗∗)
Since the fractions of local workers L(a, j) and Mobile workers M(a, j) are observed for the
four groups of workers, it is straightforward to verify that the parameters µθ,σθ, al , ah,αj , θ
∗
are identified directly. To identify θ∗∗, one additional support condition θ∗∗(a, j) >
mj
a should
be satisfied. Otherwise, the mobile worker’s wage distribution R1 would be identical to local
workers’ wage distribution, leaving θ∗∗(a, j) unidentified.
Therefore, I use the fraction of movers Fr , to help identify θ∗∗(a, j) as well as the moving
cost term c(a, j). First of all, I note that
Fr(a, j) =
G̃ (max{θ∗∗(a, j), mj′a })
G̃ (max{θ∗(a, j), mja })
Given that G̃ and θ∗(a, j) are already identified, the critical value θ∗∗(a, j) is identified
directly from the observed Fr(a, j).31 Moving costs can then be backed out from the following
one-to-one mapping:
c(a, j) =
αj ′a(θ
∗∗(a, j)− θ∗(a, j ′))
ρ+ ηj ′
+
a(θ∗(a, j ′)− θ∗(a, j))
ρ
Given the identified c(a, j) and observed migration/commuting choices P0(a, j) and P1(a, j),
the choice-specific moving cost cc0(a, j) and cc1(a, j) are identified by the logit assumption
of equation 1.11.
Althrough the bargaining power αj can be identified from R0 and R1, Flinn (2006) uses
a Monte Carlo experiment to show its practical power is tenuous. Because of this, I use
the average payroll share of firms’ expenditures from the Economy Wide Key Statistics
(EWKS), which is the U.S. government’s official five-year measure of American business
31θ∗∗(a, j) is potentially not identified when Fr(a, j) > 1, which means the number of movers are larger
than the number is local workers. However, this situation rarely happens empirically.
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and the economy. This payroll share is calculated at the county level and provides cross-
sectional variation of the labor share αj .
The identification of the vacancy cost ψj follows from Equation 1.10 as long as the matching
technology ωj is known. Flinn (2006) uses multiple cross sections with different minimum
wages to identify ωj based on the assumption that the economy is in a steady-state in both
measurements and the vacancy cost is constant.32 In this paper, I use a market tightness
index (job demand/labor supply) constructed from the Conference Board Help Wanted
OnLine (HWOL) data, which is widely used in the macroeconomic literature as a direct
measure of matching technology that does not impose any additional assumptions.3334
Table 4 summarizes the empirical moments used to identify the model parameters.
1.4.4. Model fit
My model reproduces many features of the data (Table 5). It predicts a higher employment
rate and higher average hourly wage for high-type workers compared with those for low-
type workers. The fraction of migrants for both low-type workers and high-type workers
are also well matched. Although the fraction of high-type commuters is almost perfectly
predicted, the fraction of low-type commuters is over-predicted. My model also correctly
predicts the correlation between labor mobility patterns and the geographic characteris-
tics (rent prices and physical distance between paired counties). My model replicates the
negative correlation between mobility rates and housing prices. I observe low numbers of
migrants and commuters in counties with relatively high rental prices. On the other hand,
both simulation and data find a positive correlation between migration and distance but a
negative correlation between commuting and distance.
32See the discussion of Condition C-Coherency in Flinn (2006) for more details.
33Beginning in 2005, HWOL provides a monthly series that covers the universe of vacancies advertised on
about 16,000 online job boards and online newspaper editions. While HWOL only collects the job openings
advertised online, its pattern is quite similar with the general pattern measured by JOLTS, especially before
2013. A detailed comparison between HWOL and JOLTS can be found in Şahin et al. (2014).
34See Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) for a survey of these studies.
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Table 4: Selection of Moments
Empirical moments County j County j ′ Identified
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Parameters
Moments from mean and S.D. in county pair p(j , j ′)
Employment rate (high type) 0.881 0.083 0.886 0.078 µb,σb,µψ,σψ
Employment rate (low type) 0.785 0.127 0.761 0.127 µb,σb,µψ,σψ
Average hourly wage (high type) 13.63 2.47 - - µb,σb, ah,µG ,σG
Average hourly wage (low type) 9.23 2.57 - - µb,σb, al ,µG ,σG
Proportion of migrants (high type) 0.073 0.050 0.070 0.046 µβ0,σβ0,β0a
Proportion of migrants (low type) 0.042 0.037 0.037 0.039 µβ0,σβ0,β0a
Proportion of commuters (high type) 0.113 0.127 0.096 0.106 µβ1,σβ1,β1a
Proportion of commuters (low type) 0.084 0.102 0.072 0.091 µβ1,σβ1,β1a
Correlation between migrants and commuters 0.630 - 0.523 - ρβ
Correlation between migrants and distance 0.149 - 0.014 - β0d
Correlation between commuters and distance 0.008 - -0.168 - β1d
Correlation between migrants and rent cost -0.103 - -0.056 - β0γ
Correlation between commuters and rent cost -0.116 - -0.110 - β1γ
Correlation between migrants and rent cost
Correlation between employments (high type) 0.318 - - - ρb, ρψ
Correlation between employments (low type) 0.211 - - - ρb, ρψ
Correlation between separation rate 0.599 - - - ρψ
Correlation between wage rate 0.498 - - - ρb, ρψ
Moments directly measure parameter values
Separation rates in county j(quarterly) 0.353 0.130 0.358 0.132 ηj
Bargaining power αj in county j 0.311 0.044 0.310 0.043 αj
Matching technology ωj in state s(j) 1.36 0.385 1.41 0.406 ωj
Centroid distance djj′ between j and j
′ 66.6 45.9 66.6 45.9 djj ′
The median rent cost (local amenity γj) in j 683 168 683 178 γj
Note: (i) For details about the construction of the empirical moments, see Appendix 1.10. (ii) County j represents
the county which increases its minimum wage, while county j ′ is the county keeps the minimum wage fixed.
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Table 5: Model fit
Empirical moments County 1 County 2
Data Sim Data Sim
Employment rate (high type) 0.883 0.829 0.888 0.827
Employment rate (low type) 0.754 0.789 0.765 0.786
Hire rate 0.375 0.354 0.361 0.348
Average hourly wage (high type) 13.630 13.385 - -
Average hourly wage (low type) 9.230 9.156 9.230 9.156
Proportion of migrants (high type) 0.074 0.075 0.069 0.070
Proportion of migrants (low type) 0.043 0.047 0.038 0.045
Proportion of commuters (high type) 0.109 0.114 0.094 0.107
Proportion of commuters (low type) 0.082 0.143 0.071 0.131
Correlation between migrants and commuters 0.612 0.695 0.510 0.732
Correlation between migrants and distance 0.123 0.079 0.066 0.031
Correlation between commuters and distance -0.079 -0.011 -0.155 -0.071
Correlation between migrants and rent cost -0.101 -0.069 -0.063 -0.103
Correlation between migrants and rent cost -0.099 -0.029 -0.098 0.011
1.5. Estimation results
In this section, I present the parameter estimates and discuss their magnitudes. I then
compare the elasticities of migrants and comments with respect to minimum wage changes
predicted by the model with the elasticities estimated in the previous regressions. Finally, I
quantify the downward bias in the estimation of disemployment effect when ignoring labor
mobility.
1.5.1. Understanding the model estimates
Table 46 provides model estimates for both the general parameters and the parameters in
the moving equation (Equation 1.11). The estimated value of unemployment,
(
bj , bj ′
)
, is
relatively homogeneous across counties. However, the vacancy cost ψ displays considerable
heterogeneity across counties. Its mean value is 428, which is equivalent to $68,480 if the
filled worker is required to work 160 hours/month. Furthermore, the large standard error
suggests substantial spatial diversification in vacancy costs. In addition, I find the pro-
ductivity of high educated workers is on average significantly higher than the productivity
of low educated workers (ah = 3.106 vs. al = 1.406). When comparing mobility costs,
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Table 6: Parameter estimates
General parameters
Parameters Notation Mean µ S.D. σ Corr. τ
Matching quality θ 1.963 0.162 -
Unemployed flow utility b -23.8 0.123 0.949
Vacancy cost ψ 428 211 0.196
High type productivity ah 3.106 - -
Low type productivity al 1.406 - -
Commuting cost β0 48.5 1.217 0.458
Migration cost β1 78.4 9.709
Coefficients in equation cch(a, j)
Commuting (h = 0) Migration (h = 1)
Additional cost for high type β0a 2.222 β1a -4.927
Coefficient for different local amenity β0γ 2.884 β1γ 7.709
Coefficient for different distance β0d 0.697 β1d -2.051
Scale of preference shock (low type) σl 15.0
Scale of preference shock (high type) σh 25.0
migrating is more costly (β1 = 78.4) than commuting (β0 = 48.5), which explains why the
fraction of commuters is on average larger than the fraction of migrants.
The lower panel in Table 46 reports the the determinants of choice-specific moving costs
cch(a, j). The positive sign of β0a and negative sign of β1a indicate that, compared to low
educated workers, high educated workers are more likely to migrate when accepting the
job offers from a neighboring county. These two coefficients rationalize the observation that
when looking at commuting behavior, 40% of high educated workers are commuters whereas
only 34% of low educated workers are commuters. The next two coefficients, β0γ and β1γ
link the moving cost with the local housing rental price, which is regarded as a proxy of local
amenities . The positive values of β0γ and β1γ mean that high housing costs are associated
with high moving costs. Workers are less likely to take neighboring jobs when the housing
price in neighboring county is high. Even accepting the neighboring jobs, the mobile workers
are less likely to choose migration as their preferred moving option. The coefficients β0d and
β1d capture the correction between physical distance and moving cost. The positive sign
of β0d and negative sign of β1d reflects the pattern that more mobile workers would choose
migration over commuting as county pairs are farther apart. Lastly, the scale parameters
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Table 7: Moving costs and neighboring county preference
Lump-sum ex-ante moving cost (unit: $) Indifferent opportunity
Low educated High educated Low educated High educated
County j County j ′ County j County j ′ County j County j ′ County j County j ′
10th 7,749 7,773 7,648 7,626 0.010 0.008 0.022 0.014
25th 8,400 8,286 8,602 8,459 0.047 0.036 0.092 0.067
Median 8,794 8,760 9,262 9,210 0.222 0.181 0.229 0.211
75th 9,194 9,109 9,818 9,741 0.880 0.823 0.561 0.495
90th 9,691 9,544 10,410 10,365 1.023 1.018 0.997 0.974
Mean 8,693 8,683 9,098 9,067 0.407 0.373 0.367 0.336
SD 1,046 931 1,330 1,242 0.405 0.402 0.351 0.333
Note: the dollar value of ex-ante moving cost c(a, j) is estimated based on a representative full time worker
whose working time is 160 hours/month.
for low-educated workers is smaller than that for high educated workers.
Table 7 reports the distributions of moving costs. The left panel displays summary statistics
of the ex-ante moving costs c(a, j) for workers differentiated in their types and locations.
According to my estimates, the ex-ante moving cost is on average $8,700 for low type workers
and $9,100 for high type workers. These costs are summary statistics of relocation costs,
housing market transaction costs (for migrants only) and psychic costs.(Schwartz (1973),
Greenwood (1975)) The estimated moving costs are lower than previous ones reported in
the literature. For example, Kennan and Walker (2011) estimate a moving cost value of
$312,000 for an average movers across states in the US. And Schmutz and Sidibe (2016) find
the average moving cost among French cities is around e 15,000. The moving costs in my
paper are lower for two reasons: first, I focus on the migration/commuting flows between two
contiguous counties. The geographic proximity could greatly reduce the potential moving
costs. Secondly. I focus on younger workers who are more likely to be affected by minimum
wages. The opportunity costs of moving for those workers are relatively low.
Moreover, the moving cost can be equivalently measured using the openness of the local
labor market. The right panel illustrates this idea and calculates the possibility that a
random job from a neighboring county is preferred to a random job from the local county.
The probability distribution for low type workers are less diversified than that for high
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type workers. The probability of preferring a neighboring county ranges from 0.010 (the
10th percentile) to 1.023 (the 90th percentile) for low educated workers in county j ; this
probability shrinks to a range of 0.020 (the 10th percentile) to 0.997 (the 90th percentile) for
high educated workers. I also find this distribution is right skewed. In the median county,
the probability for a low-skilled worker to receive a preferred job from neighboring county
is 22.2%. This effect is comparable to the results of Manning and Petrongolo (2017). Using
UK data, they find that the probability of a random job 5km distant being preferred to
random local job is only 19%.
1.5.2. Out-of-sample validation: comparing model-based predictions with regression results
In this section, I use the model to predict the minimum wage elasticities of commuters
and migrants and then compare the predicted elasticities to actual elasticities estimated
by regression 1.14. This comparison is treated as an extra out-of-sample validation since
the elasticities of commuters and migrants with respect to minimum wage are not used as
targeted moments when estimating the baseline model.
Given county specific parameters and local minimum wage levels, the model allows me to
calculate the fraction of migrants and commuters in each county . Specifically, the fraction
of migrants in county j given minimum wage pair MI (a, j ;mj ,mj ′) is expressed as the number
of migrants from county j ′ to county j , divided by the sum of local hires in county j , and
total mobile hires from county j ′, i.e.
MI (a, j ;mj ,mj ′) =
P1(a, j
′)U(a, j ′)G̃ (max{θ∗∗(a, j ′), mja })
U(a, j)G̃ (max{θ∗(a, j ′), mja }) + U(a, j ′)G̃ (max{θ∗∗(a, j ′),
mj
a })
Meanwhile, the fraction of commuters in county j given the local minimum wage pair
CM(a, j ;mj ,mj ′) is given by the total number of commuters from county j , divided by the
sum of local hires in county j ′ and all mobile workers (both commuters and migrants) from
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county j , i.e.
CM(a, j ;mj ,mj ′) =
P0(a, j)U(a, j)G̃ (max{θ∗∗(a, j),
mj′
a })
U(a, j ′)G̃ (max{θ∗(a, j ′), mj′a }) + U(a, j)G̃ (max{θ∗∗(a, j),
mj′
a })
When the minimum wage in county j increases from mj to mj + ∆mj but the minimum
wage in county j ′ remains unchanged, I calculate new fractions of commuters CM(a, j ;mj +
∆mj ,mj ′) and migrants MI (a, j ;mj ,mj ′) in the new steady-state. The percentage changes
in labor mobility are defined as:
∆ logMI (a, j) = log(MI (a, j ;mj + ∆mj ,mj ′)− logMI (a, j ;mj ,mj ′)
∆ logCM(a, j ′) = log(CM(a, j ′;mj + ∆mj ,mj ′)− logCM(a, j ′;mj ,mj ′)
Using data on minimum wage changes, I predict ∆ logMI (a, j) and ∆ logCM(a, j ′). Figure 2
displays the distributions of ∆ logMI (a, j) and ∆ logCM(a, j ′) for different types. First, all
distributions show substantial heterogeneity across county-pairs, suggesting local markets
are diversified. Minimum wage hikes decrease the chance of finding a job but increase
the expected wages once hired. When the cost exceeds the benefit, the local labor market
becomes less attractive, and workers either move away or stop moving in. The mean value of
∆ logCM(low , j) is positive (0.034) whereas the average value of ∆ logMI (low , j) is negative
(-0.034), both of which indicate that low-skilled workers are more likely to leave areas with
higher minimum wages in the majority of county pairs. Second, the distributions for low-
skill workers are more dispersed than those for high-skilled workers. This is in line with the
observation that low-skill workers are more responsive to minimum wage changes.
Next, I check the out-of-sample validation by comparing the model generated ∆ logMI (a, j)
and ∆ logCM(a, j ′) with the data. In the sample, the percentage changes of migrants and
commuters are directly calculated by comparing the fractions of mobile workers before
minimum wage changes with those after minimum wage changes. Then I run the following
regression to compute the minimum wage elasticity from model predictions (“Model-based
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Figure 2: The distribution of ∆ logMI (a, j) and ∆ logCM(a, j ′) after minimum wage hikes
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Table 8: The comparison between model predictions and regression results
Model-based (β∗1) Data-based (β1)
Low skilled Commuters 0.741*** 0.458**
(0.234) (0.215)
Low skilled Migrants -0.590** -0.589***
(0.260) (0.160)
High skilled Commuters -0.282*** 0.263**
(0.082) (0.133)
High skilled Migrants -0.081 -0.101
(0.080) (0.112)
Note: The regression column is directly from Table 10. Standard errors are displayed in
parentheses. * for 10%. ** for 5%, and *** for 1%.
elasticity β∗1”) and from data observations (“Data-based elasticity β1”) separately:
∆ logMI (a, j) = β∗1∆logMWj + ∆ε0
∆ logCM(a, j) = β∗1∆logMWj + ∆ε1
(1.12)
The regression results based on the data were previously calculated in Table 10 since re-
gression 1.12 is a simplified version of Equation 1.14 that ignores the county fixed effect
and restricts the observational period. Table 8 shows that the model-based β∗1 and the
data-based β1 are comparable. For low educated mobile workers, both estimates suggest
that they exit counties with minimum wage hikes. And the magnitudes of both elasticities
are very similar (within a 90% confidence interval). In addition, both estimates find the
elasticities for low educated workers(absolute value) are larger than the elasticities for high
skilled workers. This is consistent with the intuition that low educated workers are more
responsive to the minimum wage adjustments.
The model-based elasticity for more highly educated commuters is less consistent with data-
based elasticity. This discrepancy can be attributed to the distinction between short- and
long- run effects. Althrough the data-based β1 captures the immediate response after the
minimum wage change, the model-based β∗1 demonstrates cumulative changes between two
steady states.
This distinction between the short- and long-run effects is also emphasized in Sorkin (2015).
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He argues that the reduced-from effects are essentially uninformative about the true long-run
elasticity. In my case, the key reason is the sorting of workers provides additional feedback
effects in the long run. When a local county increases its minimum wage, the fraction of
low type workers decreases in local county but increases in the neighboring county. As
the average worker quality improves in the local market, firms have more incentive to post
vacancies in local county rather than in neighboring county. However, this feedback effect
is hard to be observed in the short run since the adjustment of local worker quality is slow.
I will further explore this mechanism in Section 1.6.
1.5.3. Quantifying the underestimation of disemployment effects when ignoring labor mo-
bility
Starting with Card and Krueger (1994), cross-border comparisons became a common method
of studying the disemployment effects of the minimum wage. Dube et al. (2010) and Dube
et al. (2016) generalize this strategy to all county pairs and find limited disemployment
effects, which is consistent with Card and Krueger (1994). Although the cross-border de-
sign allows one to assume similarity between the treated area and control area, it may be
problematic. As pointed out by Neumark et al. (2014b), “spillover effects can certainly
contaminate the control observations. If workers displaced by the minimum wage find jobs
on the other side of the border, employment will expand in the control areas”. Based on my
model, I quantitatively evaluate two sources of the underestimation of disemployment ef-
fects. First, unemployed workers who leave are “missing” from the treated county. Second,
they may “reappear” in the neighboring county, contaminating the control group.
To evaluate the first channel, I compare the disemployment effect from two different min-
imum wage increases. In case 1, both counties increase their minimum wage by the same
percentage
(
mj ,mj ′
)
→
(
mj + ∆mj ,mj ′ + ∆mj ′
)
. In case 2, only one county increases its
minimum wage
(
mj ,mj ′
)
→
(
mj + ∆mj ,mj ′
)
. In case 1, the geographical minimum wage
differences are more compressed since the minimum wage increases in both counties rather
than increase only in one local county. Therefore, the opportunity to arbitrage relative
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Figure 3: The disemployment effect under different minimum wage hikes
minimum wage differences are largely eliminated in case 1 compared with case 2. The
disemployment effect caused by minimum wage hikes is defined as the change of the log
employment rate under the steady-state before minimum wage change and the new steady-
state after the minimum wage change:
Case 1: ∆ log Empj = log Empj(mj + ∆mj ,mj ′ + ∆mj ′) − log Empj(mj ,mj ′)
Case 2: ∆ log Empj = log Empj(mj + ∆mj ,mj ′) − log Empj(mj ,mj ′)
Figure 3 compares the distribution of ∆ log Empj under case 1 and case 2. The average
value of ∆ log Empj in case 1 is more negative than that in case 2 while the distribution of
∆ log Empj in case 1 (red histogram) is more right-skewed than in case 2 (blue histogram).
86.9% of counties in case 1 experience negative employment changes due to minimum wage
hikes compared to only 82.0% in case 2. This comparison confirms that the spillover effect
actually attenuates the disemployment effect.
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Next, I calculate the minimum wage elasticity of employment by estimating the following
regressions:
Case 1: ∆ log Empj = β1∆logMWj + ∆ε1
Case 2: ∆ log Empj = β2∆logMWj + ∆ε2
To include the potential bias caused by the contamination of control group, I recalculate
the disemployment elasticity in case 2 using the neighboring county as the control group.
This calculation mimics the diff-in-diff approach:
Case 3: ∆ log Empj −∆ log Empj ′ = β3∆logMWj + ∆ε3
Table 9 reports the minimum wage elasticity of employment in all three cases. “Case 1”
reports the elasticity of employment when both counties increase their minimum wages by
the same proportion. “Case 2” reports the elasticity of employment when only the local
county increases its minimum wage. Finally, “Case 3” displays the alternative elasticity if
the neighboring county is used as the control group. Workers in case 1 have less incentive to
arbitrage the minimum wage difference between two counties compared with their incentive
in case 2. Therefore, changes in labor mobility after minimum wage hikes in case 1 is smaller
than changes in case 2. Consequently, I observe a larger disemployment effect in case 1 (-
0.0733) compared with case 2 (-0.0421). Furthermore, when using the neighboring county
as the control group, the disemployment effect continues to shrink from -0.0421 to -0.0341.
This shares the same pattern with the different disemployment effect estimated in Table
11. In Table 11, the minimum wage elasticity of employment changed from -0.068 to -0.039
after controlling for pair-specific time trends instead of a common time trend. Dube et al.
(2016) argue that this change is driven by spatial heterogeneity. My findings suggest that
such changes are driven by labor mobility rather than by spatial heterogeneity. This result
highlights the concern that neighboring counties, despite their geographic proximity, may
not be the appropriate control group due to the contamination caused by labor mobility.
If labor mobility is causing underestimation of the disemployment effect, then the bias
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Table 9: Elasticity of employment with respect to the minimum wage
Case 1 (β1) Case 2 (β2) Case 3 (β3)
Whole Sample -0.0733*** -0.0421*** -0.0341***
(0.0069) (0.0075) (0.0096)
Below bottom quartile -0.0957*** -0.0445*** -0.0153
of moving cost (0.0163) (0.0136) (0.0190)
Note: “Case 1” reports the elasticity of employment when both county increase their minimum wages by the same
proportion. “Case 2” reports the elasticity of employment when only the local county increase its minimum wage.
“Case 3” displays an alternative elasticity if the neighboring county is wrongly picked as the control group. Standard
errors are displayed in parentheses. * for 10%. ** for 5%, and *** for 1%.
should be larger for counties with lower moving costs. To verify this conjecture, I conduct
an additional placebo test for a sub-sample of counties whose moving costs are in the
bottom quartile. My estimates, reported in the second row of Table 9, are in line with this
conjecture. First, the difference of the elasticities between case 1 and case 2 becomes larger
when using the restricted sample. The main reason is that the disemployment effect in
case 1 is larger (-0.0957) compared with the previous effect (-0.0733) using the full sample.
Second, using the neighboring county as the control group creates more severe downward
bias. Although the elasticities in case 2 are robust to different sub-samples, it goes down
sharply to -0.0153 in case 3 when using the neighboring county as the control group. To
summarize, ignoring labor mobility and potential spillover effects cause the disemployment
effect to be underestimated.
1.6. Policy experiments
In this section, I use the estimated model to examine the distributional impacts of local
minimum wage hikes. There are (at least) two criteria to evaluate the welfare consequences
of the minimum wage polices. The first natural welfare candidate is the value of unem-
ployment Vu(a, j), which can also be interpreted as the ex-ante welfare of heterogeneous
workers with different types a and locations j . This is my primary measure because my goal
is to understand the distributional effects for heterogeneous workers under minimum wage
hikes. A second welfare criteria is defined for the local government, which is of particular
interest when considering the total spillovers of local minimum wage policy to the neigh-
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boring county. Following Flinn (2006), I assume that the minimum wage is the only policy
instrument available to the local government and the welfare function of local government
defined as follows:
Wj(mj) =
∑
a∈{al ,ah}[L(a, j)V̄e(θ, a, j , θ
∗(a, j))︸ ︷︷ ︸
(1) Local employed workers
+MI (a, j)
(
V̄e(θ, a, j , θ
∗∗(a, j ′))− c(a, j ′)
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(2) Migrants from neighbouring county
+ CM(a, j ′)
(
V̄e(θ, a, j
′, θ∗∗(a, j ′))− c(a, j)
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(3) Commuters to the neighbouring county
+ U(a, j)Vu(a, j)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(4) Unemployed workers
+ E (a, j)V̄f (a, j)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(5) Revernue from filled vacancies
]− Kjψj︸︷︷︸
(6) Total cost of vacancies
where (1) L(a, j) is the population of local employed workers with V̄e(θ, a, j , θ
∗(a, j)) denot-
ing their average welfare. (2) MI (a, j) is the population of migrants who move from county
j ′, with V̄e(θ, a, j , θ
∗∗(a, j ′))− c(a, j ′) as their average net welfare. (3) CM(a, j ′) is the pop-
ulation of migrants who commute to work in county j ′, with V̄e(θ, a, j
′, θ∗∗(a, j)) − c(a, j)
as their average net welfare. (4) U(a, j) is the population of local unemployed workers (all
unemployed workers have same welfare level Vu(a, j)). On the demand side of the market,
while there are Kj vacancies in county j , only Mj =
∑
a E (a, j) are filled with workers and
generate positive revenue. The free entry condition guarantees that the revenue generated
from the filled vacancy is equal to the total cost of posted vacancies in the steady state.
Thus the total contribution of terms (5) and (6) is equal to 0.
To understand the distributional effects of local minimum wage hikes, it is important to
recognize the different forces at play. Assume county 1 changes its minimum wage while
county 2 keeps its minimum wage unchanged. The direct effect in county 1 depends on the
trade-off between the decrease in working opportunities (“disemployment effect”) and the
increase in expected income (“wage enhancement effect”). Because the productivity distri-
bution of high type workers first-order stochastically dominates that of low type workers ,
the working opportunity of the high type is less hurt by the same minimum wage increase
compared with that of low type workers. As a result, low type workers have stronger in-
centives to move out of the country to avoid welfare losses caused by the minimum wage
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hike. Besides the direct effects, there is an additional general equilibrium effect through
the change in a firm’s incentive to post vacancies. First, the share of matching surplus
decreases when firms are constrained by a higher minimum wage (“share reduction effect”).
Secondly, due to the assumption of random search, firms are unable to screen workers’ type
when they post vacancies. Thus, vacancies (per capita) will be negatively correlated with
the proportion of low type workers in their local county. Worker sorting decreases the com-
position of high type in county 2. As a result, the local workers in county 2 suffer additional
welfare losses because of the decrease in hiring probability (“composition changing effect”).
The additional force is the moving costs which generates welfare differences between the
same type workers in different locations. Compared with local workers, mobile workers have
to pay additional moving costs to work in the same job, ceteris paribus. This friction is
traditionally referred to as the lock-in effect.
After understanding the distributional effects of heterogeneous workers, I conduct two coun-
terfactual policies aiming for the reduction of spillover externalities. In the first policy
experiment, I completely restrict labor mobility between counties by increasing the mov-
ing cost to infinity. This experiment captures the extreme case when no labor mobility is
allowed. In the second policy experiment, the central government preempts the local min-
imum laws. In other word, the two paired counties follow universal minimum wage hikes
rather than setting up their local minimum wages. In reality, the preemption of local min-
imum wage laws is a popular policy intervention for state legislation to avoid “patchwork”
of wage levels within a state. So far, 27 states have passed such laws.
1.6.1. The distributional effect of local minimum wage hikes
In this section I explore how the welfare of workers (differentiated by their type a and
location j) changes with respect to local minimum wage changes in county 1. To better
exclude the effect of local minimum wage hikes from other disturbances such as geographic
asymmetry, I consider symmetric county pairs where the geographic parameters in both
counties take the mean values of the distributional estimates. The distributional effects
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Figure 4: Worker composition under different minimum wages
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depend critically on the magnitude of local minimum wage increases. I assume the initial
hourly minimum wage in both counties is $7 and consider welfare changes when increasing
the minimum wage in county 1 to an amount between $7 and $17. Most of my results are
presented in graphical form. I will first report the change in local economic conditions (e.g.
contact rates, the composition of heterogeneous workers). Then, I will compute welfare
changes with respect to changes in minimum wages for different workers. Lastly, I show
welfare changes of local governments with changes in minimum wages.
Figure 4 display changes in worker composition in both counties under different minimum
wage increases. As the local minimum wage in county 1 increases from $7 to $17, the
fraction of low type worker in county 1 monotonically decreases to 0.15 while the fraction of
low type workers in county 2 has a hump shape with a peak of 0.8 when m1 = $14. These
two patterns suggest that local minimum wage policy serves as a worker selection device.
By setting a higher minimum wage, the local government extracts high type workers from
the neighboring county while also dumping low type workers on the neighboring county.
The prediction in my model is consistent with the real changes happening in Seattle after
its city-level minimum wage increases from $9.43/hour to $13/hour.(Jardim et al. (2017))
As showed in figure 5, the number of low-pay job (wage < 19/hour) decreases while the
number of high-pay job ( wage > $19/hour) increases.
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Figure 5: Changes in Seattle jobs after increasing minimum wage from $9.43 to $13
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Data source: administrative employment records from the Washington Employment Security
Department, reported in Jardim et al. (2017), table 3.
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Figure 6: Contact rates under different minimum wages
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Next I consider the changes of firms’ incentive to post vacancies. Figure 6 displays changes
of contact rates in both counties and suggests two channels of changing the profit of posted
vacancies. First, for the same match, firms get less value per vacancy when the minimum
wage is higher. A higher minimum wage decreases both the probability that a given match
is acceptable and makes the sustainable match less profitable. This channel explains why
contact rates in both counties experience a downward change when minimum wage in county
1 increases. Second, the sorting of workers increases the concentration of high types in
county 1 but decreases their concentration in county 2 because firms tend to post relatively
fewer vacancies in the county with higher fraction of low type workers. The second channel
explains why the contact rate in county 2 is systematically lower than that in county 1.
Furthermore, the fraction of low type in county 2 reaches its peak at $14 and starts to
decrease after that, which explains the rebound of the contact rate in county 2 when m1 ≥
$15.
The most crucial results are the distributional effects of local minimum wage policies on
heterogeneous workers. This heterogeneity is not well explored in the previous literature
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because workers are often considered to be ex-ante identical (e.g. Flinn (2006)). Let
Vu(a, j ;m1,m2) be the ex-ante welfare for a worker with type a and in location j when
m1 is set at m and m2 is set at $7, then the change of welfare is defined as
∆W0(a, j ;m, 7) = Vu(a, j ;m, 7)− Vu(a, j ; 7, 7)
Figure 7 shows the results. The top left panel displays welfare changes of low type workers
in both county 1 (the blue line) and county 2 (the red line). The low type is severely
harmed by higher minimum wages. As noted previously, this is driven by a combination
of two effects. First, the higher m1 rules out previously acceptable wages. Second, the
higher minimum wage policy in county 1 pushes low type workers to county 2, diminishing
their probability to be hired. The top right panel displays the welfare changes of high type
workers in both county 1 (the blue line) and county 2 (the red line). The hump shape in high
type welfare shows the existence of countervailing effects. Although raising the minimum
wage increases workers’ welfare by increasing the return of a match, previously acceptable
matches become unacceptable. The latter effect dominates the previous effect when local
minimum wage in county 1 exceeds $14.
The lower panel of Figure 7 reports the change of inequality between high type and low
type as minimum wage increase in county 1. Because the welfare of the low type is a convex
curve whereas the welfare of the high type is a concave curve, the inequality curve expands
and then reaches its peak when m1 = 15. This result reveals that local minimum wage
policy could actually increase inequality between high and low type workers, completely
opposite of the intended policy effect.
Lastly, the welfare difference between same type workers in two counties indicates the “lock-
in” effects due to the existence of moving costs, I will continue to explore this effect in the
next section.
Figure 8 plots the change of total welfare in each county with respect to a change in the
47
Figure 7: Welfare changes across heterogeneous workers under different minimum wage
increases
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Figure 8: Changes in local government welfare as minimum wage changes in county 1
(a) Changes in local government welfare -
county 1
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(b) Changes in local government welfare -
county 2
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local minimum wage. The total welfare in county 1 has a single peak at m1 = 8, while the
total welfare in county 2 declines until m1 = 16. An increase in m1 almost always harms the
total welfare in county 2. Put another way, the increases in local minimum wages generate
negative externalities to neighboring counties.
1.6.2. Restricting labor mobility between counties
In this session, I want to reduce spillover externalities by completely blocking labor mobility
between counties. This can be treated as an extreme way of implementing mandatory local
hiring requirements. For example, the public infrastructure projects in San Francisco require
that at least 50% of their job hours to go to San Francisco residents. I achieve this moving
barrier in the model by setting the moving cost to be infinite (c(a, j) = +∞) so that the
two labor markets are totally disconnected, which is referred as “Autarky case”.
Figure 9 compares the ex-ante welfare across different types of workers in the “Baseline”
and “Autarky” cases. In the “Autarky” case, a minimum wage increase in county 1 has no
effect on the workers in county 2, because these two labor markets are totally segregated.
Therefore, the welfare of worker in county 2 (green line) is a horizontal line in the “Autarky”
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case. The welfare in the “Baseline” case and in the “Autarky” case differ because of two
effects. First, workers in the “Baseline” case have additional working opportunities from
the neighboring county, which generate welfare gains for all types of workers. Secondly,
the sorting of workers discourages firms from posting vacancies in county 2. This reduction
of contact rates in county 2 has a negative effect on all workers, but particularly on lower
type workers, because they are more concentrated in county 2 when m1 increases. Taken
together, welfare increases for everyone except for the low skill worker in county 2. When
m1 > 10, they would prefer to stay in the “Autarky” case to avoid the negative spillover
effects.
1.6.3. Preempting local minimum wage laws (universal (federal) minimum wages vs. local
minimum wages)
In this section, I perform a second counterfactual experiment: preempting local minimum
wage laws. In reality, the preemption of local minimum wage laws is a popular policy
intervention adopted by either federal or state legislatures to avoid a “patchwork” of min-
imum wage levels within their justification. Sometimes, progressive legislatures offer a
statewide/nationwide raise to avoid more aggressive local level minimum wage changes. To
understand the trade-off between universal level minimum wage hikes and local level min-
imum wage hikes, I consider the case in which both counties have an identical increase of
their same minimum wages. Thus welfare changes of heterogeneous workers when setting a
universal federal minimum wage at m is defined as
∆W0(a, j ;m,m) = Vu(a, j ;m,m)− Vu(a, j ; 7, 7)
Figure 10 compares welfare changes under local minimum wage regulation and welfare
changes under universal minimum wage regulation. Rather than keeping m2 unchanged, a
universal minimum wage policy equalizes the minimum wages in both counties, m1 = m2.
Compared with the “Baseline” case, the increase of m2 generates two offsetting effects. On
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Figure 9: Change in worker welfare both in “Baseline” case and “Autarky” case
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(b) Welfare - Low type in county 2
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(c) Welfare - High type in county 1
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(d) Welfare - High type in county 2
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Figure 10: Changes in total welfare under local and under universal (federal) minimum
wages
(a) Changes in local government welfare -
county 1
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(b) Changes in local government welfare -
county 2
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one hand, the minimum wage hikes in county 2 dissolves previously acceptable matches.
On the other hand, the increase of m2 prevents the sorting of workers between two counties,
encouraging firms to post more vacancies. As shown in the right panel of Figure 10, the
benefit of preventing negative spillovers dominates the cost of losing acceptable matches
when m < 13.5. When minimum wage is not dramatically high, the total welfare in county
2 is actually higher under universal minimum wage policy. When the minimum wage exceeds
$13.5, the total welfare in both counties is reduced, because the loss of sustainable matches
becomes the dominant effect.
When decomposing total local welfare by worker types, I find preferred minimum wage
regulation (universal vs. local) in county 2 is driven by low type workers. Thus, a planner
that cares for low type workers should opt for universal rather than local minimum wage
intervention when the change is moderate (m < $14.5). However, this welfare gain is
accompanied with a welfare loss for high type workers.
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Figure 11: Change in worker welfare under local and universal (federal) minimum wage
changes
(a) Changes in welfare - low type in county
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(b) Changes in welfare - low type in county
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(c) Changes in welfare - high type in county
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(d) Changes in welfare - high type in county
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1.7. Conclusions
In this paper, I developed a spatial search model to study the effect of both local and uni-
versal (federal) minimum wage policies. In the model, firms endogenously choose where to
post vacancies. Workers, differentiated by their type and location, engage in random search
and can either accept a local job or migrate/commute to work in the neighboring county.
My model captures three important effects associated with the minimum wage increases.
First, conditional on being employed, a higher minimum wage shifts profits from firms to
workers and increases workers’ earnings. Second, a higher minimum wage also creates a
disemployment effect by dissolving previously acceptable matches. This disemployment ef-
fect is more for low type worker. Third, firms reduce their vacancy postings in response to
changing county-level worker composition and because they receive a smaller share of the
matching surplus. Although the reduction in contact rates affects both counties, it has a
larger effect on the neighboring county.
My analysis yields a number of interesting empirical findings when simulating the effects
of minimum wage increases in county 1 with no change in county 2. First, minimum wage
increases up to $14/hour increase the welfare of high type workers but lower the welfare of
low type workers, leading to an increase in inequality. Minimum wage increases in excess
of $14/hour lower the welfare of all workers, because the wage increases do not compensate
for the disemployment effects. Second, the welfare of same type workers differs by locations
(“lock-in effect”) due to migration/commuting costs. Lastly, I find the disemployment
effect of a minimum wage increase is underestimated if one ignores labor mobility. With
the model, I obtain with the model a minimum wage elasticity of employment equal to
-0.073; ignoring labor mobility cuts this value in half to -0.034. The bias is most severe for
the counties with higher fractions of mobile workers.
I examine two counterfactual policies aiming for reducing spillover externalities: restricting
labor mobility and preempting local minimum wage laws. In the experiment restricting
labor mobility, the low type workers in neighboring county (the county without minimum
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wage change) prefer “Autarky” labor markets when the increase of local minimum wage
is large (m > $10). In the experiment of preempting local minimum wage laws, low type
workers prefer a universal (federal) minimum wage rather than local minimum wages when
the increa se of minimum wage is moderate (m < $14.5). In contrast, the welfare of high
type reduces unambiguously under both policies.
There are several ways to extend my analysis for future research. First, my model only
compares the change between two steady states with minimum wage hikes. Adding transi-
tional dynamics could capture the immediate effect of minimum wage hikes, which might
differ from the long-term steady-state. Second, although I emphasize the worker selection
and reallocation consequences of the local minimum wage policy, the local government is
not a strategic player in my current model. Examining the competitive behavior of policy
makers could be interesting. Third, local minimum wages also affect labor force participa-
tion. With higher minimum wages, individuals who were out of the labor force may also
start to look for jobs in the labor market. This feature could be added into the model where
government not only cares about the working population, but also the sub-population out
of the labor force.
1.8. Appendix 1: equation expressions
1.8.1. Deducing the expressions of Vu(a, j) and Ve(w , a, j)
I now consider individual’s search problem
Vu(a, j) = (1 + ρε)
−1[ abjε+ λjε
∫ ∞
mj
max{Ve(w , j),Vu(a, j)}dF (w |a, θ, j)︸ ︷︷ ︸
A local offer arrives
+ λj ′ε
∫ ∞
mj′
max{Ve(w , j ′)− c(a, j),Vu(a, j)}dF (w |a, θ, j ′))︸ ︷︷ ︸
A neighbouring offer arrives
+ +(1− λjε− λj ′ε)Vu(a, j) + o(ε)]
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Multiplying 1 + ρε then subtracting Vu(a, j) from both sides, I get
ρεVu(a, j) = abjε+ λjε
∫ ∞
mj
max{Ve(w , j),Vu(a, j)}dF (w |a, θ, j)︸ ︷︷ ︸
A local offer arrives
+ λj ′ε
∫ ∞
mj′
max{Ve(w , j ′)− c(a, j),Vu(a, j)}dF (w |a, θ, j ′))︸ ︷︷ ︸
A neighbouring offer arrives
+ −(λjε+ λj ′ε)Vu(a, j) + o(ε)
Dividing both sides by ε and taking limits ε→ 0, I arrive at
ρVu(a, j) = abj + λj
∫ ∞
mj
{Ve(w , j)− Vu(a, j)}+dF (w |a, θ, j)︸ ︷︷ ︸
A local offer arrives
+ λj ′
∫ ∞
mj′
{Ve(w , j ′)− c(a, j)− Vu(a, j)}+dF (w |a, θ, j ′))︸ ︷︷ ︸
A neighbouring offer arrives
The value of employment with wage w is
Ve(w , a, j) = (1 + ρε)
−1{wε+ ηjεVu(a, j) + (1− ηjε)Ve(w , a, j) + o(ε)}
Multiplying 1 + ρε then subtracting Ve(a, j) from both sides, I get
ρεVe(w , a, j) = wε+ ηjεVu(a, j)− ηjεVe(w , a, j) + o(ε)
Dividing both sides by ε and taking limits ε→ 0, I arrive at
Ve(w , a, j) =
w + ηjVu(a, j)
ρ+ ηj
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1.8.2. Solving for the bargained wage equation without the minimum wage constraint
Follow the same deduction procedure, the firm’s value for a match with wage w , V ft (w , a, θ, j), is(I
assume that the effective discount fact ρ+ ηj is the same as worker’s):
Vf (w , a, θ, j) =
aθ − w
ρ+ ηj
Then the Nash bargaining ŵ(θ, a, j) without considering possible binding minimum wage is:
ŵ(a, j , θ) = arg maxw (Ve(w , a, j)− Vu(a, j))1−αjVf (w , a, θ, j)1−αj
= arg maxw (
w+ηjVu(a,j)
ρ+ηj
− Vu(a, j))1−αj ( aθ−wρ+ηj )
αj
= arg maxw (
w−ρVu(a,j)
ρ+ηj
)1−αj ( aθ−wρ+ηj )
αj
= αjaθ + (1− α)ρVu(a, j)
(1.13)
1.8.3. The derivation of fixed point system of θ∗(a, j) and θ∗∗(a, j)
I start from the expression of unemployed value Vu(a, j), equation 1.1:
ρVu(a, j) = abj + λj
∫ ∞
mj
{Ve(w , j)− Vu(a, j)}+dF (w |a, θ, j)︸ ︷︷ ︸
A local offer arrives
+ λj ′
∫ ∞
mj′
{Ve(w , j ′)− c(a, j)− Vu(a, j)}+dF (w |a, θ, j ′))︸ ︷︷ ︸
A neighbouring offer arrives
Now, I replace the term Ve(a, j , θ) in the above equation using the following step-wise
function:
Ve(a, j , θ) =

mj+ηjVu(a,j)
ρ+ηj
αj (aθ−ρVu(a,j))
ρ+ηj
+ Vu(a, j)
θ ∈ [mj , θ̂(a, j))
θ ∈ [θ̂(a, j),∞)
Then I replace ρVu(a, j) with its equivalent definition aθ
∗(a, j) then get:
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aθ∗(a, j) = abj +
λj
ρ+ηj
[I (θ∗(a, j) <
mj
a
)(mj − aθ∗(a, j))
(
G̃ (θ̂(a, j))− G̃ (
mj
a
)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Local offer with wage mj
+
∫
max{θ̂(a,j),θ∗(a,j)}
aαj(θ − θ∗(a, j))dG (θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Local offer with wage wj > mj
]
+
λj′
ρ+ηj′
[I(θ∗∗(a, j) <
mj ′
a
)(mj ′ − aθ∗(a, j ′))
(
G̃ (θ∗∗(a, j))− G̃ (
mj ′
a
)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Neighbouring offer with wage mj′
+
∫
max{θ̂(a,j ′),θ∗∗(a,j)}
aαj(θ − θ∗(a, j ′))dG (θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Neighbouring offer with wage wj′ > mj′
+
(
ρ+ ηj ′
)
(
a(θ∗(a, j)− θ∗(a, j ′))
ρ
+ c(a, j))G̃ (θ∗∗(a, j))︸ ︷︷ ︸
The unemployed value difference between staying/moving
]
1.9. Appendix 2: suggestive regression results
1.9.1. Both migrants and commuters are responsive to minimum wage hikes
This section presents the responses of migrants and commuters to minimum wage hikes.
I find that low educated workers tend to commute/migrate away from states with higher
relative minimum wage (compared to its neighboring state) rather than towards them. More
specifically, the fraction of workers commuting out of the state increases and the number of
individuals migrating into the local county from other states decreases.
I use the following regression to measure the effect of the relative minimum wage ratio on
worker’s migration and commuting behaviors:35
log yc,t = β0 + β1 log
MWs(c),t
MWs′(c),t
+ εc,t (1.14)
35Ideally, I would distinguish the effect of the own state’s minimum wages from the effect of the neighboring
state’s minimum wages by using the following regression:
log yc.t = β0 + β1 logMWs(c),t + β
′
1 logMWs′(c),t + εc,t
However, due to the high correlation between MWs(c),t and MWs′(c),t , the estimates suffer multicollinearity
and become too sensitive to model specification. Therefore, I put the restriction β1 = −β
′
1 to deliver more
stable estimates.
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Here yc,t is the ratio of migrants or commuters in county c , at time t. I estimate sepa-
rate regressions for each education group. The minimum wage ratio
MWs(c)t
MWs′(c)t
compares the
minimum wage of s(c), the state containing county c , to the minimum wage of s ′(c), the
neighboring state of county c . The coefficient β1 is the primary parameter of interest, which
is the elasticity of outcomes yit with respect to the relative minimum wage ratio.
Regression estimates are reported in Table 10. Column (1) reports the elasticity of the
flows of migrants and commuters with respect to the change of relative minimum wage
ratio. I use the relative minimum wage ratio rather than the absolute minimum wage levels
to allow the flexibility that migration and commuting could be driven by either the own
state’s minimum wage hikes or the neighboring state’s minimum wage increases. I find
that minimum wage changes have a statistically significant negative effect for low educated
migrants. In response to a 1% hike in the relative minimum wage ratio, the flows of low-
educated migrants decrease by 0.539%. For commuters, these flows increase by 0.458% in
response to a 1% increase in the relative minimum wage ratio.
However, observed commuting and migration changes could respond to other factors hap-
pening simultaneously with minimum wage increases. For example, if the local economic
conditions are declining for the states with minimum wage increases, I would misattribute
these changes to minimum wage changes instead of local economic conditions. Column (2)
estimates the same regression model for high educated workers. If local conditions were un-
derlying the observed changes of labor mobility, then high educated workers should present
similar patterns, but that is not the case. There is no statistically significant migration
response and only moderate commuting response to the same minimum wage increase.36
While the evidence above does not prove causality, it is consistent with the view that min-
imum wage policy should have asymmetric effects on workers with different educational
levels. Compared with low educated workers, the high educated group receives a higher
36I ran the same regression only for the high-school graduates, which are more closely related to high-
school dropouts. The estimates are very close to the estimates for the whole high educated group. (This
regression result is not reported in table 10)
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wage on average, yielding a lower probability to be bound by minimum wage increases.
Another concern is that the state-level minimum wage policy may move in tandem with
other redistribution policies, such as unemployment insurance benefits, which may also
cause asymmetric effects on workers with different levels of education. To minimize this
concern, I restrict my sample to the period covered by The Fair Minimum Wage Act of
2007.37 It is worth noting that the federal minimum wage compresses the minimum wage
difference between contiguous counties. Therefore, the federal minimum wage should gen-
erate the opposite effect for states bound by the federal minimum wage: the commuting
flows increase while the migration flows decrease. Columns (4) and (5) report values that
are slightly higher (-0.682 and 0.678 compared to -0.589 and 0.458) than my baseline es-
timates for the low-education group, but not significantly different. The estimates for the
high educated group are also similar to my baseline estimates. The elasticity of migration
is not statistically significant and the elasticity of commuting is significantly positive but
moderate in its magnitude. To sum up, my results are robust to the restricted sample only
using the federal-level minimum wage variation, which supports the hypothesis that the
potential endogenity of state-level minimum wage change does not bias the estimates.
Another concern is that pseudo county-based statistics may be imprecise. To mitigate this
concern, I re-run the same regressions using different data sources in Column (6). The
alternative migration data comes from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) which collects
the year-to-year address changes reported on individual income tax returns between 2005-
2015.38 The alternative commuting data comes from the 2009-2015 aggregated county-
level ACS.39 Unfortunately, these two alternative data sets lacks workers’ demographic
37The Fair Minimum Wage Act of 2007 was implemented by three stages. Stage one increased the minimum
wage from $5.15 to $5.85 in 2007. Stage two continued to increase it to $6.55 in 2009. Then the final stage
finalized the minimum wage in the level of $7.25 in 2009. Thus I restrict my sample to year 2007-2009 to
include the total effect of federal minimum wage change.
38IRS data is more robust than other data for a few reasons. First, IRS data covers 95 to 98 percent
of the individual income tax filing population. Furthermore, the IRS and ACS display similar declines in
migration after 2005, which is not true for other data such as the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID),
the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), and the Current Population Survey (CPS). A
detailed discussion comparing different migration data sets can be found in Molloy et al. (2011).
39This is collected from the American FactFinder which only provides aggregate moments. Thus it
is impossible to further disaggregate moments to get conditional ones on workers’ characteristic. See
61
characteristics. Therefore, I can only compare estimates based on the full sample rather than
estimates of subgroups classified by their education levels. The estimates using alternative
data have similar values but different level of statistical significance. The elasticities of
migration and commuting when using alternative data sets are -0.148 and 0.212 compared
to my baseline estimates of -0.093 and 0.278.40
Lastly, I do another robustness check on the selection of contiguous county pairs. Follow-
ing Dube et al. (2016), the baseline regression includes county pairs whose centriods are
within 75 kilometers because the counties with closer centriods have more similar labor
markets. In column (7), I run the same specification using all county pairs. Compared
with the estimates using the baseline sample, the elasticities for low educated group are
smaller but not different from my baseline estimates. This makes sense because as physi-
cal distance increases, workers have less incentive to take opportunities in the neighboring
market since moving costs are higher. The regression results in this section suggest that low
educated workers tend to move away from counties with minimum wage increases, either
by commuting or migration.
1.9.2. The disemployment effect of local minimum wage hikes
In this section, I show additional evidence that the increase of outflows in response to a
minimum wage increase is caused by the decline of local working opportunities. Following
Dube et al. (2007) and Dube et al. (2016), I run the following regression:
log yc,t = β0 + β1 logMWs(c),t + β2Xc,t + φc + ηp(c),t + εc,t (1.15)
where yc,t refers to the local labor market variables, including earnings, employment, sep-
arations and hires, in county c and period t. Xc,t is the log of the total local population.
https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/index.xhtmlfor details.
40The larger variance of my baseline estimates is due to the imputation process. One PUMA usually
contains several counties, which washes away the inter-county variation when converting the PUMA-based
statistics into the county-based statistics. Consequently, the “pseudo” county-level variation should be
smaller than the “true” county-level variation, which results in less significant estimates.
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Table 11: Minimum wage elasticity for employment stocks and flows
yit (1) (2)
Hires -0.156*** 0.012
(0.017) (0.045)
84,140 83,280
Separations -0.190*** -0.024
(0.017) (0.022)
84,120 83,246
Employment -0.068*** -0.039**
(0.017) (0.017)
84,140 83,280
Earnings 0.056*** -0.016
(0.015) (0.015)
84,140 83,280
Controls
County fixed effect Y Y
Common time effects Y
Pair-specific time effects Y
Centriods <75mi Y Y
Data source: 2005-2015 Quarterly Workforce Indicator (QWI). This table reports the elasticity of the labor market
outcomes listed in the first column. The regression sample is restricted to the counties from 964 county-pairs whose
centriods are within 75 miles and includes all workers whose age is between 14-34. Robust standard errors, in
parentheses, are clustered at the the paired-county level. * for 10%. ** for 5%, and *** for 1%.
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The coefficient β1 is the primary variable of interest representing the elasticity of yit with
respect to the local minimum wages. Table 11 reports two regressions which only differ in
their specification of the time-fixed effect. In Column (1), I restrict the time fixed effect
to be common across all county pairs (ηp(c),t = ηt) and I find statistically significant dis-
employment effects in response to local minimum wage changes. The estimated elasticity
of employment stock is -0.156. Meanwhile, the elasticities of employment flows are also
substantial with minimum wage increases. The hire elasticity and separation elasticity are
-0.190 and -0.156, both of which are statistically significant. The fact that the separation
elasticity is larger than the hire elasticity is consistent with the negative effect of minimum
wage on employment stock. However, when I account for the pair-specific time fixed ef-
fect (to control for time-varying, pair-specific spatial confounders), the estimates for the
hire elasticity and separation elasticity are not distinguishable from zero. I attribute this
change to the existence of spatial spillover effect. After the local county increases its own
minimum wage, unemployed workers may seek their jobs in the neighboring county (either
by migration or by commuting), which causes disemployment in the neighboring county.
As a result, this spillover effect generates a common trend between the counties in one pair.
When this pair-specific co-movement is teased out by pair-specific time effect, the estimates
of local disemployment effect become less substantial.
1.10. Appendix 3: sample construction
1.10.1. Minimum wage policies between 2005-2015
In this section, I consider changes of minimum wage policies both on the state and federal
level (See Table 12).41 Between 2005 and 2015, there was only one change to federal
minimum wage law, the Fair Minimum Wage Act of 2007.42 While 78 changes in minimum
wage resulted from the Act, the other 164 events were due to state ordinances. Table 12
41David et al. (2016) document all minimum wage law changes between 1979-2012. My table differs
slightly from David et al. (2016) because I extend the sample through 2015 and include DC. Additionally, I
have corrected errors in the minimum wages of Pennsylvania and Colorado.
42The Act raised the federal minimum wage in three stages: to $5.85 60 days after enactment (2007-07-24),
to $6.55 one year after that (2008-07-24), then finally to $7.25 one year after that (2009-07-24).
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highlights two important patterns. First, at least 5 states change their effective minimum
wage every year. Second, there is significant variation in how often states change their
minimum wages. For example, Georgia only changed its minimum wage three times in
line with federal minimum wage policy. On the contrary, its neighbor, Florida, makes the
most minimum wage adjustments, changing 11 times.43 Overall, the effective minimum
wage increases $0.54 per change on average, but with substantial variation (Table 13). The
largest change ($1.90) happened in Michigan in 2005, while the smallest increment ($0.04)
happened in Florida in 2010.
One limitation is the scarcity of city-level minimum wage ordinances. Before 2012, only five
localities had their own minimum wage laws. As of September 2017, 39 counties and cities
have passed local minimum wage ordinances. Due to limited data, I evaluate the effect
of county-level minimum wage indirectly. I estimate the baseline model using state-level
minimum wage variation but focus on the resulting county-level labor market outcomes.
Then, the effect of the county-level minimum wage will be inferred using contiguous border
county pairs.
1.10.2. The raw ACS 2005-2015 PUMA database cleanup
First, I merge the three raw ACS 2005-2007, 2008-2010 and 2011-2015 data files into one
that contains all the relevant variables between 2005-2015. The raw ACS files are down-
loaded directly from the US Census Bureau, following https://www.census.gov/programs-
surveys/acs/data/pums.html. From year 2012, the ACS starts to use the 2010 version of
Public Use Microdata Areas (PUMAs). Therefore, I further use the 2000-2010 PUMA
crosswalk (https://usa.ipums.org/usa/volii/puma00 puma10 crosswalk pop.shtml) to map
the 2010 PUMA definitions to 2000 PUMA definitions for all the years after 2010. The
variables obtained from the raw database are reported in Table 14. The wage measures
are adjusted for inflation to be “2015 dollars” equivalent. I further put an age restriction
16 ≤ age ≤ 30 on the population.
43Two changes happened in 2009.
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Table 12: Variation in State Minimum Wages (2005-2015)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Changes
FederalMW 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.85 6.55 7.25 7.25 7.25 7.25 7.25 7.25 3
Alabama 3
Alaska 7.15 7.15 7.15 7.15 7.15 7.75 7.75 7.75 7.75 7.75 8.75 3
Arizona 6.75 6.90 7.25 7.35 7.65 7.80 7.90 8.05 8
Arkansas 6.25 6.25 7.50 4
California 6.75 6.75 7.50 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 9.00 9.00 3
Colorado 6.85 7.02 7.28 7.28 7.36 7.64 7.78 8.00 8.23 8
Connecticut 7.10 7.40 7.65 7.65 8.00 8.25 8.25 8.25 8.25 8.70 9.15 6
Delaware 6.15 6.15 6.65 7.15 7.15 7.75 8.25 5
D.C. 6.60 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.55 8.25 8.25 8.25 8.25 9.50 10.5 7
Florida 6.15 6.40 6.67 6.79 7.21 7.31 7.67 7.79 7.93 8.05 11
Georgia 3
Hawaii 6.25 6.75 7.25 7.25 7.25 3
Idaho 3
Illinois 6.50 6.50 7.00 7.63 7.88 8.13 8.25 8.25 8.25 8.25 8.25 5
Indiana 3
Iowa 6.20 7.25 7.25 2
Kansas 3
Kentucky 3
Louisiana 3
Maine 6.35 6.50 6.75 7.00 7.25 7.50 7.50 7.50 7.50 7.50 7.50 5
Maryland 6.15 6.15 6.15 8.25 4
Massachusetts 6.75 6.75 7.50 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 9.00 3
Michigan 7.05 7.28 7.40 7.40 7.40 7.40 7.40 8.15 8.15 4
Minnesota 6.15 6.15 6.15 8.00 9.00 5
Mississippi 3
Missouri 6.50 6.65 7.05 7.35 7.50 7.65 7
Montana 6.15 6.25 6.90 7.35 7.65 7.80 7.90 8.05 10
Nebraska 8.00 4
Nevada 6.24 6.59 7.20 7.55 8.25 8.25 8.25 8.25 8.25 5
NewHampshire 3
NewJersey 6.15 7.15 7.15 7.15 7.25 8.25 8.38 5
NewMexico 6.50 7.50 7.50 7.50 7.50 7.50 7.50 7.50 4
NewYork 6.00 6.75 7.15 7.15 7.15 8.00 8.75 6
NorthCarolina 6.15 6.15 3
NorthDakota 3
Ohio 6.85 7.00 7.30 7.30 7.40 7.70 7.85 7.95 8.10 8
Oklahoma 3
Oregon 7.25 7.50 7.80 7.95 8.40 8.40 8.50 8.80 8.95 9.10 9.25 10
Pennsylvania 6.70 7.15 7.15 6
Rhodeisland 6.75 7.10 7.40 7.40 7.40 7.40 7.40 7.40 7.75 8.00 9.00 5
SouthCarolina 3
SouthDakota 8.50 4
Tennessee 3
Texas 3
Utah 3
Vermont 7.00 7.25 7.53 7.68 8.06 8.06 8.15 8.46 8.60 8.73 9.15 10
Virginia 3
Washington 7.35 7.63 7.93 8.07 8.55 8.55 8.67 9.04 9.19 9.32 9.47 10
WestVirginia 6.20 6.90 7.25 8.00 4
Wisconsin 5.70 6.50 6.50 6.50 4
Wyoming 3
Changes 12 17 47 45 47 5 9 8 10 18 24 242
Note: Two minimum wage changes happened in 2009 for Florida.
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Table 13: Summary Statistics of State-Level Effective Minimum Wage Changes (2005-2015)
Year Counts Mean S.D. Min Max
2005 12 0.621 0.475 0.10 1.45
2006 17 0.605 0.463 0.15 1.85
2007 47 0.831 0.527 0.25 1.90
2008 45 0.541 0.285 0.10 1.35
2009 47 0.533 0.206 0.05 1.00
2010 5 0.548 0.234 0.04 0.70
2011 9 0.160 0.190 0.06 0.70
2012 8 0.315 0.032 0.28 0.37
2013 10 0.160 0.068 0.10 0.35
2014 18 0.362 0.321 0.10 1.00
2015 24 0.629 0.467 0.12 1.85
Total 212 0.538 0.370 0.04 1.90
Note: All units are in nominal dollars.
Table 14: Variables obtained from the raw ACS
Variables Variable labels
serialno Housing unit/GQ person serial number
puma Public use microdata area code
st State code
adjinc Adjustment factor for income and earnings dollar amounts
agep Age
pwgtp Person’s weight replicate
migpuma Migration PUMA
migsp Migration recode - state or foreign country code
powpuma Place of work PUMA
powsp Place of work - State or foreign country recode
schl Educational attainment
esr Employment status recode
wagp Wages or salary income past 12 months
wkhp Usual hours worked per week past 12 months
wkw Weeks worked during past 12 months
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Table 15: Converting individual-level observations to county-level moments
Individual-level
variables
County-level variables Definition RAW
ACS
High type
dummy
High type fraction Education attainment is high school graduate or above schl
Low type dummy Low type fraction Education attainment is high school dropouts schl
Employment
dummy
Employment rate by
types (high and low)
(1) Employed at work and (2) employed with a job but
not at work
esr
Hourly wage Average hourly wage by
types (high and low)
“Wages or salary income past 12 months”(wagp)
divided by the product of “usual hours worked per week
past 12 months”(wkhp) and “weeks worked during past
12 months”(wkw)
wagp,
wkhp,
wkw
Migrants dummy The fraction of migrants
by types (high and low)
Individuals who report a migration states (not N/A) migsp
Commuters
dummy
The fraction of
commuters by types
(high and low)
Individuals who report the place of work different from
the place of residence
powsp
Labor force
dummy
Labor force
participation rate by
type (high and low)
(1) Employed at work, (2) employed with a job but not
at work and (3) unemployed
esr
Next, I convert the individual-level observations into county-level moments, reported in Ta-
ble 15. The biggest challenge in this process is that the basic geographic units for respon-
dents in ACS is “Public Use Micro Areas”(PUMAs) rather than any jurisdiction geographic
entity (i.e. county, city, etc.) in order to comply with census non-identifiable disclosure
rule. Therefore, I instead construct the “pseudo” county-level statistics by the following
two steps: (1) First, I construct the PUMA-level summary statistics from the corresponding
individual-level variables. (2) Second, I impute the county-based measures from the corre-
sponding PUMA-based measures following the crosswalk provided by Michigan Population
Studies Center http://www.psc.isr.umich.edu/dis/census/Features/puma2cnty/. The new
constructed county-level variables are reported in second column in Table 15, while the
original individual-level variables are displayed in first column.
Finally, I label the adjacent counties on the state borderline, consistent with the classifica-
tion showed in figure 1. Table 2 and the second panel in table 3 report conditional statistics
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Table 16: County-level moments obtained from QWI
Variables Definition Raw QWI
Average monthly
earnings
Average monthly earnings of employees who worked on the
first day of the reference quarter.
EarnBeg
Employment Estimate of the total number of jobs on the first day of the
reference quarter.
Emp
Hire rate The number of workers who started a new job at any point
of the specific quarter as a share of employment
HirA/Emp
Separation rate The number of workers whose job in the previous quarter
continued and ended in the given quarter
SepBeg/Emp
both by educational types and by interior/borderline locations.
1.10.3. The raw QWI 2005Q1-2015Q4 database cleanup
The time series of county-level variables from QWI are directly obtained through LED
extraction tool https://ledextract.ces.census.gov/static/data.html. The age group 19-21,
22-24, 25-34 are selected. The variables displayed in table 16 are calculated and used in
this paper.
1.10.4. Creating the merged sample using multiple data sources
In this session, I will report the final step to merge multiple data sources together into the
final completed sample. First, I will use QWI as the baseline data sample. Second, I will
merge the ACS into QWI. Third, I will further merge other county-level moments from
several different data sources.
• Step 1: build the baseline data structure with QWI variables. I create
a balanced panel of all contiguous county-pairs with quarterly frequency between
2005Q1-2015Q4. (Obs. 43,596) Then I only keep the observations when one of the two
counties changes its minimum wage at quarter t and the information for the following
quarter t + 1 is still completed. (Obs. 3,278) I only keep one quarter observation if
minimum wage changes multiple times in one year. (Obs. 2,886)
69
Table 17: Key moments from other data sources
Variables Definition Data source Year Completeness
Bargaining power
αj
The annual payroll expenditure in account for
the employer value of sales, shipments, receipts,
revenue, or business done in restaurant industry
(NAICS:722)
Economy Wide Key
Statistics (EWKS)
2012 2,243
Matching
technology ωj
The number of divided by the number of total
ads and reflects the latest month for which
unemployment data is available
The Conference board
Help Wanted OnLine
(HWOL)
2017.4 2,306
The centroid
distance djj′
- Dube et al. (2010). - 2,314
The local
amenity γj
Median gross rent 2011-2015 American
Community Survey
2012 2,314
• Step 2: merge with the pseudo county-level ACS 05-15 variables. I merge
the ACS into QWI using the indicator combining county-pair and year. I use the QWI
data from step 1 as the master file for the merge. Then I only keep all the observation
with positive shares of both migrants and commuters. (Obs. 2,314)
• Step 3: merge additional other variables from several different databases.
I merge several key variables from other data sources which are displayed in the fol-
lowing table. The final sample covers 2,243 observations with all variables completed.
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CHAPTER 2 : A Dynamic Model of Personality, Schooling, and Occupational
Choice
Petra Todd and Weilong Zhang
2.1. Introduction
It has long been recognized that cognitive skills are important determinants of labor mar-
ket success, but there is increasing evidence that noncognitive skills also play a salient
role.(Becker (1964); Griliches (1977)) For example, using data from the Perry Preschool
randomized experiment, Heckman et al. (2010) find that the ability to plan and to exert
self-control significantly affects lifetime earnings and employment. Devising effective so-
cial policies that maximize the potential for human development requires an understanding
of the mechanisms through which cognitive and noncognitive skills evolve and influence
individuals’ education and labor market trajectories.
This paper develops and estimates a dynamic model of schooling, work, and occupational
choices that incorporates noncognitive personality traits, as measured by the so-called “Big
Five.” Our model allows both cognitive and noncognitive traits to influence educational and
labor market outcomes through multiple channels, by affecting pecuniary or nonpecuniary
returns from schooling and by affecting the reward from choosing white or blue collar
occupations. Our analysis is inspired in part by the pioneering work of Keane and Wolpin
(1997) that estimates a similar type of model without personality traits.
A key finding from Keane and Wolpin (1997) analysis is that 90 percent of the total variance
in expected lifetime utility is explained by unobserved skill endowments at age 16. The im-
portance of unobserved heterogeneity in explaining educational and labor market outcomes
has also been emphasized in other studies. For example, Yamaguchi (2012) finds that en-
dowment differences prior to labor market entry account for 70% of the log-wage variance
in the first year and 35% after 20 years. Sullivan (2010) finds that 56% of the variance
in discounted expected lifetime utility is explained by initial heterogeneity. Huggett et al.
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(2011) conclude that 61.5 percent of the variation in lifetime earnings and 64.0 percent of
the variation in lifetime utility is attributable to initial conditions.
Although accumulated evidence clearly points to the importance of endowment heterogene-
ity in explaining educational and labor market trajectories, its precise components remain
unclear. Keane and Wolpin (1997) find that family background accounts for less than 10
percent of the total variation in lifetime utility and that adding cognitive ability only in-
creases the explained variation to 14 percent. Prior studies have not considered the potential
role of personality traits as a component of endowment heterogeneity because the datasets
typically used do not include personality trait measurements.
In the psychology literature, personality traits have been shown to be correlated with many
aspects of individuals’ lives. However, study of their effects on economic outcomes is rela-
tively scarce. (Almlund et al. (2011)) The five-factor model (so called “Big-five”) is the most
widely adopted measurement of personality in both psychology (Goldberg (1992a);Saucier
(1994);Gosling et al. (2003)) and economics (Borghans et al. (2008)). The Big Five traits in-
clude openness to experience, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness and neuroticism
(OCEAN). The meaning of these traits and their determination will be further described
below.
The dynamic model of schooling, work and occupational choices that we estimate assumes
that individuals make one of four mutually exclusive choices: attending school, staying
home, working in a white-collar job or working in a blue-collar job from ages 15 to 58.
Individual endowments at age 15 consist of personality traits, cognitive ability, and family
background characteristics, which include parental schooling, number of siblings, sibling
order and whether the person lived with both parents at age 14. To allow for unobserved
heterogeneity in a tractable way, we assume each individual is one of four types (denoted I-
IV). An individual’s type potentially affects their pecuniary and nonpecuniary reward from
choosing particular schooling or work options. In the dynamic discrete choice literature, it
is common to assume unobserved types are fixed over time (e.g. Keane and Wolpin (1997),
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Yamaguchi (2012), Sullivan (2010)). Our model begins at age 15. At this age, it has
been shown that the ranking of cognitive ability is relatively stable. However, personality
traits still evolve until the mid 30s. We incorporate personality traits into our model in a
parsimonious way as a determinant of the unobserved types and we allow the distribution of
unobservable heterogeneity to change over time. We therefore allow the unobserved types,
which depend in part on personality traits, to change with age. We implement a likelihood
ratio test for type stability over the life-cycle, which we strongly reject in our data.
The model is estimated using the Household Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia
(HILDA) longitudinal data set, waves 1(2001) through 13(2013). The data have repeated
measures of the Big-Five personality traits as well as measures of cognitive ability. Our
estimation results show that the unobserved types are malleable, particularly at early ages.
At age 15, individuals have on average a 40% probability to change type, but by age 36
their type stabilizes. Our results are broadly consistent with findings from some psychology
studies on personality trait stability. For example, Terracciano et al. (2006) and Terracciano
et al. (2010) report that intra-individual stability increases up to age 30 and thereafter
stabilizes.
We use the estimated model to evaluate two education policies: making senior secondary
school compulsory and providing a 50% cost subsidy to attend college. Both policies provide
incentives to enroll in school but differ in their distributional implications. We find that
individuals belonging to types I and IV have a comparative advantage in education and
receive the most benefit from the college subsidy policy. Their average number of years
of completed education increases by around one year, in comparison to half a year on
average for types II and III. In contrast, the impacts of compulsory senior second school
are concentrated on types II and III, who tend to come from lower SES backgrounds. The
average increase in years of education is around one-half for these two types but close to
zero for the other two types. Thus, the two policies both increase average years of education
but have very different distributional effects.
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To study the relevance of personality traits in assessing impacts of these educational policies,
we also estimate a model with fixed types. When this channel is shut down, we find that
there is less incentive for disadvantaged groups to pursue education, because they no longer
have the potential to alter their disadvantaged types. The increase in annual earnings
attributable to the policy intervention is significantly smaller in the fixed type model. In
other words, the inequality in the distribution of the policy effect is significantly overstated
in the restricted fixed type model.
This paper is organized as follows: Section II reviews the literature. Section III describes
the HILDA data and the Big-Five measures. Section IV describes the general structure
of our model and its econometric implementation. Section V discusses the identification
strategy and estimation method. Section VI explains our estimation strategy. Section VII
presents the estimation results and provides information for the goodness of model fit. The
model implications are discussed in section VIII. Section IX reports results from the two
policy experiments and section X concludes.
2.2. Related Literature
The “Big Five” personality traits are defined as follows: (1) extraversion: an orientation
of one’s interests and energies toward the outer world of people and things rather than the
inner world of subjective experience; characterized by positive affect and sociability, (2)
neuroticism: a chronic level of emotional instability and proneness to psychological distress.
Emotional stability is predictability and consistency in emotional reactions, with absence
of rapid mood changes, (3) openness to experience/intellect: the tendency to be open to
new esthetic, cultural, or intellectual experiences, (4) conscientiousness: the tendency to be
organized, responsible, and hardworking and (5) agreeableness: the tendency to act in a
cooperative, unselfish manner.
Several studies examine the influence of personality traits on wage performance and occu-
pational choices. For example, both Nyhus and Pons (2005) and Salgado (1997) find that
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emotional stability and conscientiousness are strongly correlated with wage and job perfor-
mance. Cubel et al. (2016) examine whether Big Five personality traits affect productivity
using data gathered in a laboratory setting where the task effort is directly measurable.
They find that individuals who exhibit high levels of conscientiousness and higher emo-
tional stability perform better on the task. Fletcher (2013) uses data on siblings and finds
a robust relationship between personality traits and wages using sibling samples. Specifi-
cally, conscientiousness, emotional stability, extraversion and openness to experience were
all found to positively affect wages. There are few papers that examine the correlation
between personality traits and educational attainment. Personality traits are predictive of
educational attainment. For example, Lundberg (2013) finds positive correlations between
personality traits (such as conscientiousness, agreeableness and openness to experience) and
college entrance. However, personality traits may also be changed by education experience.
Dahmann and Anger (2014) and Schurer et al. (2015) note that educational experiences in
secondary school and at university shape students’ personality.
Our paper is also related to the burgeoning literature examining the process of noncognitive
skill formation. Heckman et al. (2006) study the effect of non-cognitive skills on schooling de-
cisions and subsequent labour market outcomes, allowing schooling and family background
to influence be potential determinants of skill formation. Cunha and Heckman (2008) esti-
mate a linear dynamic model to study the formation of cognitive and non-cognitive skill as
it depends on parental investment. Heckman and Raut (2016) formulate a dynamic struc-
tural model that integrates preschool investment choices that affect skill formation with
schooling and earning outcomes later in life.
2.3. Data
The analysis is based on a sample of individuals from the Household Income and Labour
Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) longitudinal data set. HILDA is a representative one in
one thousand sample of the Australian population. It is an ongoing annual dataset starting
from the year 2001 with 19,914 initial individuals from 7,682 households. (Summerfield et al.
75
(2014)) Our paper makes use of the following variables: (1) labor market outcomes including
occupational information (coded following the ANZSCO system1), annual labor earnings
and working hours; (2) family background information including parental education levels,
sibling number and order as well as measures of household intactness; (3) education levels
ranging from senior secondary school until the highest degree; (4) cognitive ability measured
in wave 12; and (5) the “Big-five” personality traits assessment repeatedly collected in wave
5, 9 and 13.
Table 18: Definitions and examples of the ANZSCO coding of occupations
Collar Occupations Examples 
White 
Collar 
Managers Legislators, senior officials 
Corporate/general managers 
Professionals Professionals, Physician, mathematician, 
Engineer and life science. 
Technicians and  
tradespersons 
Technicians and associate professionals, 
 Physical and engineering scientists, 
Life science and health association  
Blue  
Collar 
Community and  
personal service workers 
Office clerks, Customer service clerks 
Clerical and  
administrative workers 
Service workers and shop workers, 
Personal and protective service workers 
Models, salespersons 
Sales workers Sales representative, insurance brokers, checkout 
operator, models and telemarketers, 
Machinery operators  
and drivers 
Industrial spraypainter, sewing machinist, motion 
picture projectionist, crane operator, forklift driver, 
and train driver 
Labourers Cleaners, steel fixer, product assembler, packer, 
slaughter, farm worker, kitchen hand, freight 
handler and handypersons 
 
To the best of our knowledge, HILDA has the best quality measures of personality traits
among all nationwide data sets. For the majority of respondents, we observe three repeated
measurements of personality traits over an eight-years time window.2 HILDA’s “Big-Five”
1In practice, we classify all occupations into two categories: blue-collar job and white-collar job. White
collar jobs includes managers, professionals, technicians and tradesperson. Blue collar jobs include commu-
nity and personal service workers, clerical and administrative workers, sales workers, machinery operators
and drivers as well as labourers. See table 18 for details.
2One alternative national-wide data set providing personality traits inventory assessment is German
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Table 19: The survey illustration of personality questionnaire
+ +
+ 10 +LIA M 2005              
✘
B17 Does your household regularly pay someone to
do any of the housework (cleaning, washing,
ironing, cooking, etc)? (Cross        one box)  
Yes
No 
✘
B18 Does your household regularly pay someone to
do any gardening or lawn mowing?
(Cross        one box)  
Yes
No
B19 How well do the following words describe you? For each word, cross one box to indicate how well that
word describes you. There are no right or wrong answers.
(Cross         one box for each word.)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Does not describe
me at all
Describes 
me very well
talkative
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Does not describe
me at all
Describes 
me very well
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
sympathetic
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
orderly
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
envious
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
jealous
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
deep
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
intellectual
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
withdrawn
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
extroverted
cold
disorganised
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
harsh
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
temperamental
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
complex
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
shy
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
systematic
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
warm
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
moody
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
efficient
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
philosophical
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
fretfulbashful
kind imaginative
inefficient
touchy
creative
quiet
cooperative
sloppy
✘
enthusiastic
selfish
careless
calm
traditional
lively
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ELSPAYGD 
EPNJEAL
EPNINTEL
EPNEXTRO 
EPNCOLD
EPNDORG
EPNTEMP
EPNCOMPX
EPNSHY
EPNWARM
EPNEFFIC 
EPNFRET 
EPNIMAG 
EPNENTH
EPNSELF
EPNCLESS
EPNCALM
EPNTRAD
EPNLIVLY
Wave 5 Self Completion Questionnaire e120c
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1
2
1
2
ELSPAYHW
EPNTALK
EPNSYMP
EPNORDER
EPNENVY
EPNDEEP
EPNWD
EPNHARSH
EPNSYST
EPNMOODY
EPNPHIL
EPNBFUL
EPNKIND
EPNINEFF
EPNTOUCH
EPNCREAT
EPNQUIET 
EPNCOOP 
EPNSOPPY 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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information is based on 36 personality questions.(table 19) Respondents were asked to pick
a number between 1 to 7 to assess how well each personality adjective describes them. The
lowest number 1 denotes a total opposite description and the highest number 7 denotes
a perfect description. According to Losoncz (2009), only 28 of 36 items load well into
their corresponding components when performing factor analysis. The other 8 items are
discarded due to either their low loading value or their ambiguity on several traits.3 The
construction of “Big-five” in our paper follows the approach of Losoncz (2009). Big-five
personality traits are available for 4,938 males aged 15-58 interviewed in wave 5. The traits
are recorded for is 5,048 and 6,771 respondents in wave 9 and wave 13, respectively. We
include all individuals who have at least one measure of personality traits in our estimation
sample.4
Cognitive ability is only surveyed once in wave 12.5 We construct a one-dimensional mea-
sure of cognitive ability from three different measurements: (i) Backward Digits Span, (ii)
Symbol Digits Modalities and (iii) a 25-item version of the National Adult Reading Test.
2.3.1. Additional background variables and sample restrictions
In addition to the cognitive and noncognitive trait measures described above, we use the
following information in our analysis: sibling information (including whether the person has
siblings, whether he is the eldest child in the family and how many siblings), an indicator
of growing up in an intact family, parental education, and parental working information.6
We also include state of residence and cohort information.
Our estimation focuses on males between age 15-58. Women are not included to avoid
additional complication of modeling marriage and fertility decisions, which may impact
Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) study. GSOEP also surveys “Big-five” three times in years 2005, 2009 and
2013.
3The way to check each item’ loading performance is to calculate the loading value after doing oblimin
rotation. The loading values of 8 abandoned items were either lower than 0.45, or did not load more than
1.25 times higher on the expected factor than any other factor.(Losoncz (2009))
4A detailed comparison of the personality traits measurement between three waves will be provided in
section 2.3.3.
5According to the report of Wooden (2013), the response rate is high, approximately 93%.
6All the parental questions are conditional on the situation when the respondent was at the age of 14.
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schooling and labor supply decisions to a larger extent. We exclude the persons age 58 or
older because many people are retired by that age. Individuals serving in the military are
also dropped. Lastly, we drop person-year observations that are missing information on
the state space variables in our model. The remaining sample has 36,639 observations from
4,215 individuals in total.
Selected summary statistics of individual’s characteristics are reported in table 20. Our
sample is distributed across eight states and territories.7 83.4% of individuals report residing
in an intact family at the age of 14, whereas 7.34% of individuals lived only with their
mothers at that age. The majority (96.37%) have siblings. The cases of one, two, three and
four siblings account for 25.63%, 30.71%, 18.20% and 9.94% of the total sample. About one-
third of the individuals (34.32%) are the eldest child in the family. Table 20 also provides
statistics on parental education and occupations when the individual was age 14. 57.98%
of fathers and 37.78% of mothers have a college degree. Most fathers were employed, but
only about half the sample had working mothers. Almost two-thirds of fathers’ jobs were
in white-collar occupations. Half of the working mothers worked in blue-collar jobs.
2.3.2. Educational and occupational choices over life cycle
During the survey, individuals report both school enrollment and employment information
annually. Details include the desired education level and whether they eventually reach
this level.8 The employment information includes employment status, working hours, total
annual earnings and occupational codes.
Figure 12 shows the choice distribution of schooling, staying at home, blue collar jobs and
white collar jobs by age. At age 15, about 80% are enrolled in school but after age 17, this
fraction drops sharply to around 30%. The majority of secondary school graduates choose
to work immediately rather than to continue their tertiary education. The enrollment rate
7They are Australian Capital Territory(ACT), New South Wales(NSW), Victoria(VIC), Queens-
land(QLD), South Australia(SA), Western Australia(WA), Tasmania(TAS) and Northern Territory(NT).
8A rough classification of the tertiary education certificates includes 1. Certificates I-IV; 2. Diploma,
Advanced Diploma, Associate Degree; 3. Bachelor degree and honors; 4. Graduate Certificate and Graduate
Diploma; 5. Master degree; 6. Doctoral degree.
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Table 20: Sample summary statistics
Variable Proportion Variable Proportion
Geographic Information Parental Information
State Father Education
NSW 0.3125 College 0.5798
VIC 0.2496 Not College 0.4202
QLD 0.2009 Mother Education
SA 0.0928 College 0.3778
WA 0.0871 Not College 0.6222
TAS 0.0275 Father Working
NT 0.0057 Employed 0.9558
ACT 0.0240 Not Employed 0.0209
Family background Deceased 0.0233
Family Intactness Father Occupation
Both parents 0.8341 White Collar 0.6485
Father and step 0.0107 Blue Collar 0.3515
Mother and step 0.0427 Mother Working
Father only 0.0233 Employed 0.5488
Mother only 0.0734 Not Employed 0.4139
Other 0.0158 Deceased 0.0720
Sibling Info Not Asked 0.0302
Sibling dummy Mother Occupation
Has siblings 0.9637 Not Asked 0.2113
No siblings 0.0373 White Collar 0.2889
Sibling numbers Blue Collar 0.4990
Not Asked 0.0379 Cohort Information
1 0.2563 Year
2 0.3071 1940-1949 0.1038
3 0.1820 1950-1959 0.1919
4 0.0994 1960-1969 0.2358
5 or more 0.1173 1970-1979 0.1913
Eldest Sibling 1980-1989 0.1686
Not Asked 0.0373 1990- 0.1040
Oldest 0.3432
Not Oldest 0.6195 Total Individuals 4215
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Figure 12: Work status and college attendance by age(% of the sample)
keeps decreasing from 19% at age 23 to around 9% at age 34.
An individual is defined to be “working” if reported to be working positive hours and not
enrolled in school. An individual is defined to be “staying home” if he is neither working
nor in school.9 The blue-collar participation rate decreases monotonically from around 50%
at age 18 to around 38% at age 58. The significant increase of the white-collar participation
rate between ages 22 to 25 suggests that a college degree is a prerequisite for many white-
collar occupations. The white collar participation rate continues to increase after age 26,
as some workers switch from blue-collar job to white-collar jobs over time. After age 53,
the option of staying home becomes more prevalent, reflecting the retirement decisions of
participants.
Figure 13 reports the age-earnings profile by two occupations, between ages 18 to 58.10 Both
9We do not distinguish between being unemployed and being out of labor force, as the decision to be
unemployed is always considered voluntary under our model.
10We drop the wage observations between age 15 and age 17 because of two reasons. 1. the observations
are few. 2. A Large fraction of this group are senior school students who only do some part-time jobs. Thus
their choices is classified as schooling according to our definition.
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Figure 13: Average wage profile by occupations over life cycle
the white-collar and blue-collar earning profiles exhibit a hump shape, overall. Prior to age
24, earnings of white-collar and blue-collar workers are similar. Subsequently, however, the
shape of the blue-collar earnings profile becomes flatter and then stops growing after age
28. The white-collar earnings profile keeps increasing until the mid-30s. Peak average earn-
ings from blue-collar jobs is around AU$48,000, whereas the peak from white-collar jobs
is around AU$85,000. Earnings in both sectors decrease slightly at older ages. Data on
personality traits are gathered in 2005, 2009 and 2013. Table 21 reports the average per-
sonality trait scores for three different educational levels: senior secondary school or lower,
college dropouts and college graduates. In general, the group with higher educational at-
tainment has higher scores of emotional stability, openness to experience, conscientiousness,
and agreeableness. However, this group tends to be less extraverted. Table 22 reports the
difference in personality traits between workers in white-collar and blue-collar jobs. Work-
ers in white-collar occupations are more likely to be emotionally stable, open to experience,
and conscientious, but are less extraverted. The most significant differences are seen in
conscientiousness and openness to experience.
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Table 21: Average personality traits by educational level
Occupation Emotional Stability Openness to experience Conscientiousness Agreeableness Extroversion
High School -0.0478 -0.1414 -.0784 -0.0508 0.0393
or Lower (0.0140) (0.0139) (0.0138) (0.0141) (0.0133)
College 0.0258 0.0605 0.1033 0.0765 -0.0056
Dropouts (0.0354) (0.0338) (0.0349) (0.0345) (0.0358)
College 0.1043 0.3096 0.1430 0.0839 -0.0997
Graduates (0.0208) (0.0202) (0.0217) (0.0208) (0.0232)
Note: Each personality trait was standardized to have mean 0, variance 1.
Source: HILDA, waves 5, 9 and 13.
Table 22: Average personality traits by occupation category
Occupation Emotional Stability Openness to experience Conscientiousness Agreeableness Extroversion
Blue-collar -0.0366 -0.1715 -.0464 -0.0208 0.0215
(0.0166) (0.0162) (0.0162) (0.0168) (0.0158)
White-collar 0.0797 0.1507 0.1360 0.0573 -0.0127
(0.0166) (0.0164) (0.0171) (0.0164) (0.0179)
Note: Each personality trait has been standardized to have mean 0, variance 1.
Source: HILDA, waves 5, 9 and 13.
2.3.3. Stability of personality traits
The stability of personality traits is an important issue discussed both in the psychology
and economics literature. Some studies find that personality traits are stable for adults
(Terracciano et al. (2006), Terracciano et al. (2010)). Other studies find evidence of changing
personality traits, particularly during younger ages (Almlund et al. (2011), Cunha and
Heckman (2007), Cunha et al. (2010)). In this section, we use the HILDA data to examine
the malleability of personality traits over the life cycle. We calculate average personality
trait scores over the life cycle using the wave 13 sample (figure 14). After that, we investigate
how working and schooling behaviors correlate with observed changes in personality (table
23), the main channel through which personality impacts agents in the structural model.
Figures 14(a) to 14(e) present the average score of “big-five” over the life cycle using the 2013
wave. Compared with the other three traits, openness to experience and emotional stability
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are relatively more persistent. Conscientiousness and agreeableness increase over time,
with the greatest increase observed among respondents under the age of 35. Extraversion
decreases with age until age 35, and then stays stable. Overall, traits appear to be more
malleable for younger respondents.
We next investigate how education and working experiences correlate with personality
change. To this end, we regress the changes of the Big-Five personality scores, standardized
to mean 0 and variance 1, in the medium-run and in the long-run, defined as between years
2005-2008 and years 2005-2013, on years of experience in blue-collar and white-collar jobs
and on years of schooling. The estimates are shown in table 23. Occupational experience
shows little relationship with personality changes but education is related. During an eight-
year time window, a male with one more year of schooling becomes more agreeable (0.032
std. dev.) and more conscientious (0.066 std dev.). The intercept term captures the age
trend in personality traits and shows an increase in conscientiousness (0.105 std dev.) and
emotional stability (0.090 std dev.) per one-year age growth.
Table 23: Medium and long-run changes in Big-Five personality and education/occupation
Extraversion Agreeableness Conscientiousness Stability Openness
Medium Long Medium Long Medium Long Medium Long Medium Long
Education -0.009 0.005 0.049∗∗ 0.032∗ 0.022 0.066∗∗ 0.004 0.017 0.022 0.012
(0.022) (0.017) (0.023) (0.018) (0.023) (0.018) (0.026) (0.020) (0.023) (0.018)
White Collar -0.002 -0.008 0.007 0.006 -0.012 0.002 -0.010 0.001 0.000 -0.001
(0.013) (0.008) (0.014) (0.008) (0.014) (0.008) (0.016) (0.009) (0.014) (0.008)
Blue Collar -0.011 −0.016∗∗ 0.014 0.011 0.003 0.001 -0.016 0.004 -0.013 -0.006
(0.014) (0.008) (0.015) (0.008) (0.014) (0.008) (0.016) (0.009) (0.014) (0.008)
Trend 0.004 0.031 -0.052 0.019 0.078 0.105∗ 0.142∗∗ 0.090 -0.039 0.044
(0.056) (0.053) (0.060) (0.056) (0.059) (0.057) (0.067) (0.064) (0.059) (0.056)
Note: * 10% significance level. ** 5% significance level. Standard errors in parentheses.
Source: HILDA, wave 5, 9 and 13.
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Figure 14: The scores of “Big-Five” personality traits over time
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2.3.4. Correlation between personality traits and schooling and occupational choices
We next estimate probit and linear regression models to investigate how personality traits
correlate with individuals’ college attendance and occupational choice decisions and wage
performance. D = 1 if an individual has ever attended any form of college education by age
26, else D = 0. D0 = 0 for individuals with blue-collar jobs and D0 = 1 for individuals with
white-collar jobs.
Pr(D = 1) = Φ(XβD + λ
′
Dθn + γ
′
DC + εD)
Pr(Do = 1) = Φ(XβDo + λ
′
Doθn + γ
′
DoC + εDo )
logw00 = Xβ00 + λ
′
00θn + γ
′
00C + ε00 D = 0 & Do = 0
logw10 = Xβ10 + λ
′
10θn + γ
′
01C + ε10 D = 1 & Do = 0
logw01 = Xβ01 + λ
′
01θn + γ
′
10C + ε01 D = 0 & Do = 1
logw11 = Xβ11 + λ
′
11θn + γ
′
11C + ε11 D = 1 & Do = 1
wD,Do represents the average earnings between ages 26-30 conditional on the schooling choice
D and occupational choice Do . The X variables include family background characteristics
including an intact family dummy, parental occupations, parental education level, sibling
number, sibling order, cohort effect and geographical locations. θn denotes the mean value
of “Big-five” measurements in wave 5, 9 and 13.11 C represents the value of cognitive ability.
Table 24 shows how personality traits and cognitive ability relate to college attendance de-
cisions. Probit 1 only includes personality traits only whereas probit 2 includes additional
controls for family background characteristics. The estimates indicate that the college atten-
11We normalized the score of each trait to be mean 0 and variance 1 before taking the average values
across three data waves.
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dance is mainly correlated with openness to experience, conscientiousness and extraversion.
A unit standard deviation in extraversion decreases college attendance by 4.5 percentage
points, whereas the same increase in openness to experience and conscientiousness increases
the probability of college enrollment by 6.6 and 4.3 percentage points. For comparison,
a one standard deviation increase in cognitive ability increases the probability of entering
college by 15.7 percentage points.
Table 24: How personality traits and cognitive ability relate to schooling decisions
Probit 1 Marginal Probit 2 Marginal
Emotional Stability 0.084∗∗∗ 0.026 0.057∗ 0.017
Openness 0.228∗∗∗ 0.070 0.219∗∗∗ 0.066
Conscientiousness 0.137 0.042 0.142∗∗∗ 0.043
Agreeableness -0.033∗∗∗ 0.010 0.028 0.008
Extraversion -0.136∗∗∗ -0.042 -0.150∗∗∗ -0.045
Cognitive 0.514∗∗∗ 0.157 0.519∗∗∗ 0.157
Family Characteristics No Yes
Observations 6101 4361
R Square 0.1117 0.1255
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 25 shows the relationship between personality traits and occupational choices. The
first regression only includes personality traits, whereas the second and the third regressions
add family background characteristics and family background characteristics plus college
choices. Conditioning on college attainment and family background, a one standard devi-
ation increases in openness to experience increases the probability of having a white-collar
job by 6.6 percentage points. At the same time, a one standard deviation increase in con-
scientiousness raises the probability of having a white-collar job by 2.4 percentage points.
Table 26 examines how personality traits relate to log wages for four educational and occu-
pational groups. Among all personality traits, conscientiousness and openness to experience
are the dominant traits in predicting wages. A one standard deviation increase in consci-
entiousness increases wages by about 10% for white-collar workers and 7% for blue-collar
workers. Openness to experience, surprisingly has negative effect on wages; the values
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Table 25: How personality traits and cognitive ability relate to occupation
Probit1 Mgn1 Probit2 Mgn2 Probit3 Mgn3
Emotional Stability -0.044 -0.015 -0.049 -0.015 -0.074 -0.022
Openness 0.205∗∗∗ 0.072 0.273∗∗∗ 0.093 0.224∗∗∗ 0.066
Conscientiousness 0.122∗∗∗ 0.043 0.103∗∗∗ 0.035 0.083∗∗ 0.024
Agreeableness -0.016 -0.006 0.041 0.014 0.055 0.016
Extraversion 0.042 0.015 -0.012 -0.004 0.030 0.009
Cognitive 0.664∗∗∗ 0.232 0.573∗∗∗ 0.195 0.353∗∗∗ 0.105
College 1.153∗∗∗ 0.401
Family Characteristics No Yes Yes
Observations 4126 2855 2855
R Square 0.1142 0.1355 0.2399
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
are statistically significantly different from zero for the blue-collar/no-college and white-
collar/college groups.
Table 26: How personality and cognitive ability relate to log wages
Blue Collar White Collar Blue Collar White Collar
No College No College College College
Emotional Stability 0.022 -0.045 0.024 0.001
Openness -0.074∗∗∗ -0.012 -0.078 -0.097∗∗∗
Conscientiousness 0.085∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.067 0.092∗∗∗
Agreeableness -0.040 -0.021 -0.006 -0.046
Extraversion 0.036 0.030 0.113 0.029
Cognitive 0.017 -0.032 -0.041 0.010
Family Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1138 479 223 830
R Square 0.0593 0.0729 0.3095 0.0971
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
2.4. The Model
We develop a discrete choice dynamic programming (DCDP) model of decision-making with
regard to education, employment, and occupation sector over ages 15 to 58. At each age,
individuals maximize their remaining discounted lifetime utility. The choice set in each year
consists of four mutually exclusive options m ∈ M: working in either a blue- or white-collar
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occupation, attending school, or staying home. Let dm(a) = 1 if the alternative m is chosen
at age a, dm(a) = 0 otherwise. Individual endowments at age 15 consist of personality traits,
cognitive ability, and family background characteristics. These include parental schooling,
the number of siblings, sibling order and whether the person lived with both parents at age
14. To allow for unobservable heterogeneity in a tractable way, we assume each individual
is one of four types k(a) = {1, 2, 3, 4}. An individual’s type can affect their pecuniary and
nonpecuniary reward from choosing particular alternatives. One important innovation in
our model that deviates from literature (e.g. Keane and Wolpin (1997)) is that it allows
types to evolve over time in a way that may depend on age and changing personality traits.
We use Θ(a) to represent personality traits and k(a) to denote the unobserved types at age a,
which are assumed to be known by the individual but not known by econometricians. so(a)
represents all other observed state variables. At age 15, the initial type k(15) is determined
by the initial endowment so(15). Then given the initial type k(15) and observed state
variables so(15), the agent chooses the alternative dm(a) that gives the highest continuation
value. The state variables, so(16), are updated according to the choice dm(15), and then
the new type k(16) is drawn depending on so(16) and the type of the previous period k(15).
2.4.1. Laws of motion for so(a) and k(a)
The time-varying part of so(a) consists of four components so that so(a) = (g(a), x1(a), x2(a), Θ(a)).
g(a) represents accumulated education while x1(a) and x2(a) represent accumulated blue-
collar and white-collar experience at age a. We first specify the law of motion for states
g(a), x1(a), x2(a) and then discuss the transition probability functions governing the person-
ality traits Θ(a) and types k(a).
Years of schooling and occupation-specific experience evolve in a deterministic way. More
specifically, the updating of g(a), x1(a) and x2(a) are defined as follows:
g(a) : g(a + 1) = g(a) + dm(a)
xi (a) : xi (a + 1) = xi (a) + dm(a), i = {1, 2}
(2.1)
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As shown in section 2.3.3, personality traits are correlated with education but not with
work experience. We assume that the true n− th personality trait θn ∈ Θ, {n = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}
is measured with error, which the measurement error shock denoted ζn(a). We adopt the
following specification for the evolution of each trait:
θMn (a + 1) = θn(a + 1) + ζn(a + 1)
θn(a + 1) = θn(a) + γ0n + γ1n(a− 15) + γ2nd3(a) + γ3n(a− 15)d3(a)
(2.2)
where θMn (a + 1) is the measure of the nth personality trait at age a + 1 and θn(a + 1) is
the true trait without measurement error. γ0n and γ1n capture the age effects. The term
γ2n + γ3n(a− 15) captures a potential age*education interaction effect.
As previously described, we allow the unobserved types to change in a way that may depend
on age and on personality characteristics. We specify a Markov process through which types
evolve. After the initial period, the type k(a) can stay the same with probability 1 − p(a)
or change to a new type with probability p(a).12 Conditional on a type changing, we use
notation qk(a) to represent the probability of becoming type k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. Let L(a) denote
the Markov transition matrix of types between period a to period a+1. The matrix has the
following form:
L(a) = p(a)

1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1

+ (1− p(a))

qk=1(a) qk=1(a) qk=1(a) qk=1(a)
qk=2(a) qk=2(a) qk=2(a) qk=2(a)
qk=3(a) qk=3(a) qk=3(a) qk=3(a)
qk=4(a) qk=4(a) qk=4(a) qk=4(a)

(2.3)
where
p(a) =
1
1 + exp(γ7 + γ8(a− 15) + γ9(a− 15)2)
(2.4)
qk(a) =
v̄ak (Θ, c)
ΠK=4k=1 v̄
a
k (Θ, c)
(2.5)
12We assume the changing probability p(a) does not vary by type k, so that different types have the same
persistence at the same age.
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log v̄ak (Θ, c) = γ3k +
N=5∑
n=1
γ4knθn(a) + γ5kc +
Z∑
z=1
γ6zkdz + ηk(a) (2.6)
At age 15, the initial types are directly drawn from the distribution qk(15). In subsequent
ages, types are updated following the Markov transition matrix L(a). When p(a) is close
to 0, then L(a) corresponds to an identity matrix I4×4 and the types, k, are fixed. When
p(a) = 1, types do not persist from previous period. We estimate p(a), allowing for the
possibility that types become more or less persistent with age. The probability of each type
qk(a) follows a multinomial logit form (equation 2.5). Equation 2.6 captures the correlation
between types and their determinants, including current personality traits θn(a), cognitive
skill c as well as background characteristics dz(a).
2.4.2. Rewards associated with each alternative
An individual can choose to work in either a blue-collar occupation or a white-collar occu-
pation. The reward to a particular sector include the wage compensation wm(a) and any
non-pecuniary reward rm(a). εm(a) is the preference shock when choosing m − th alterna-
tive. m = 1 denotes the blue-collar alternative and m = 2 the white-collar alternative. This
yields the following utility function at age a:
um(a) = wm(a) + rm(a) + εm(a),m = {1, 2} (2.7)
As in Keane and Wolpin (1997), the wage is specified as a human capital pricing equation.
It is given by the product of the price per unit of human capital pm and the amount of
human capital em(a) embodied in the individual. That is wm(a) = pmem(a). Human capital
is accumulated through work experience and by attending school:
em(a) = exp(e
k
m +
I∑
i=1
βm0idi + βm1g(a) + (βm2 + βm3I{xm(a) ≤ 2})xm(a)
+ βm4x
2
m(a) + βm5xm(a)g(a) + ξm(a))
(2.8)
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which yields a log-wage equation the form:
logwm(a) = log pm + e
k
m +
I∑
i=1
βm0idi + βm1g(a) + (βm2 + βm3I{xm(a) ≤ 2})xm(a)
+ βm4x
2
m(a) + βm5xm(a)g(a) + ξm(a)
(2.9)
In (2.9), di , i ∈ {state × cohort} denotes a fixed effect of being a member of particular
age cohort and residing in a particular state. ekm is the type-specific component of reward,
which represents the advantage or disadvantage of type k when choosing alternative m.
g(a) represents the years of schooling and xm(a) denotes the working experience in sector
m. The component βm3I{xm(a) ≤ 2}xm(a) captures a potential differential in returns to
experience when the agent is new in an occupation (has two years or less experience). The
component βm5xm(a)g(a) captures the interaction term between working experience xm(a)
and education year g(a), included to allow returns to experience to differ with education.
ξm(a) is a skill technology shock, which follows a i.i.d. normal distribution.
The second term in equation (2.7), rm(a), represents nonpecuniary aspects of choosing a
certain occupation (such as working hours flexibility) expressed in monetary equivalent
units. For the purpose of identification, we normalize the nonpecuniary utility from white-
collar job r1(a) equal to 0. We allow the non-pecuniary utility from the blue-collar job r2(a)
to vary with education level.
r1(a) = 0
r2(a) = β5 + β6I [g(a) ≤ 12]
(2.10)
If a person chooses to attend school, the per-period utility consists of two parts: a nonpe-
cuniary component, which may reflect such as physical and mental costs when attending
school, and a pecuniary component, such as tuition costs and fees. Thus, we have a school
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utility at age a defined by:
u3(a) = e
k
3 +
Z∑
z=1
αzdz +
R∑
r=1
αrdr + α0I (age < 19)− α1I (college)
− α2I (graduate) + ε3(a)
(2.11)
The indicator dz captures the potential effect of family background on a person’s preference
for attending school.13 dr is a cohort-specific effect. The term α0I (age < 19) captures the
extra utility of attending school when the agent is under the age 19. α3 and α4 are per
period schooling costs of attending college and attending graduate school. Lastly, ek3 is the
type-specific reward from attending school.
The reward from staying home, u4(a), consists of the type-specific component e
k
4 , an age
effect and an age squared effect, α3 and α4, and a home-staying preference shock ε4(a), i.e.:
u4(a) = e
k
4 + α3 · age + α4 · age2 + ε4(a) (2.12)
It is worthwhile to mention that personality traits do not directly appear in the choice-
specific utilities. Instead, they affect the choices indirectly through their influence on an
individual’s type probability. In addition, different types have different type-specific com-
ponent ekm in each choice m. This structure reduces the dimensionality of the state space as
it avoids the need to include a five-dimensional personality trait vector in the time-varying
state space.
2.4.3. Information structure
In our model, individual heterogeneity comes from two sources: ex-ante endowments s(15)14
and ex-post realized shocks (εm(a), ξm(a), ζn(a), ηk(a)). In terms of timing, we assume that
the shocks governing the evolution of personality and of types are realized first, allowing
13The family background information includes sibling numbers, birth order and parental education level.
14the full list of state variable includes s(a) = {k(15), Θ(15), c,Z , state, cohort}
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individuals learn whether their type changed. After that, individuals observe preference
shocks and choose their preferred sector. After this choice, wage shocks are realized.
Let Sv (s) ⊆ S denote the set of visited states and S f (s) ⊆ S as the set of feasible states
that can reached from s. Given the earlier time-line assumptions, we define ι(s) as the
information set of the agent in state s by specifying all components known in the state,
where
ι(s) =

εm(a); ζn(a); ξm(a); ηk(a) : for all s(a) ∈ Sv (s)
εm(a + 1) : for s
′(a + 1) ∈ S f (s)
k(15), Θ(15), c,Z , state, cohort; Ω : and for all s
An individual in state s knows all state variable laws of motion, Pr(s(a + 1)|s(a), dm(a)).
He uses the distribution of wage shocks Fm(ξ(s)), idiosyncratic preference shocks Fm(ε(s)),
traits transition shocks Fn(ζ(s)) and type transition shocks Fk(η(s)) to form an expectation
over future states. For computational simplicity, ξm(a) and ζn(a) are assumed to be uncor-
related and normally distributed, whereas εm(a) and ηk(a) are assumed to be type I extreme
value distributed. Conditional on the unobserved types, the other shocks are assumed to
be iid over time.
2.5. Identification
The general procedure for incorporating multinomial types into longitudinal models dates
back to Heckman (1981), Heckman and Singer (1984). The method was first used in the
context of discrete choice dynamic programming (DCDP) models with fixed types in Keane
and Wolpin (1997). The identification of serially correlated, unobserved types for a discrete
choice model that satisfies a first-order Markov distribution is shown in Hu et al. (2015).
Their identification strategy imposes one additional “limited feedback” restriction: namely
that the type evolution is independent of choices mt−1 after conditioning on state vari-
ables st−1. This “limited feedback” assumption is satisfied in our model.
15 Following the
15Hu et al. (2015) also requires the stationary assumption of the Markov kernel, which is a common
assumption in I/O applications(i.e. dynamic games). Their conclusion can be generalized to our case where
the conditional choice probability is age-dependent.
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argument in section 2.2 in Hu et al. (2015), one can nonparametrically identify both the
distributions of unobserved types and the law of motions of all state variables (including
unobserved types) using at least three time periods of data.
As the model is finite horizon, the case for identification of some of the model parameters
can be made using the last time period. Wages in the blue collar and white collar sectors
are observed. We impose a timing assumption on the model that individuals choose sectors
after observing preference shocks but before observing wage shocks. Therefore, there is no
selection problem in estimating the wage equation.
The utility values associated with the schooling choice and with the home choice as well as
the nonpecuniary values of choosing a white or blue color job are not directly observed. In
the last time period, the set-up of the choice problem is analogous that of a multinomial
logit model given the types. Identification of these kinds of models is discussed in Horowitz
(1981). The choices we observe allow us to infer relative but not absolute utilities, so
identification requires normalizing one of the utility values. We normalize the nonpecuniary
value of the white collar sector choice to be zero. Lastly, the difference in conditional choice
probabilities by type identifies the type-specific components ekm of the flow utility functions.
Personality traits are observed in multiple time periods, so it is possible to directly estimate
the transition process where personality traits at any time period are a function of lagged
personality traits and of age following equation 2.2. The final parameter that we need
to identify is the discount rate. The discount rate is identified through functional form
assumptions that allow separation of the current period utility from future expected utility.
2.6. Estimation Strategy
2.6.1. Solving the dynamic programming problem
At the beginning of age a, an individual has the state vector s(a), determined by his choices
up to age a. As previously described, the evolving state variables include the accumulated
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sector-specific experience xi (a), i = 1, 2, the completed schooling g(a), personality traits
Θ(a) and unobserved types k(a).16 Let dm(t) = 1 denote that alternative m is chosen at
age t. The value function at age a is the maximum over all possible sequences of future
choices:
V (s(a), a, Ω) = max
{dm(t)}
E
[
A∑
t=a
δτ−a
4∑
m=1
um(t)dm(t)|s(a),
]
where Ω denotes a set of parameter values. The summation over t denotes the ages and
the summation over m denotes the different sector choices. The problem can be written in
Bellman equation form.
The alternative specific value function is
Vm(s(a), a, Ω) = ũm(s(a), a) + δE [V (s(a + 1), a + 1, Ω)|s(a), dm(a)]
for a < A, and
Vm(s(A),A, Ω) = ũm(S(A),A)
in the last time period. As previously noted, to facilitate computation, we impose an as-
sumption on the timing of the model that the sector is chosen after preference shocks are re-
alized but before the wage shock is realized. We denote ũm(s(a), a) to be um(s(a), a) after in-
tegrating over the wage shock distribution (i.e. ũm(s(a), a) =
∫
ξm(a)
um(s(a), a)f (w(ξm(a)))dξm(a)).
Wages in the white and blue collar sectors are assumed to be both normally distributed
and uncorrelated. The expectation in the Bellman equation is taken over future wage and
preference shocks and over the random process that governs the transition of personality
traits and the unobserved types. 17
16The personality traits at the initial age may not directly be observable, so in some cases we infer them
using the approach described in Appendix 2.11.
17Even though the realized wage shocks do not affect the contemporaneous utility associated with different
sectors, the expected value functions will depend on the variance of the wage shocks.
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The value function is the max over the alternative specific value functions:
V (s(a), a, Ω) = max
m∈M
Vm(s(a), a, Ω)
Recall that the preference shocks enter additively into um(s(a), a) and, for computational
simplicity, are assumed to follow an i.i.d. type I extreme value distribution with a location
parameter 0 and a common scale σc .
Let Ṽm(s(a), a, Ω) denote the choice-specific value function excluding the contemporaneous
sector-specific preference shock εm(a),.
Vm(s(a), a, Ω) = Ṽm(s(a), a, Ω) + εm(a).
Because of the distributional assumption on the preference shocks, we have
Pr(dm(a) = 1|s(a), Ω) =
exp(Ṽm(s(a), a, Ω)/σc)∑4
j=1 exp(Ṽj(s(a), a)/σc)
As shown by Rust (1987), the expected value function can be written as
E [V (s(a + 1), a + 1, Ω)|s(a), dm(a)] = Eεm(a) maxdm(a)
∑4
m=1 dm(a){Ṽm(s(a), a, Ω) + εm(a)}
= σc log
(∑4
m=1 exp(Ṽm(s(a), a, Ω)/σc)
)
+ σcγ
where γ is the Euler’s constant and σc is the scale parameter of the preference shock.
18
The dynamic programming problem uses backward recursion for each set of parameter val-
ues under consideration. That is, in the last period A, when there is no future expected value
function and using the previous equation, one obtains E [V (s(A),A)|s(A− 1), dm(A− 1),A− 1]
for each possible point in the state space.
18This closed form representation of the value function is a big advantage in estimation because, without
it, numerical integration over the structural errors is required to get the expected value function. It also
generates an analytic one-to-one mapping between the choice probability and utility level of each choice.
This tractable i.i.d. generalized extreme value (GEV) distributions assumption is also adopted in other
recent DCDP papers such as Chan (2013) and Kennan and Walker (2011).
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Plugging in E [V (s(A),A)|s(A− 1), dm(A− 1),A− 1] into Ṽj(s(A− 1),A− 1), one can then
use the same expression to obtain E [V (s(A− 1),A− 1)|s(A− 2), dm(A− 2), (A− 2)] and so
on, back until the first time period. After solving the dynamic programming problem, one
obtains the expected future value functions for all possible state points. It is then possible
to use the model to simulate choices and to implement a simulated method of moments
optimization algorithm to estimate the parameters.
2.6.2. Simulated Method of Moments estimation
Our model parameters are estimated by simulated method of moments. We use an uncon-
ditional simulation approach starting from age 15, because occupation-specific experience
stocks are not observed at the time of sampling. The simulation process is briefly summa-
rized as follows:
For each individual i , given a set of trial parameters Ω:
1. Solve backward for choice-specific value function Vm(s(a), Ω) and choice probability
Pr(dm(a)|s(a), Ω) following the procedure described in the previous section.
2. Impute initial personality traits θn(15) following the procedure described Appendix
2.11. Initial unobserved types k(15) are drawn from equation 2.5.
3. Starting from s(15) = g(15) = 0, xi (15) = 0, k(15), θn(15), we simulate sequential shocks
{εm(a), ζn(a), ξm(a), ηk(a)} and compute the following outcomes: (1) agents’ lifetime
choices dm(a); (2) wage realizations wm(a) when m = {1, 2}, a = {18, ..., 58}; and (3)
personality traits θn(a), n = {1, 2, ..., 5}.
The simulation process is repeated for all i=1,2,...,N individuals, given their initial state
variables. We then compute R moments using both the N simulated samples and the ob-
served data, and then calculate the weighted difference between those R simulated moments
M̃N,R(Ω) and the data moments MR , using the following objective criterion:
Ω̂N,R,W = arg min
Ω
(
(MR − M̃N,R(Ω))′WR(MR − M̃N,R(Ω))
)
(2.13)
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where MR denotes the data moments, and M̃N,R(Ω) represents the simulated moment eval-
uated at the parameter set Ω based on N repeated simulations.19
We use the variance information of each data moment to form the weighting matrix, WR .
Del Boca et al. (2014) show the consistency for this type of estimator for large sample
sizes, plimN→∞M̃N,R(Ω0) = MR(Ω0).
20 In total, we match 505 moments to estimate 124
parameters. The following types of moments are used in estimation:
1. Sequential life-time choices:
• The fraction of individuals in the blue-collar occupation sector by age (15-58).
• The fraction of individuals in the white-collar occupation sector by age (15-58).
• The fraction of individuals in school by age (15-58).
• The fraction of individuals at home by age (15-58).
2. Earning profiles21
• Average log earnings of blue-collar workers by age (18-58).
• Average log earnings of white-collar workers by age (18-58).
• The standard error of log earnings of blue-collar jobs by age (18-58).
• The standard error of log earnings of white-collar jobs by age (18-58).
3. Personality traits
19This unconditional simulation algorithm is often used to estimate dynamic discrete choice models when
some state variables are unobserved(e.g. Keane and Wolpin (2001), Keane and Sauer (2010)). The consis-
tency and other asymptotic properties of this estimator based on unconditional simulation are discussed in
Gourieroux and Monfort (1996), section 2.2.2.
20Compared with directly calculating the optimal weighting matrix, this method simplifies computation
significantly. Altonji and Segal (1996) discusses that gains from using an optimal weighting matrix may be
limited.
21We don’t fit the earning between age 15-17 because too fewer observations have earning information at
these ages.
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• Mean value of openness to experience by four-year age groups and by waves.22
• Mean value of conscientiousness by four-year age groups and by waves.
• Mean value of extraversion by four-year age groups and by waves.
• Mean value of agreeableness by four-year age groups and by waves.
• Mean value of emotional stability by four-year age groups and by waves.
2.7. Estimates
2.7.1. Parameter Values
Tables 27-29 show the model parameter estimates along with standard errors. Table 27
shows the parameters corresponding to the per-period reward for each of the alternatives
(white-collar job, blue-collar job, schooling, and home staying). An additional year of
schooling increases white-collar and blue-collar wage offers by 4.47 and 3.99 percent. The
reward for the first two years’ work experience (exp ≤ 2) is relatively high. One year of
white-collar experience increases white collar wage offers by 16.24 percent, and one-year of
blue-collar experience increases blue-collar wages by 29.32 percent. Although white-collar
experience does not have a significant return in blue-collar jobs, blue-collar job experience is
rewarded in the white-collar sector. The non-pecuniary terms capture the psychic difference
between working in a white-collar or a blue-collar job. As previously described, we normalize
the non-pecuniary utility from a white-collar job to 0. The non-pecuniary blue collar job
premium is AU$23,388 for individuals who are not college graduates but only AU$3,377 for
college graduates.
For the schooling option, we estimate a utility of AU$15,554 per year if an individual
stays in school until age 17; a relatively high utility is needed to capture the drop-off in
schooling after high school graduation. We find a net lump-sum cost of college education
22The four-year age groups are 15-18, 19-22, 23-26, 27-30, 31-34, 35-38, 39-42, 43-46, 47-50, 51-54, 55-58.
The waves are 2005, 2009 and 2013.
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Table 27: Model parameter estimates: reward functions
1.White-Collar 2.Blue-Collar 3. Schooling
Skill Function Tuition cost: college 13.5199(0.7885)
Mincer Equation Additional cost:graduate school 10.6251(0.6737)
Schooling 0.0447(0.0047) 0.0399(0.0052) Additional utility before age 19 1.5554(0.1181)
White-Collar experience 0.0105(0.0054) -0.0013(0.0058) Constant:
Blue-Collar experience 0.0385(0.0048) 0.0244(0.0054) Type I 8.1760(0.4348)
“Own” experience squared/100 -0.0293(0.0058) -0.0304(0.0061) Deviation of type 2 -3.7180(0.0059)
“Own” experience× edu 0.0103(0.0058) 0.0106(0.0054) Deviation of type 3 -7.6862(0.0055)
“Own” experience ≤ 2 0.1624(0.0094) 0.2932(0.0185) Deviation of type 4 -0.8058(0.0058)
Standard Error 0.4750(0.0246) 0.3773(0.0254) Family Background
Constant: Family Intactness Dummy 0.0911(0.0060)
Type I 9.8638(0.0684) 9.3990(0.0807) Sibling(Omitted cat: only child)
Deviation of type 2 -0.0771(0.0058) 0.3893(0.0248) multiple children, eldest one -0.1054(0.0065)
Deviation of type 3 -0.6018(0.0061) -0.3572(0.0063) multiple(N < 4), not eldest one -0.0489(0.0068)
Deviation of type 4 -0.5935(0.0056) -0.5772(0.0053) multiple(N ≥ 4), not eldest one -0.1947(0.0300)
State(Omitted cat:NSW) Parental Education(Omitted cat:no college)
VIC -0.1267(0.0056) -0.1593(0.0057) One college 0.0750(0.0199)
QLD -0.0306(0.0062) -0.5000(0.0055) Two colleges 0.3830(0.0090)
SA -0.5045(0.0057) 0.5000(0.0333) Cohort(Omitted cat:40-49)
WA 0.0135(0.0060) -0.0044(0.0060) 50-59 -0.1562(0.0058)
TAS -0.2544(0.0053) 0.5007(0.0298) 60-69 -0.2539(0.0058)
NT -0.5027(0.0054) -0.5054(0.0045) 70-79 0.5064(0.0300)
ACT 0.2370(0.0153) -0.0306(0.0059) 80-89 1.6202(0.0855)
Cohort(Omitted cat:40-49) After 90 1.6620(0.1557)
50-59 0.1980(0.0134) 0.3038(0.0189) 4. Home-staying
60-69 0.3508(0.0201) 0.4859(0.0250) Age 0.0138(0.0056)
70-79 0.5334(0.0299) 0.6351(0.0369) Age squared/100 0.0092(0.0059)
80-89 0.3010(0.0182) 0.5295(0.0305) Constant:
After 90 0.0003(0.0058) 0.0009(0.0058) Type I 4.4872(0.1761)
Non-pecuniary Values Deviation of type 2 -1.0019(0.0059)
Constant - 2.3388(0.1145) Deviation of type 3 -2.2900(0.0055)
College Premium - -2.0011(0.1293) Deviation of type 4 -1.1334(0.0065)
Preference Shock 0.9195(0.0594) Discount Factor 0.8960(0.0284)
The unit for the non-pecuniary, school and home-staying columns is 10,000AU$.
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Table 28: Estimated coefficients on type probabilities
Types I(baseline) II III IV
Constant term - 0.030 0.001 -0.010
(.0058) (.0060) (.0062)
Cognitive - -0.508 -0.990 -1.520
(.0063) (.0058) (.0060)
Openness to Experience - -1.500 -1.000 0.000
(.0067) (.0064) (.0051)
Conscientiousness - -0.900 -0.520 -1.110
(.0060) (.0060) (.0057)
Extraversion - -0.020 -0.026 -0.880
(.0053) (.0058) (.0061)
Agreeableness - 1.500 0.510 0.510
(.0968) (.0285) (.0295)
Emotional Stability - -0.100 -0.110 -0.209
(.0056) (.0062) (.0057)
Parental Background(baseline)
Middle 0.001 0.007 0.000 -0.010
(.0065) (.0058) (.0058) (.0066)
High 0.020 0.020 -0.070 0.030
(.0058) (.0061) (.0061) (.0056)
Family Intactness 0.030 0.020 0.040 0.010
(.0057) (.0059) (.0057) (.0063)
Type Persistence Time shift term Age − 15 (Age−15)
2
100
Values 0.40 0.12 1.00
(.0164) (.0085) (.0654)
Table 29: Estimated model coefficients for personality trait transitions
Traits Edu Edu ∗ (Age − 15)/100 Age − 15 (Age − 15)2/100
Openness to Experience 0.0022 -0.0042 -0.0022 0.0116
(.0056) (.0056) (.0060) (.0055)
Conscientiousness 0.0460 -0.1159 0.0342 -0.0694
(.0051) (.0052) (.0050) (.0070)
Extraversion 0.0049 -0.0057 -0.0167 0.0384
(.0058) (.0058) (.0055) (.0055)
Agreeableness 0.0364 -0.0968 0.0086 0.0136
(.0059) (.0061) (.0053) (.0061)
Emotional Stability 0.0079 -0.0141 0.0108 0.0075
(.0054) (.0057) (.0052) (.0062)
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of AU$135,199 and a one-time cost of graduate school of AU$108,251.23 This cost includes
both tuition and living expenditures as well as potential psychological costs.
With regard to the home staying option, the flow utility is specified as quadratic in age.
The utility of staying home increases from AU$13.8 at age 15 to AU$7,635 at age 58. Lastly,
we estimate a discount rate parameter, β, equal to 0.8960 and preference scale parameter
σc equal to 0.9195.
There is considerable variation in the estimated rewards across occupations for the unob-
served types. For the two working options, types I and II have comparative advantages.
Type I receives the highest reward in the white-collar occupation and type II receives the
highest reward in the blue-collar occupation. With regard to the schooling alternative, type
I gets the highest reward from attending school, followed by types IV, II and III. The benefit
of type I is only slightly higher than that of type IV (AU$8,058), but much higher than for
types II (AU$37,180) and III (AU$76,862). For the option of staying home, the rewards of
type I-IV are AU$44,872, AU$34,853, AU$21,972 and AU$33,538.
Table 28 shows how estimated type probabilities relate to cognitive ability, personality
traits and family background. Both personality traits and cognitive ability are important
in type determination. High cognitive ability leads to a high probability of being type I
and a relatively low probability of being type III or type IV. A high score of openness to
experience implies a high probability of being types I or IV but a low probability of being
type II. A person with high conscientiousness is more likely to be type I but less likely to be
types II or IV. High agreeableness leads individuals to be type II rather than type I. The
last two rows of table 28 show the malleability of types over time and how types become
23We compare our estimated costs with the real cost collected in Australia. For example, a
2014 HSBS report lists a per year cost for undergraduate study as AU$42,093, which includes
AU$24,081 for fees and AU$18,012 for living costs. Source:http://www.about.hsbc.com.au/news-
and-media/australia-the-most-expensive-country-for-education-hsbc-report. Another official website for
Australia gives annual tuition fees for Bachelor’s degree, Master’s degree, and Doctoral degree in
the range of AU$15,000-AU$33,000, AU$20,000-AU$37,000 and AU$14,000 to AU$37,000, respec-
tively. Source:http://www.studyinaustralia.gov.au/global/australian-education/education-costs/education-
costs-in-australia.
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more persistent with age. As shown in figure 19, the probability of changing type starts at
around 0.4 at age 15 then diminishes to 0 around age 34. In other words, our estimation
results show that the types become relatively fixed in the mid-30s.
Table 29 shows the estimates of the probability that personality traits change, which is
assumed to potentially depend on education and age.24 Education has positive and signifi-
cant effects only for the conscientiousness and agreeableness traits. One additional year of
education at age 15 increases the level of conscientiousness and agreeableness by 4.60% and
3.64%, whereas it increases openness to experience, extraversion and emotional stability
by only 0.22%, 0.49% and 0.79%.25 The negative estimated coefficient on the interaction
term between education and age (γ3n) implies that the effect of education diminishes with
age. For example, the effect of education on conscientiousness is negligible by age 55. The
age effects on conscientiousness, extraversion and emotional stability are significantly larger
than those on the other two traits. Conscientiousness increases with age at a diminishing
rate. On the other hand, aging has an increasingly positive effect on emotional stability.
Lastly, the results show that extraversion decreases with age.
2.7.2. Model Fit
Figures 15 and 16 display the data moments and compare model simulations with the data.
The estimated moments pertain to three categories: the proportion choosing different sec-
tors over life cycle (figure 15); the log wage of both white-collar and blue-collar occupations
over life-cycle (figure 15); and the personality trait values over life-cycle (figure 16).
As seen in figure 15, the model captures salient features of data: (1) The fraction of blue-
collar occupational choices exhibits an upward jump at age 18 and then declines gradually.
24Recall that personality trait changes were found to be strongly associated with schooling and to change
with age up until the mid 30s, but were not found to be associated with white collar or blue collar job
experience.
25By comparison, Schurer et al. (2015) find that university education increases scores on agreeableness
for male students from low socioeconomic backgrounds but has no effect on conscientiousness. Our sample
includes individuals with both senior secondary and university education, whereas their sample focuses only
on individuals with university education. Li and Powdthavee (2014) studies the effect of a policy change that
increased the compulsory minimum leaving school age, using HILDA data, and concludes that the average
conscientiousness rises after the reform.
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Figure 15: The comparison of choice distribution and earning profile between real data and
model simulations
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(b) White Collar Occupation
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(2) The fraction of white-collar occupation choices grows smoothly from nearly 0 at age
18, reaches its peak in the mid-30s, and then moves downwards slowly. (3) Except for
a small hump shape in the early 20s, the fraction that stays home exhibits a slow but
persistent increase over the life cycle. (4) The fraction in school rapidly drops at age 18.
Subsequently, a moderate decreasing trend takes over until it eventually reaches a stable
level before age 39. (5) The concavity and the level of the earning profile are also captured
by our simulated sample, both for white-collar occupation and blue-collar occupation. (6)
Although the standard errors of log earnings from the data are more volatile, the simulated
standard errors fit the observed average level reasonably well.
Figure 16 compares simulated personality traits and with the data measurements. In gen-
eral, our simulated moments fit the data very well. Only 3 out of 165 moments fall outside
of the 95% confidence interval generated by the corresponding data moments. Our simula-
tions capture the following trait-specific patterns: 1. Openness to experience is quite stable
over life-cycle. 2. Conscientiousness and emotional stability increase monotonically with
age. 3. Extraversion decreases over time. 4. Agreeableness displays a hump shape during
younger ages and then achieves a stable level after that.
2.8. Model Simulation Results
We next use the estimated model to simulate individuals’ choices. First, we explore the
link between personality traits, types and choices. Second, we examine the relative impor-
tance of personality traits in explaining ex-ante heterogeneity compared with other initial
endowments (e.g. cognitive ability, family background). Third, we implement a likelihood
ratio test to test the hypothesis that the unobserved types are stable over time, which is
assumed in many other studies. We reject this hypothesis.
2.8.1. Understanding the link between personality traits, types and choices
Table 30 examines the type distributions within the different sectors. The row labeled
“original” shows the proportions of the four types within each sector. The row labeled
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Figure 16: The comparison of personality traits between real data and model simulations
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Data Source: ”Big-Five” personality traits gathered in wave 2005, 2009 and 2013.
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“adjusted” gives the proportions adjusted by the proportion of each type in the population.
Our simulation results show that type I has a comparative advantage in schooling and in
the white-collar sector. Type II has a comparative advantage in the blue-collar sector. Type
III is more likely to be in the blue-collar sector or to stay at home. Type IV is more often
at school or at home.
Table 30: Simulated type proportions for different sector choices
Occupation Type I Type II Type III Type IV
White-collar Original 47.89 17.58 9.00 25.53
Adjusted 43.87 15.05 12.92 24.45
Blue-collar Original 8.61 48.03 26.47 16.89
Adjusted 7.89 41.12 38.01 16.18
Schooling Original 37.53 15.28 4.17 43.03
Adjusted 34.38 13.08 5.99 41.22
Home staying Original 7.46 9.17 29.37 54.00
Adjusted 6.83 7.85 42.17 51.72
Total 27.29 29.20 17.41 26.10
Table 31 shows mean personality trait values and cognitive scores for each of the four
types. Type I has higher personality scores in all five dimensions and also high cognitive
scores. As was seen in Table 7, openness to experience and conscientiousness and a high
cognitive score were the most predictive of higher educational attainment. Type II has the
lowest score on openness to experience and also lowest cognitive score. Type III has high
scores on extraversion and conscientiousness, although not as high as observed for Type
I. Lastly, type IV (the home-staying type) has low scores on both emotional stability and
conscientiousness.
Figure 17, a radar chart, provides a graphical depiction of the average levels of personality
traits and cognition among types. Each equi-angular spokes (“radii”) represents one di-
mension of personality traits. Each star-like hectagon denotes the values of the “Big-five”
along with the cognitive score for each type. It is clear that type I has the highest values of
all five traits and for cognition, because its hectagon totally covers the other three types’
hectagon. It seems that high cognitive ability and high values of personality traits tend to
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Table 31: Average personality traits and cognitive ability by type
Type I Type II Type III Type IV
Openness Mean 0.466 -0.614 -0.253 0.324
SE (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Conscientiousness Mean 0.453 -0.274 0.069 -0.406
SE (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Extraversion Mean 0.289 0.113 0.168 -0.427
SE (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Agreeableness Mean 0.300 -0.201 0.002 -0.059
SE (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Stability Mean 0.127 0.022 0.088 -0.318
SE (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Cognition Mean 0.473 -0.165 0.056 0.011
SE (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
be clustered in type I individuals, who are those that tend to acquire more schooling and
to work in the white collar sector.
Figure 17: Average personality traits of each type
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Figure 18 shows how the fraction of types change for different age cohorts. With age, the
proportions of type II and IV, decrease while the proportions of type I and III increase.
Those changes are driven primarily by increasing levels of conscientiousness. Our estimates
in table 29 indicate that the average level of conscientiousness increases over time, both
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because of increasing levels of education and because of a direct effect of age. A higher
conscientiousness score increases the probability of being type I or type III. Figure 19 plots
the probability that types change over time. In general, types become more stable with
age. The probability of switching types starts at around 0.4 at age 15 and diminishes to 0
by age 36.
Figure 18: The fraction of types by age cohort
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2.8.2. Exploring the importance of personality traits in explaining ex-ante life-time utility
heterogeneity
To understand the importance of personality traits in explaining ex-ante utility heterogene-
ity, we estimate a linear regression where the dependent variable is the expected present
value of lifetime utility at the age of 15 and the independent variables are initial person-
ality traits, cognitive ability and family background. Table 32 summarizes the regression
results under three different specifications of regressors: (i) only family background (ii) both
family background and cognitive ability, (iii) personality traits, cognitive ability and family
characteristics. The first two regressions are comparable to model specifications reported
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Figure 19: The probability of type change by age
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in Keane and Wolpin (1997). They estimate a similar regression and report that adding
Armed Forces Qualification test score(AFQT), the “ability” score measure, increases the R2
from 0.10 to 0.14. In our case, including the cognitive ability measurement increase the R2
from 0.095 to 0.121. When we estimate regression specification (iii) including, in addition,
personality traits, we get a further increase in R2 to 0.154.
2.8.3. Testing the hypothesis of type stability
A novel feature of our model relative to other models in the literature is that unobserved
types evolve over time in a way that may depend on age and the evolution of personality
traits. In this section, we test the validity of this assumption by comparing our model with
an alternative “fixed types” model. In the fixed type model, the probability of each type
does not depend on personality traits but is still determined by other age 15 endowments
(e.g. family background). Types are assumed to be fixed after age 15. This assumption is
almost the same as that of Keane and Wolpin (1997)26.
26In Keane and Wolpin (1997), they assume the initial type distribution only depends on with initial
schooling years(10 years or more V.S. nine years or less.) Then they calculate the conditional probability of
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Table 32: Determinants of ex-ante utility variation
Reg 1 Reg 2 Reg 3
Intactness −0.814* −0.612 −0.579
Father Occupation 0.476 0.264 0.300
Parental Education 0.546** 0.284 0.235
Sibling −0.417** −0.337* −0.297*
Cohort 1.454*** 1.452*** 1.406***
State 0.850*** 0.844*** 0.836***
Cognitive 2.080*** 1.975***
Openness 0.245
Conscientiousness 1.210***
Extraversion 0.905***
Agreeableness 0.347*
Emotional Stability −0.234
Observation 4215 4215 4215
R square 0.095 0.121 0.154
Table 33 shows the null hypotheses of the alternative model specifications and its corre-
sponding criteria function. The LR-test indicates that the “fixed type” model is rejected
with a p-value less than 0.01.
Table 33: Model specification test
Baseline model “Fixed type” model
Null Hypothesis H0: Pa = 0, γ4kn = 0
Distance Measure 2279.976 2406.325
LR test 126.349
The number of restrictions 18
χ2(0.01) criteria 34.80
2.9. Two education policy experiments: compulsory senior secondary school and a
college subsidy
We next use the estimated dynamic discrete choice models, both the variable types and fixed
types versions, to evaluate the effects of two education policies, a tuition subsidy program
and a compulsory schooling policy.
becoming each type on individual’s family background information. We model the dependence between the
initial types distribution and family background characteristic directly
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2.9.1. Using the model to simulate the effects of educational policies
Since the late 1980s, the Australian government started providing financial assistance to
students through a program called the Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS) and,
after 2005, the Higher Education Loan Programme (HELP). With the goal of relieving the
financial burden of a university education, those eligible for HECS-HELP can either receive
no interest student loans or get a 10 % discount on the upfront payment. Some students also
receive direct financial help to cover living expenditures through a means-tested programs
(such as Austudy or Youth Allowance). Motivated by these financial aid programs, we use
the model to simulate the effects of a hypothetical policy that reduces the cost of attending
college by 50%.
Our second policy experiment is motivated by the spatial variation in compulsory schooling
requirements across different states and territories. The compulsory education policy in
Australia is age-based. In 2009, the minimum school leaving age in Queensland, Western
Australia, South Australia and Tasmania was 17, whereas the leaving age in other areas
was between 15-16. 27 In 2010, areas with lower compulsory school attendance ages came
up with plans to increase compulsory schooling.28 As a result, students in all states and
territories are now required to stay in school until age of 17. (National Report on Schooling
in Australia 2011) Inspired by these policies, we consider the imposition of a national
compulsory secondary school rule that forces individuals to stay in school until at least age
17.29
We next use model to simulate to the effects of the two education policies previously de-
27Source: National Report on Schooling in Australia 2009.
28From 2010, New South Wales, Victoria, Northern Territory and Australian Capital Territory all claim
that local students need to complete Year 10 and then participate in education, training or employment
until they turn 17.
29We aware that the individuals who are younger than age 18 after the year 2009 in HILDA data should be
already subject to the compulsory education policy. However, currently, the policy is not strictly enforced.
The school enrollment rates for teenagers ages 15-18 are 84.9%(175/206) in year 2010, 90.0%(226/251) in
the year 2011, 89.8%(211/235) in the year 2012 and 83%(176/212) in the year 2013. These enrollment rates
are stable and do not significantly differ for years prior to 2009. Our baseline model estimation assumes no
compulsory schooling law and we simulate the effects of a compulsory schooling law that is strictly enforced.
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scribed, considering both mean effects and distributional effects. To understand the impor-
tance of allowing for time-varying types, we compare the simulated policy effects of 4215
individuals obtained under the baseline model to that obtained under a restricted “fixed
type” model. Table 34 shows the effect of the two policies.30 Specifically, we examine ef-
fects on (1)the percentage high school graduates; (2) the percentage college graduates; (3)
the average years of education; (4) the annual earnings for workers; and (5) the expected
lifetime utility gain. In each of these categories, we first present the values under baseline
model in the row labeled as “benchmark”. The two rows labeled “50% college subsidy” and
“compulsory senior secondary school” show the deviations from baseline values under two
separated policy experiments.
Table 34: The effect of educational policies on schooling and labor market outcomes, by
type
Model Type I Type II Type III Type IV Total
Percentage Finishing High school
Benchmark 98.4 78.4 75.5 97.9 88.2
50% college subsidy 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.2
Compulsory schooling 1.6 21.6 24.5 2.1 11.8
Percentage College Graduates
Benchmark 43.6 19.5 21.8 43.9 32.4
50% college subsidy 32.1 19.1 21.6 28.3 25.2
Compulsory schooling 0.5 1.9 4.2 0.8 1.7
Years of Education
Benchmark 14.347 12.132 12.072 14.832 13.431
50% college subsidy 1.003 0.593 0.687 0.924 0.799
Compulsory schooling 0.031 0.477 0.635 0.051 0.279
Annual Earnings (for workers)
Benchmark 96852.8 71946.8 34145.8 44211.4 66324.1
50% college subsidy 6672.8 2389.8 2340.0 8208.7 4718.7
Compulsory schooling 606.2 3616.2 2804.3 451.0 2210.4
Utility Change(Unit: AU$10,000)
Benchmark 80.132 73.908 68.623 73.786 74.520
50% college subsidy 1.758 0.574 0.687 0.477 1.135
Compulsory schooling -0.831 -3.434 -5.328 -0.882 -2.423
Comparing the effects of two policies, two features stand out. First, the compulsory school-
30Because the types change over time and are potentially influenced by education, we classified agents
according to their initial type at age 15.
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ing policy has the most direct positive effect on the secondary school completion rate
(+11.8pp), whereas the college subsidy has the largest positive impact on the fraction of
college graduates (+25.2pp). However, because individuals are forward looking and gradu-
ation from senior secondary school is the prerequisite to attending college, the compulsory
school policy also stimulates college graduation (+1.7pp) and college subsidy policy also
encourages senior secondary school completion (+0.2pp). Second, these two policies affect
different types of individuals. The college subsidy increases the average years of completed
education by around one year for types I and IV but only by around a half year for types
II and III. In contrast, the compulsory school policy increases years of education by about
one half year for types II and III but has almost no effect for types I and IV.
We observe a similar pattern for labor market outcomes. Under the college subsidy inter-
vention, types I and IV experience an average increase in annual earnings of AU$ 6,772.8
and AU$ 8,208.7. The increases observed for types II and III are only AU$ 2,389.8 and AU$
2,340.0. When implementing the compulsory schooling policy, types II and III benefit the
most. The annual earnings increases of those two types are AU$ 3,616.2 and AU$ 2,804.3,
whereas the increases of other two types are only AU$ 606.2 and AU$ 451.0. The differences
between types are caused by the original education level of each type. Secondary school
completion is already so prevalent among types I and IV, thus few individuals of those types
are affected by the compulsory schooling policy. These individuals are more likely to face
the trade-off between finishing college or not and are most strongly influenced by the college
subsidy policy.
Table 35 reports the effects of two policies on personality traits at age 30, when most have
completed their education. The “benchmark” row shows the average trait score of each
type. The rows “50% college subsidy” and “compulsory senior secondary school” report the
additional change under these two policies. In general, the effects of both policies on traits
are positive. However, the change of conscientiousness and agreeableness are one-order of
magnitude larger than the change of the other three traits. Conscientiousness increases
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by 0.026, equivalent to 0.93 of its standard error, under a 50% college subsidy policy and
0.015 (equivalent to 0.53 of its standard error) under compulsory senior secondary school
policy. Agreeableness increases by 0.020, equivalent to 0.71 standard error, under a 50%
college subsidy policy and 0.011 (equivalent to 0.39 standard error) under compulsory senior
secondary school policy.
Table 35: The effect of educational policies on personality traits, by type
Model Type I Type II Type III Type IV Total
Openness to experience (at age 30)
Benchmark 0.458 -0.634 -0.262 0.319 -0.018
50% college subsidy 0.002 -0.001 0.003 0.001 0.001
Compulsory schooling -0.007 0.003 0.005 0.000 0.001
Conscientiousness (at age 30)
Benchmark 0.388 -0.357 -0.008 -0.450 -0.113
50% college subsidy 0.031 0.010 0.017 0.034 0.026
Compulsory schooling 0.000 0.027 0.020 0.001 0.015
Extraversion (at age 30)
Benchmark 0.338 0.144 0.212 -0.374 0.075
50% college subsidy 0.003 -0.001 -0.002 0.004 0.004
Compulsory schooling 0.007 -0.008 0.004 -0.001 0.002
Agreeableness (at age 30)
Benchmark 0.251 -0.279 -0.058 -0.103 -0.048
50% college subsidy 0.024 0.012 0.005 0.030 0.020
Compulsory schooling 0.005 0.016 0.018 0.003 0.011
Emotional Stability (at age 30)
Benchmark 0.027 -0.073 0.003 -0.406 -0.118
50% college subsidy 0.001 0.009 -0.008 0.008 0.005
Compulsory schooling 0.002 0.001 0.012 -0.006 0.003
2.9.2. Understanding the importance of changeable types
To understand the empirical importance of allowing for changing types, we evaluate the same
two education policies under the restricted “fixed types” model. The results are reported in
table 36. Compared with table 34, there are two main differences. First, the policy impacts
are now more concentrated among types. The college subsidy policy only affects the college
graduation decision of type I and type IV, while compulsory senior secondary school policy
essentially only affects the senior secondary school certificate completion rate of types II
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Table 36: The effects of educational policies under the restricted model with fixed types
model simulation Type I Type II Type III Type IV Total
Percentage Finishing High school
Benchmark 100.0 73.6 41.2 100.0 81.8
50% college subsidy 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Compulsory senior secondary school 0.0 26.4 58.8 0.0 18.2
Percentage College Graduates
Benchmark 55.8 0.2 0.0 77.1 34.9
50% college subsidy 35.0 8.3 0.0 17.0 15.9
Compulsory senior secondary school 0.8 0.0 0.0 1.2 0.5
Years of Education
Benchmark 14.637 11.813 10.993 15.409 13.354
50% college subsidy 1.053 0.249 0.004 0.547 0.487
Compulsory senior secondary school 0.023 0.484 1.150 0.039 0.361
Annual Earnings(for workers)
Benchmark 100481.5 69533.0 29793.3 47273.6 66004.0
50% college subsidy 4656.1 909.5 9.4 7232.8 2943.7
Compulsory senior secondary school 484.9 2390.3 2565.4 760.0 1592.8
Utility Change(Unit: AU$10,000)
Benchmark 83.971 77.209 53.354 65.214 71.559
50% college subsidy 2.504 0.064 0.000 2.246 1.251
Compulsory senior secondary school -0.261 -2.196 -4.386 -0.396 -1.597
and III. Second, the effects on labor market earnings are smaller. In our baseline model,
the 50% college subsidy policy and the compulsory senior secondary school policy boost
employed workers’ average annual earnings by AU$ 4,718.7 and AU$ 2,210.4. In contrast,
the earning increase drops to AU$ 2,943.7 and AU$ 1,592.8 in the restricted “fixed type”
model.
The reason for these differences is fairly straightforward. When type is changeable, the
education investment has both a direct reward in terms of increasing wage offers and an
indirect reward through the chance to become a different type. Table 37 shows the type
distribution in each age group under the baseline model and under the two policies. When
years of education increases, a larger fraction of type II and type IV agents switch to
type I. 31 The “fixed types” model shuts down the second indirect channel, which lowers
the marginal benefits of education is lower. Thus, individuals in the fixed type model,
31Although the proportion of type III also increases, the increment of type I is much larger.
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Table 37: The effect of education policies on type proportions at different ages
Age Type I Type II Type III Type IV
15 Benchmark 24.70 31.44 16.89 26.98
50% college subsidy 24.70 31.44 16.89 26.98
Compulsory senior secondary school 24.70 31.44 16.89 26.98
21 Benchmark 26.14 30.06 16.84 26.95
50% college subsidy 26.19 30.04 16.92 26.86
Compulsory senior secondary school 26.43 29.94 17.13 26.50
27 Benchmark 27.45 28.94 17.39 26.22
50% college subsidy 27.69 28.75 17.58 25.98
Compulsory senior secondary school 27.73 28.78 17.58 25.91
> 33 Benchmark 27.83 28.78 17.53 25.86
50% college subsidy 28.09 28.61 17.77 25.53
Compulsory senior secondary school 28.11 28.61 17.67 25.60
especially from disadvantaged groups, are less responsive to educational policies, which also
leads to an overestimation of the inequality in policy effects.
2.9.3. Heterogeneous policy effects by family background social-economic status (SES)
Lundberg (2013) emphasizes the importance of family background in understanding the
correlation between personality traits and college graduation. Therefore, we investigate
the heterogeneous effects of two policies on individuals from different family backgrounds.
The social-economic status is defined in terms of parents’ educational attainment. In group
I, both parents have education equal to high school or less. In group II, one parent has
some college, and in group III, both parents have above high school graduation.32 We find
the personality patterns between individuals from different SES are exactly the same as
those reported in Lundberg (2013). Individuals from more advantaged family backgrounds
tend to have high scores for conscientiousness, openness to experience as well as emotional
stability (the opposite of neuroticism).
Tables 38 and 39 summarize the effects of both the college subsidy policy and the compulsory
senior secondary school policy. The policy effect of the college subsidy is roughly equally
32We did not consider the family intactness as additional dimension, because the majority (82.89%) grew
up with both biological parents in our sample.
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distributed across the different SES groups in terms of education increase. The increases
in conscientiousness are 0.025, 0.028 and 0.025 for Groups I, II and III. 33 However, with
regard to annual earnings increase, the benefits of the college subsidy policy accrue more
to advantaged families. The earnings increase for Group I is AU$4410.2, while the earnings
increase for Group III is AU$4869.6. On the other hand, the compulsory senior secondary
school policy has larger effects on individuals from disadvantaged backgrounds. The average
education enhancement for Group I is 0.32 year, whereas the average increase of Group III
is only 0.21 year. Considering the labor market outcomes, the earnings increase of Group
I is AU$ 2,148.4, and the earning increase of Group III is AU$ 2,000.8. Regarding the
personality traits, we observe a larger improvement for the least advantaged group in both
conscientiousness (0.017 of Group I vs. 0.011 of Group III) and openness to experience
(0.013 of Group I vs. 0.009 of Group III).
2.10. Conclusions
This paper develops a dynamic model of schooling and occupational choices that incor-
porates personality traits. As is common in the discrete choice literature, we introduce
unobservable types’ to capture agents’ heterogeneous comparative advantages in schooling
and in particular occupational sectors. One innovative aspect of the model is that we allow
the unobserved types to change over time in a way that may depend on age and on evolving
personality traits. We perform a likelihood ratio test to examine the assumption that types
are fixed, which is strongly rejected. Our estimates indicate that types are malleable when
agents are young but become stable after age 36. Another finding is that high levels of cog-
nitive skills and high personality trait scores, in all five dimensions, tend to be clustered in a
certain type of individual. This type also acquires more schooling and tends to work in the
white collar sector. Much of the prior economics literature emphasizes the role of cognitive
skills in determining lifetime outcomes, but our analysis shows that high cognitive skills, on
average, go hand-in-hand with high non cognitive skills.34 For this reason, the relevance of
33This increase is equal to about one standard error of the mean value.
34See, for example, Neal and Johnson (1996).
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Table 38: The effect of educational policies on labor market outcomes by SES background
Socio Economic Status (SES)
Model simulation I II III Total
Percentage of Finishing High school
Benchmark 84.7% 87.9% 91.8% 88.1%
50% college subsidy 0.3% 0.2% 0.4% 0.3%
Compulsory senior secondary school 15.3% 12.1% 8.2% 11.9%
Percentage of College Graduates
Benchmark 25.4% 30.2% 41.6% 32.4%
50% college subsidy 25.1% 26.9% 23.5% 25.3%
Compulsory senior secondary school 0.9% 2.1% 1.9% 1.7%
Education Years
Benchmark 13.081 13.346 13.865 13.431
50% college subsidy 0.778 0.854 0.756 0.799
Compulsory senior secondary school 0.324 0.301 0.210 0.278
Annual Earning(for workers)
Benchmark 62861.9 66433.2 69580.6 66324.1
50% college subsidy 4410.2 4860.8 4869.0 4718.7
Compulsory senior secondary school 2148.4 2434.2 2000.8 2210.4
Utility Gain(Unit: AU$10,000)
Benchmark 73.135 74.380 76.014 74.500
50% college subsidy 0.878 1.091 1.434 1.155
Compulsory senior secondary school -2.812 -2.426 -2.044 -2.403
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Table 39: The effect of educational policies on personality traits by SES background
Socio Economic Status (SES)
Model simulation I II III Total
Personality Traits at age 30
Openness to experience
Benchmark -0.180 0.019 0.138 -0.018
50% college subsidy 0.002 -0.036 0.002 0.001
Compulsory senior secondary school 0.001 -0.037 0.001 0.001
Conscientiousness
Benchmark -0.128 -0.127 -0.084 -0.113
50% college subsidy 0.025 0.028 0.025 0.026
Compulsory senior secondary school 0.017 0.016 0.011 0.014
Extraversion
Benchmark 0.037 0.066 0.121 0.075
50% college subsidy 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004
Compulsory senior secondary school 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002
Agreeableness
Benchmark -0.098 -0.063 0.019 -0.047
50% college subsidy 0.018 0.021 0.020 0.020
Compulsory senior secondary school 0.013 0.012 0.009 0.011
Emotional Stability
Benchmark -0.194 -0.102 -0.064 -0.118
50% college subsidy 0.006 0.006 -0.005 0.005
Compulsory senior secondary school 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.002
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the cognitive dimension as a determinant of labor market success may be overemphasized
in studies that ignore non-cognitive attributes.
Using the estimated dynamic discrete choice model, we evaluate two education policies: a
compulsory senior secondary school policy and a 50% college subsidy policy. Both policies
increase educational attainment, but their distributional effects are very different. The
compulsory school policy is effective for individuals from more disadvantaged backgrounds,
whereas the college subsidy mainly benefits those from more advantaged backgrounds who
have a comparative advantage in the schooling sector. We show that a model with fixed
types ignores the indirect reward of education in acquiring better personality traits, which is
empirically important to consider when evaluating the distributional effect of these policies.
The policy response is greater in a model that allows types to change.
Our results highlight the importance of personality traits in explaining ex-ante heterogene-
ity, which, as was demonstrated in Keane and Wolpin (1997), is a major determinant of
ex-ante life-time inequality. We find that one of the benefits of attending school is that it
changes personality characteristics, which, along with increased schooling levels, enhances
earnings. One caveat to our findings is that personality endowments are measured as of
age 15. They likely reflect parental investment and life experience from conception to age
15. As emphasized in Cunha et al. (2010), the most cost effective policies for fostering the
accumulation of non-cognitive skills, such as personality traits, may be policies that are
targeted during early childhood years rather than high school or post-secondary schooling
interventions.
2.11. Appendix: method used to impute initial age 15 personality traits
In many cases, sampled individuals are older than age 15, so we do not directly observe
initial personality traits. The data contain up to three measures of personality traits, each
measured at a time four years apart. We next describe the method that we use to impute the
initial personality traits θn(15) based on these three measures, θ
M1
n (a1), θ
M2
n (a2), θ
M3
n (a3),
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observed at ages a1, a2, a3 and using the structure of our model. Given the current trial
parameter values Ω, personality trait n at age 15 (θn(15)) is obtained as follows:
1. From equation (2) in subsection 2.4.1, we solve for
θn(a1 − 1) = θn(a1)− (γ0n + γ1n(a1 − 1− 15) + γ2nd3(a1) + γ3n(a1 − 1− 15)d3(a1))
where a1 is the age when individual is surveyed and d3(a1) is the indicator whether
the individual is in school (alternative m = 3) at age a1.
2. Substituting θn(a1) = θ
M1
n (a1)− ζn(a1), we get
θn(a1 − 1) + ζn(a1) = θMn (a1)− (γ0n + γ1n(a1 − 16) + γ2nd3(a1) + γ3n(a1 − 16)d3(a1))
3. Given θn(a1 − 1) + ζn(a1), recover θn(a1 − 2) + ζn(a1) following the same approach.
θn(a1−2)+ζn(a1) = (θn(a1−1)+ζn(a1))−(γ0n+γ1n(a−17)+γ2nd3(a1−1)+γ3n(a1−17)d3(a1−1))
Continue this way until we get θM1n (15) ≡ θn(15) + ζn(a1).
4. For the other two personality measurements at age a2 and age a3, (θ
M2
n (a2) and
θM3n (a3)), repeat steps (1)-(3) to get
θM2n (15) ≡ θn(15) + ζn(a2), θM3n (15) ≡ θn(15) + ζn(a3)
5. This procedure provides three different imputed values of initial personality traits,
each with a measurement error that is assumed to be mean zero. We obtain our
measure of the personality trait at age 15 θn(15) as the mean of these three values:
θn(15) =
1
3
(θM1n (15) + θ
M2
n (15) + θ
M3
n (15))
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CHAPTER 3 : Personality Traits, Intra-household Allocation and the Gender Wage
Gap
Christopher Flinn, Petra Todd and Weilong Zhang
3.1. Introduction
Early models of household decision-making specified a unitary model that assumed that
a household maximizes a single utility function. (e.g. Becker (1981)) In recent decades,
however, researchers have made substantial progress towards modeling the household as a
collection of individual agents with clearly delineated preferences, which permits consider-
ation of questions related to the production and distribution of household resources. The
agents are united through the sharing of public goods, through joint production technologies
for producing public goods, through shared resource constraints, and through preferences.
One approach is the cooperative approach that allows differences between spouses to af-
fect household decision-making by specifying a sharing rule or the Pareto weights of what
is essentially a household social welfare function. Cooperative models assume that the
household reaches Pareto efficient outcomes. Variations in the class of cooperative models
specify different ways in which households reach a particular point on the Pareto frontier
(e.g. Manser and Brown (1980), McElroy and Horney (1981), and Chiappori (1988)). An
alternative approach assumes that household members act noncooperatively. This approach
is also based on a model with individual preferences, but assumes that realized outcomes
are determined by finding a Nash equilibrium using the reaction functions of the household
members. These equilibria are virtually never Pareto efficient (e.g. Lundberg and Pollak
(1993), Bourguignon (1984), Del Boca and Flinn (1995)).
In reality, it is likely that different households behave in different ways and even that
the same household might behave differently at different points in time. One of the few
studies to combine these different modeling approaches into one paradigm is Del Boca and
Flinn (2012). Their study estimates a model of household time allocation, allowing for both
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efficient and inefficient household modes of interaction. In their model, two spouses allocate
time to market work and to producing a public good and their decisions are repeated over an
indefinitely long time horizon. The model incorporates incentive compatibility constraints
that require the utility of each household member to be no lower that it would be in the
(non cooperative) Nash equilibrium. Del Boca and Flinn (2012) find that the constraints
are binding for many households and that approximately one-fourth of households behave
in an inefficient manner.
This paper adopts a cooperative/noncooperative modeling framework similar to that of
Del Boca and Flinn (2012), but our focus is on understanding the role of personality traits
in affecting household time allocation decisions and labor market outcomes. Personality
trait measures aim to capture “patterns of thought, feelings and behavior” that corre-
spond to “individual differences in how people actually think, feel and act” (Borghans et al.
(2008)). The most commonly used measures, which are the ones used in this paper, are
the so-called Big Five. They measure individual openness to experience, conscientiousness,
extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism (the opposite of emotional stability).1 The
model we develop and estimate incorporates public and private goods consumption, labor
supply at the extensive and intensive margins, and time allocated to home production. Per-
sonality traits operate as potential determinants of household bargaining weights and wage
offers.
There is an increasing recognition that noncognitive traits play an important role in ex-
plaining a variety of outcomes related to education, earnings, and health. Heckman and
Raut (2016) and Heckman et al. (2006) argue that personality traits may have both di-
rect effects on an individual’s productivity and indirect effects by affecting preferences for
schooling or occupation choices. A study by Fletcher (2013) finds a robust relationship
between personality traits and wages using sibling samples to control for family-level unob-
servables. Specifically, conscientiousness, emotional stability, extraversion and openness to
1The Big Five traits have the acronym OCEAN.
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experience positively affect wages. Cubel et al. (2016) examine whether Big Five personal-
ity traits affect productivity using data gathered in a laboratory setting where effort on a
task is measured. They find that individuals who exhibit high levels of conscientiousness
and emotional stability perform better on the task.
Recent reviews of gender differences in preferences and in personality traits can be found
in Croson and Gneezy (2009) and Bertrand (2011). Studies across many different coun-
tries find that women are on average more agreeable and more neurotic than men and that
gender differences in personality are associated with differences in wages.2 However, the
most crucial traits in affecting wages differ by country. Using Dutch data, Nyhus and Pons
(2005) find that emotional stability is positively associated with wages for both genders
and agreeableness is associated with lower wages for women. Using data from the British
Household Panel Study, Heineck (2011) analyzes correlations between Big Five personality
traits and wages and finds a positive relationship between openness to experience and wages
and a negative linear relationship between agreeableness and wages for men. He also finds a
negative relationship between neuroticism and wages for women. Mueller and Plug (2006),
using data from the Wisconsin Longitudinal Study, find that nonagreeableness, openness to
experience and emotional stability are positively related to men’s earnings, whereas consci-
entiousness and openness to experience are positively related to women’s earnings. They
find that the return that men receive for being nonagreeable is the most significant factor
explaining the gender wage gap. Applying decomposition methods to data from the NLSY
and using different measures of personality, Cattan (2013) finds that gender differences
in self-confidence largely explain the gender wage gap, with the strongest effect being at
the top of the wage distribution.3 Braakmann (2009), using German Socioeconomic Panel
(GSOEP) data, finds that higher levels of conscientiousness increase the probability of being
full-time employed for both genders, while higher levels of neuroticism and agreeableness
2Women also exhibit differences in competitive attributes, risk aversion, preferences for altruism, and
inequality aversion.
3The National Longitudinal Survey of Youth Data do not contain the Big Five personality trait mea-
surements. NLSY measurements include a ten-item scale of self-esteem ((Rosenberg, 1965)) and a four-item
scale of locus of control (Rotter (1966)).
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have the opposite effect.
It is only recently that survey data have been collected on the personality traits of multiple
household members for large random samples, which permits analysis of how personality
traits affect marriage and the division of labor/resources within the household.4 Lundberg
(2012) notes that personality traits can shape preferences and capabilities that affect the re-
turns to marriage and that they may also influence the ability of partners to solve problems
and to make long-term commitments. Using data from the German Socioeconomic Panel
(GSOEP), she finds that Big Five traits significantly affect the probability of marriage, the
probability of divorce, and the duration of marriage. Using data from the Netherlands,
Dupuy and Galichon (2014) show that Big Five personality traits are significant determi-
nants of marriage matches and that different traits matter for men and women.
In this paper, we use a structural behavioral model to explore the extent to which personality
traits of husbands and wives affect household time and resource allocation decisions. In
particular, we examine how personality traits affect the mode of interaction the household
adopts (cooperative or noncooperative), the amount of labor each spouse supplies to home
production and market work, the provision of public goods, wage offers and accepted wages.
Our analysis focuses on couples where the head of the household is age 30-50, because
education and personality traits have largely stabilized by age 30. The model is static and
takes the observed marriage sorting patterns with regard to spouse characteristics as given.
In the model, spouses have their own preferences over consumption of a private good and
a public good. They choose the amount of time to allocate to market work and to the
production of a public good. There is a production technology that specifies how household
members’ time translates into public good production. The model incorporates household
bargaining weights that may depend on the personality characteristics of both spouses, their
education levels, ages,and cognitive abilities.5
4Examples include the British Household Panel Study (BHPS), the German Socioeconomic Panel
(GSOEP), and Household Income and Labor Dynamics in Australia (HILDA), from which the data used in
this paper are drawn.
5This formulation differs from Del Boca and Flinn (2012).
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We use data from the Household Income and Labor Dynamics survey in Australia (HILDA).
An unusual feature of these data is that they contain the Big Five personality measures
at three points in time (over a span of eight years) for multiple household members. In
addition to the personality trait measures, we also use information on age, gender, educa-
tional attainment, cognitive ability, wages, hours worked, and time spent engaging in home
production.
Model parameters are estimated using the Method of Simulated Moments. The moments
used in estimation pertain to wages, labor market hours, housework hours and labor force
participation of different types of households. Model parameters are chosen to minimize
the weighted distance between moments simulated using the model data generating process
and moments based on the data.
We use the estimated model to analyze the determinants of male-female earnings differen-
tials. The vast majority of papers in the gender earnings gap literature (e.g. Altonji and
Blank (1999), Blau and Kahn (1997, 2006); Autor et al. (2008)) consider male and female
earnings without taking into account that most adults are tied to individuals of the opposite
sex through marriage or cohabitation and that these ties likely affect their decision-making.
There are a few papers, however, that analyze male and female labor supply decisions and
wage outcomes within a household framework. For example, Gemici (2011) analyzes house-
hold migration decisions in response to wage offers that males and females receive from
different locations. Gemici and Laufer (2011) studies household formation, dissolution, la-
bor supply, and fertility decisions. Tartari (2015) studies the relationship between children’s
achievement and the marital status of their parents within a dynamic framework in which
partners decide whether to stay married, how to interact (with or without conflict), on labor
supply and on child investments. Joubert and Todd (2016) analyze household labor supply
and savings decisions within a collective household model, with a focus on the gender gap
in pension receipt.
Within a household modeling framework, we analyze the manner in which households make
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decisions regarding whether a man or woman works in the labor market, how many hours
they work, how many hours they devote to housework and the implications for earnings.
Given the model’s assumptions concerning male and female preferences, wage offer distri-
butions, and the method of determining household allocations, we are able to assess the
impact of individual and household characteristics not only on observed differences in wages
but also the utility realizations of household members. Below, we will show that differences
in utility levels of males and females inhabiting households together are more important
indicators of systematic gender differences than are differences in observed wage rates.
Our analysis yields a number of potentially important findings. First, personality traits
are significant determinants of household bargaining weights and of offered wages. Second,
men and women have different traits on average and their traits are valued differently in
the labor market as reflected in estimated wage offer equations. The combined effect of
personality traits on offered wages is comparable in magnitude to the effect of education.
Third, decomposition results show that gender differences in market valuations of person-
ality traits explain a significant fraction of observed wage gaps. We find that if women
were paid according to the male wage offer equation, the observed wage gap would be elim-
inated. Fourth, we find that the gender gap in accepted wages is smaller than the gap in
offered wages. This difference arises because of the labor market participation decisions
of husbands and wives, notably, because women are more selective than men in accepting
employment. Fifth, we find that 38.7 percent of households choose to behave cooperatively,
which also affects working decisions. Cooperation tends to increase the desired level of
household public goods, which require both time and monetary investment, and therefore
tends to increase labor supply for both men and women. Sixth, the marriage market ex-
hibits positive assortative matching on personality traits, which tends to increase gender
gaps in accepted wages relative to what it would be if spouses were randomly matched.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents our baseline model. Section 3
describes the data. Section 4 discusses the econometric specification and estimation imple-
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mentation. Section 5 and 6 present the estimation results and counterfactual experiments.
Section 7 concludes.
3.2. Model
We begin by describing the preferences of the household members and the household pro-
duction technology. Next, we describe the cooperative and noncooperative solutions to the
model. The section concludes with an examination of the choice of the household members
to behave cooperatively or not, and the potential role that personality traits play in this
decision.
3.2.1. Preferences and Household Production Technology
A household is formed with a husband and a wife, distinguished by subscripts m and f ,
respectively. Each individual has a utility function given by
Um = λm ln lm + (1− λm) lnK
Uf = λf ln lf + (1− λf ) lnK ,
where λm and λf are both elements within (0, 1), lj denotes the leisure of spouse j (j = m, f ),
and K is the quantity of produced public good. The household production technology is
given by
K = τ δmm τ
δf
f M
1−δm−δf ,
where τj is the housework time of spouse j , δj is a Cobb-Douglas productivity parameter
specific to spouse j , and M is the total income of the household. Income M depends on the
labor income of both spouses as well as nonlabor income:
M = wmhm + wf hf + ym + yf ,
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Here, wj is the wage rate of spouse j , hj is the amount of time that the supply to the labor
market, and yj is their amount of nonlabor income. The time constraint of each spouse is
given by
T = τj + hj + lj , j = m, f .
A few comments are in order concerning this model specification. We have assumed that
all of the choice variables relate to time allocation decisions, with no explicit consump-
tion choice. This is standard since most data sets used by microeconomists contain fairly
detailed information on labor market behavior and some information on housework, with
little in the way of consumption data. We have made Cobb-Douglas assumptions regarding
individual preferences and the household production technology. Because we assume that
there exists heterogeneity in the preference parameters, λm and λf , and the production
function parameters, δm and δf , we are able to fit patterns of household behavior very well,
even under these restrictive functional forms.6
To this point, we have largely followed Del Boca and Flinn (2012); Del Boca et al. (2014).
Our points of departure are the addition of personality traits to their formulation, the addi-
tion of working decisions, and the addition of wage offer equations to the model. Del Boca
and Flinn (2012) restricted their sample to include only households in which both spouses
work and they simply conditioned on husbands’ and wives’ observed wages. Because one of
the main focuses of our analysis is to examine the impact of personality traits on household
behavior and on a woman’s labor market participation decision, it is necessary for us to
estimate wage equations for both husbands and wives. Let xj denote observable character-
istics of spouse j and θj the personality characteristics of spouse j . Then a household is
6Del Boca and Flinn (2012) actually estimate the distribution of the individual characteristics nonpara-
metrically, and show that by doing so the model is “saturated.” That is, there are the same number of free
parameters as there are data points. Model fit is perfect in such a case. For the purposes of this exercise,
we assume that these characteristics follow a parametric distribution, but we utilize one that is flexible and
capable of fitting patterns in the data quite accurately.
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characterized by the state vector
Sm,f = (λm,δm,wm, ym, θm, xm)
⋃
(λf , δf ,wf , yf , θf , xf ).
Given Sm,f , either mode of behavior is simply a mapping
(τm, hm, lm, τf , hf , lf ) = ΨE (Sm,f ), E = NE ,PW
where E = NE is the (noncooperative) Nash equilibrium case and E = PW is the (coop-
erative) Pareto weight case. We note that each spouses’ wage offer wj is observed by the
household, but the analyst will not observe wj if hj = 0. Certain elements of Sm,f may not
play roles in the determination of equilibrium outcomes in certain behavioral regimes.
In our static model, couples do not have an option to get divorced. With an additional
divorce option, couples might choose to cooperate when their utility from cooperation ex-
ceeds the utility from the inefficient Nash equilibrium and the utility from divorce. Of
course there are many additional considerations other than current period utility in model-
ing divorce decisions, such as the division of assets upon divorce, the presence of children,
child support, alimony and the state of the marriage market. For the sake of simplicity, our
model focuses on married couples without considering divorce, which may to some extent
limit external validity.
We now turn to a detailed description of the non-cooperative and cooperative solutions.
3.2.2. Non-Cooperative Behavior
In the noncooperative regime, the nature of interaction between the spouses is limited and
personality characteristics only play a role through their effects on wage offers. Under
modeling assumptions that are the same as ours, Del Boca and Flinn (2012) show that
there exists a unique equilibrium solution in reaction functions, at least in the cases in
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which spouses are both in or both out of the labor market.7 Because ours is a model of
complete information, each spouse is fully aware of the other’s preferences, productivity
characteristics, wage offer, and non-labor income. The decisions made by each spouse are
best responses to the other spouse’s choices, and are (most often) unique and stable. In
this environment, little interaction between the spouses is required.
Each spouse makes three time allocation choices. Because they must sum to T , it is enough
to describe the equilibrium in terms of each spouse’s choices of labor supply and housework
time. The reaction functions given the state vector Sm,f are
{hm(NE ), τm(NE )}(hf , τf ; Sm,f ) = arg max
hm,τm
λm ln lm + (1− λm) lnK
{hf (NE ), τf (NE )}(hm, τm; Sm,f ) = arg max
hf ,τf
λf ln lf + (1− λf ) lnK ,
where
K = τ δmm τ
δf
f (wmhm + wf hf + ym + yf )
1−δm−δf
For λj ∈ (0, 1), j = m, f , and 0 < δm, 0 < δf , and δm + δf < 1, Del Boca and Flinn
(2012) show that there is a unique equilibrium for their case in which both spouses in the
households supply labor to the market. However, if we remove the constraint that the Nash
equilibrium always results in both spouses choosing to supply a positive amount of time
to the labor market, the possibility of multiple equilibria arises. The multiple equilibria
occur due to the constraint that working hours are nonnegative for both spouses. There
can be at most two Nash equilibria, with each having only one of the spouses supplying a
positive amount of time to the market, and the other in which the spouses switch roles in
terms of who is supplying time to the market and who is not. When both supply time to
the market, the equilibrium is unique, as it is when neither supplies time to the market.
Furthermore, it is the case that when one supplies time to the market and the other does
not, the equilibrium may either be unique or not. Given the structure of the model and the
7BecauseDel Boca and Flinn (2012); Del Boca et al. (2014) conditioned their analysis on the fact that
both spouses were in the labor market, the noncooperative solution was unique.
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estimated parameters, the frequency of multiple equilibria is small. However, when they
do occur, a position must be taken as to which of the two equilibria are selected. We will
follow convention and assume that the equilibrium in which the male participates and the
female does not is the one selected.8 A detailed description of how the non-cooperative
equilibrium is computed and selected is provided in Appendix 3.8.2.
The utility value of this equilibrium to spouse j is given by
Vj(NE ) = λj ln(T − hj(NE )− τj(NE )) + (1− λj) lnK (NE ), j = m, f ,
with
K (NE ) = τm(NE )
δmτf (NE )
δf (wmhm(NE ) + wf hf (NE ) + Ym + Yf )
1−δm−δf ,
where we have suppressed the dependence of the equilibrium outcomes on the state vector
Sm,f to avoid notational clutter.
3.2.3. Cooperative Behavior
The Benthamite social welfare function for the household with the Pareto weight α is given
by
W (hm, hf , τm, τf ;Sm,f ) = α(Sm,f )Um(hm, hf , τm, τf ;Sm,f )
+(1− α(Sm,f ))Uf (hm, hf , τm, τf ; Sm,f ),
where we have eliminated the leisure choice variable lj , j = f ,m by imposing the time
constraint. The Pareto weight α(Sm,f ) ∈ (0, 1), and, as the notation suggests, will be
allowed to be a function of a subset of elements of Sm,f . In the cooperative (efficient)
8Alternatively, one could allow the selection mechanism to depend on personality characteristics. How-
ever, our estimation results indicate multiple equilibria rarely occur (9 out of 1443 households). Thus, the
selection mechanism is unlikely to play a major role in the estimation.
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regime, the household selects the time allocations that maximize W , or
(hm, hf , τm, τf )(Sm,f ) = arg max
hj ,τj ,j=m,f
W (hm, hf , τm, τf ;Sm,f ).
Because this is simply an optimization problem involving a weighted average of two concave
utility functions, the solution to the problem is unique. Then the utility levels of the spouses
under cooperative behavior is
Vj(PW ) = λj log(T − hj(PW )− τj(PW )) + (1− λj) logK (PW ), j = m, f ,
with
K (PW ) = τm(PW )
δmτf (PW )
δf (wmhm(PW ) + wf hf (PW ) + ym + yf )
1−δm−δf .
Once again, we have suppressed the dependence of solutions on the state variable vector
Sm,f . In the cooperative model, there is no danger of multiple equilibria, since it is not really
an equilibrium specification at all, but simply a household utility-maximization problem.
3.2.4. Selection Between the Two Allocations
Del Boca and Flinn (2012) constructed a model in which the Pareto weight, α, was “ad-
justable” so as to satisfy a participation constraint for each spouse that enforced
Vj(PW ) ≥ Vj(NE ), j = m, f .
With no restriction on the Pareto weight parameter α, the Vj(PW ) could be less than
Vj(NE ) for one of the spouses (it always must exceed the noncooperative value for at least
one of the spouses). For example, if Vm(PW ) < Vm(NE ), the husband has no incentive to
participate in the “efficient” outcome, because he is worse off under it. To give him enough
incentive to participate, the value of α, which is his weight in the social welfare function,
is increased to the level at which he is indifferent between the two regimes. Meanwhile,
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his spouse with the “excess” portion of the household surplus from cooperation has to cede
some of her surplus by reducing her share parameter, (1− α), in this case, to the point at
which the husband is indifferent between the two regimes.
In such a world, and in a static context, an efficient outcome could always be achieved
through adjustment of the Pareto weight, α. As a result, all households would behave
cooperatively. To generate the possibility that some households would behave noncoop-
eratively, even when able to adjust α, Del Boca and Flinn assumed a pseudo-dynamic
environment, in which the spouses played the same (static) stage game an infinite number
of times. They assumed a grim-trigger punishment strategy, so that any deviation from the
agreed upon cooperative outcome by either spouse in any period results in a punishment
state in which the Nash equilibrium is played in perpetuity. In such a case, the value of
the discount factor, β ∈ [0, 1), used to weight future rewards, is critical in determining
whether a cooperative arrangement is implementable. The value to individual j of playing
the cooperative outcome forever is simply Vj(PW )(1 +β+β
2 + ...) = Vj(PW )/(1−β). The
present value of the noncooperative outcome is Vj(NE )/(1 − β). If individual j cheats on
the agreement in any period and the spouse does not, the value of cheating in the period is
denoted by Vj(C ), and it is straightforward to show that Vj(C ) > Vj(PW ). By cheating in
any period, the individual knows that the spouse will not cooperate in all future periods,
so that the gain to cheating (assuming the spouse does not) is
Vj(C ) + β
Vj(NE )
1− β
,
whereas the gain from playing cooperatively throughout (assuming that the spouse does as
well) is
Vj(PW )
1− β
Any implementable agreement will have Vj(PW ) > Vj(NE ) for each j . We can define a
critical discount factor β∗j as one that equates the value of cheating with not cheating in
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any period for individual j , and this critical value is given by
β∗j =
Vj(C )− Vj(PW )
Vj(C )− Vj(NE )
,
where it follows that β∗j ∈ [0, 1). There will be a reallocation (characterized by a value of
α) of the cooperative surplus for which the two critical discount factors are equal, and we
define this common value as β̃, where β̃ = β∗1 = β
∗
2 . Del Boca and Flinn show that if all
individuals in the population share the same discount factor, β, then a given household will
be able to implement the cooperative outcome if and only if β ≥ β̃. The intuition is fairly
straightforward. If individuals are myopic, they give excessive weight to the potential gains
from cheating now and far less weight to the costs they will incur in the future by being in the
noncooperative regime forever. Both spouses have to be sufficiently forward-looking to be
able to implement the cooperative agreement in this simple dynamic setting. Del Boca and
Flinn (2012) estimate a common discount factor β, and find that approximately 25 percent
of households in their sample behaved in a noncooperative manner given their parameter
estimates.
In our model, which focuses on the role of personality traits in explaining wage and welfare
differences between husbands and wives, we think of the Pareto weight α as being deter-
mined, in part, by the personality characteristics of the husband and wife. For example,
someone who is very agreeable and who is married to a nonagreeable person might receive
a lower Pareto weight. In this case, it is somewhat problematic to assume that the α can
be freely adjusted to satisfy the participation constraint of one of the spouses and more
reasonable to assume that α is fixed for each household. Fixed pareto weights simplifies the
cooperative versus noncooperative decision of the household, as well as the computation of
the model. In this set-up, personality characteristics of both spouses are potentially key
factors in how they settle on a particular mode of behavior.9
9In a more elaborate model, we could imagine a situation in which the Pareto weight could be adjusted,
but with a cost depending on the personality characteristics of the spouses. From this perspective, we are
assuming that the costs of adjusting the Pareto weight are indefinitely large for one or both of the spouses.
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A household will behave cooperatively if and only if both of the following weak inequalities
hold:
Vm(PW ) ≥ Vm(NE )
Vf (PW ) ≥ Vf (NE ).
Thus, there is no scope for “renegotiation” in this model. There is a positive probability
that any household behaves cooperatively that is strictly less than one given our preference
heterogeneity specification. The simplest way to characterize the cooperation decision in our
framework is as follows. We begin by explicitly including the value of α in the cooperative
payoff function for household j , so that
Vj(PW |Sm,f ,α), j = m, f .
Given that the function Vm(PW |Sm.f ,α) is monotonically increasing in α and given that
Vf (PW |Sm,f ,α) is monotonically decreasing in α, we can define two critical values, α∗(Sm,f )
and α∗(Sm,f ) such that
Vm(PW |Sm,f ,α∗(Sm,f )) = Vm(NE |Sm,f )
Vf (PW |Sm,f ,α∗(Sm,f )) = Vf (NE |Sm,f ).
The set of α values that produce cooperative behavior in the household is connected, so
that the household will behave cooperatively if and only if
α(Sm,f ) ∈ [α∗(Sm,f ),α∗(Sm,f )].
For a given value of the state variables, Sm,f , the household will either behave cooperatively
or not; there is no further stochastic element in this choice after we have conditioned on
Sm,f . The probabilistic nature of the choice is due to the randomness of Sm,f . Although
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some elements of Sm,f are observable (and do not include measurement error under our
assumptions), others are not. There are a subset of elements that are not observed for any
household, which include the preference and household production parameters. We denote
the set of unobserved household characteristics by Sum,f = {λm,δm,λf , δf }, with the set of
(potentially) observed characteristics given by Som,f = {wm, ym, θm, xm,wf , yf , θf , xf }. We
say that these elements are all potentially observable because the wage offers, wj , j = m, f ,
are only observed if spouse j supplies a positive amount of time to the labor market. The
state variable vector Som,f (i) that is observed for household i will have a degenerate marginal
distribution. The unobserved vector Sum,f (i) will always have nondegenerate marginal dis-
tributions. Let the distribution of Sum,f (i) be given by Gi , and assume that Gi = G for all
i . Then the probability that household i is cooperative is simply the measure of the set of
Sum,f (i) such that the cooperation condition is satisfied, or
P(PW |Som,f (i)) =
∫
χ[α∗(Sm,f (i)) ≤ α(Sm,f (i)) ≤ α∗(Sm,f (i))]dG (Sum,f ).
For any household i , 0 < P(PW |Sum,f (i)) < 1, due to what is essentially a full support con-
dition. The preference weight on leisure for spouse j lies in the interval (0, 1). As λj → 1,
spouse j only cares about leisure and gives no weight to the public good. In the Nash equi-
librium, their contribution to household production through time and money will converge
to 0, and the cooperative solution, which results in greater production of the public good,
will be of no value to them. As λj → 0, the individual will demand little leisure and will
spend all of their time in the labor market and household production. For cases in which
λm and λf are both arbitrarily close to 1, the household will be noncooperative. For cases,
in which λm and λf are close to 0, the household will be cooperative. Thus, independently
of the other values in the state vector, variability in the preference parameters on the full
support of their (potential) distribution is enough to guarantee that no household can be
deterministically classified as cooperative a priori.
139
3.3. Data Description
3.3.1. Selection of the Estimation Sample
We use sample information from the Household Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia
(HILDA) longitudinal data set. HILDA is a representative one in one thousand sample of
the Australian population. It is an ongoing longitudinal annual panel starting in the year
2001 with 19,914 initial individuals from 7,682 households. (Summerfield et al. (2015)) Our
paper makes use of the following variables: (1) labor market outcomes including annual labor
earnings and working hours; (2) housework split information; (3) self-completion life style
questions including a question about perceived fairness of the housework arrangement; (4)
education levels; (5) cognitive test scores on three tests and (6) the “Big Five” personality
traits assessment (collected three times, in waves 5, 9, and 13).
To the best of our knowledge, HILDA has the highest quality information on personality
traits among all nationwide data sets.10 For the majority of respondents, we observe three
repeated measurements of personality traits over an eight-year time window. As described
in Section 1, the personality trait measurements are based on the Five Factor (“Big Five”)
Personality Inventory, which classifies personality traits along five dimensions: Openness
to Experience, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Emotional Stability
(John and Srivastava (1999)). “Big Five” information in HILDA is constructed by using
responses to 36 personality questions, which are shown in table 40.11 Respondents were
asked to pick a number from 1 to 7 to assess how well each personality adjective describes
them. The lowest number, 1, denotes a totally opposite description and the highest number,
7, denotes a perfect description. According to Losoncz (2009), only 28 of 36 items load well
into their corresponding components when performing factor analysis. The other 8 items
10The only other two nation-wide data sets providing personality traits inventory assessments are the
German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) study and the British Household Panel (BHPS) study. Both of
them also collected “Big Five” measures.
11The source of these 36 adjectives come from two parts. Thirty of them are extracted from Trait Descrip-
tive Adjectives - 40 proposed by Saucier (1994), which is a selected version of Traits Descriptive Adjective
- 100 (Goldberg (1992b)) to balance the time use and accuracy. And the other additional six items come
from various sources.
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are discarded due to either their low loading values or their ambiguity in defining several
traits.12 Our construction of the “Big Five” follows the procedure provided by Losoncz
(2009). We include all individuals who have at least one personality trait measurement.
For the individuals whose personality traits are surveyed in multiple waves, we use the
average value.
In addition to the information on personality traits, HILDA also collected information on
cognitive ability once in wave 12.13 We construct a one-dimensional measure from three
different measures: (i) Backward Digits Span, (ii) Symbol Digits Modalities and (iii) a 25-
item version of the National Adult Reading Test. We construct a single measure by first
standardizing each of the three measures and then taking the mean.
The repeated measures of personality traits for the same person during eight-year window
allow us to explore how the personality traits evolve over the life-cycle. Following Cobb-
Clark and Schurer (2012), we define the mid-term change as the change in reported traits
between 2005 and 2009 and the long-term change as the change between 2005 and 2013. The
changes range from -6 to 6. Table 41 reports summary statistics for mid-term and long-term
changes. Personality trait changes are approximately normally distributed with a mean of
0 and a standard deviation of around 0.80. The majority of individuals (more than 70%)
experience changes in their personality traits within one standard deviation. Figure 20
shows the mean midterm changes in personality traits by age. The figures show that traits
are more malleable at younger ages. For example, the average change in conscientiousness is
above 0 before age 30 and close to 0 after that. We perform an F-test of whether changes in
personality traits are independent of age for individuals age 30-50 and do not reject the null.
However, the null is rejected with p-value less than 0.001 when the age group is expanded
to ages 15-50. The observed pattern is consistent with other evidence from the psychology
literature that personality traits stabilize with age. For example, Terracciano et al. (2006)
12The way to check each item’s loading performance is to calculate the loading value after doing oblimin
rotation. The loading values of 8 abandoned items were either lower than 0.45, or did not load more than
1.25 times higher on the expected factor than any other factor.
13According to the report of Wooden (2013), the response rate is high, approximately 93%.
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Table 40: Personality traits questionnaire
B19 How well do the following words describe you? For each word, cross one box to indicate how well that
word describes you. There are no right or wrong answers.
(Cross         one box for each word.)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Does not describe
me at all
Describes 
me very well
talkative
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Does not describe
me at all
Describes 
me very well
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
sympathetic
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
orderly
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
envious
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
jealous
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
deep
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
intellectual
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
withdrawn
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
extroverted
cold
disorganised
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
harsh
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
temperamental
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
complex
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
shy
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
systematic
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
warm
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
moody
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
efficient
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
philosophical
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
fretfulbashful
kind imaginative
inefficient
touchy
creative
quiet
cooperative
sloppy
✘
enthusiastic
selfish
careless
calm
traditional
lively
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Table 41: Summary statistics of personality traits and their changes over time
Level Mid-term change between 05-09 Long-term change between 05-13
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 10th 50th 90th Mean S.D. 10th 50th 90th
Openness 4.27 1.03 -0.074 0.776 -1.000 0 0.833 -0.004 0.817 -1.000 0 1.000
Conscientiousness 5.15 1.02 0.028 0.772 -0.833 0 1.000 0.106 0.824 -0.833 0 1.167
Extraversion 4.42 1.08 -0.036 0.744 -1.000 0 0.833 -0.049 0.786 -1.000 0 0.833
Agreeableness 5.40 0.88 -0.010 0.761 -1.000 0 1.000 0.087 0.794 -1.000 0 1.000
Emotional Stability 5.19 1.07 0.092 0.870 -1.000 0 1.167 0.100 0.919 -1.000 0 1.167
Data come from wave 2005, 2009 and 2013. The sample consists of 6,330 individual observations (2,913
males and 3,417 females) with three completed repeated measures. S.D.= standard deviation.
and Terracciano et al. (2010) report that intra-individual consistency increases up to age
30 and thereafter stabilizes.
We focus our attention on households whose heads are between the ages 30 and 50 for two
reasons. First, household structure may change during earlier ages due to marriage and
fertility. Second, as noted, personality traits stabilize after age 30. Thus we can reasonably
treat a spouse’s personality traits as being fixed after age 30. We drop households for
which housework information, labor market information or personality traits are missing.
Among 3151 intact households with complete information and with the husband and wife
present, 1881 of them have at least one period in which the household head is age 30-50
when surveyed. When a household has multiple qualifying periods, we randomly select
one observation period. The hourly wage is calculated by dividing annual earnings by
annual working hours. We truncated the top five percent of hourly wage rates to eliminate
unrealistically high values. We set the total time available for leisure, housework, and labor
supply in a week, T , to 116. Working time has an upper bound of 60 hours while housework
has an upper bound of 56 hours.
In general, housework time can be divided into two components: time spent with children
and other activities, such as cleaning house, cooking or running errands. Women with
younger children are most likely to have their labor supply choices influenced by children.
Because our model does not explicitly account for time spent child-rearing, we restrict our
estimation sample to only include families that do not have very young children. In table
42, we examine the effects of this restriction by comparing three alternative samples with
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Figure 20: Changes in Big-Five personality over the life-cycle (age 15-60)
−
.6
−
.4
−
.2
0
.2
.4
.6
C
ha
ng
e 
in
 O
pe
nn
es
s
15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60
Age
95% CI
Mean
F−test of no difference across age group between 30−50: p=.88 
(a) Openness to experience
−
.6
−
.4
−
.2
0
.2
.4
.6
C
ha
ng
e 
in
 C
on
sc
ie
nt
io
us
ne
ss
15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60
Age
95% CI
Mean
F−test of no difference across age group between 30−50: p=.17 
(b) Conscientiousness
−
.6
−
.4
−
.2
0
.2
.4
.6
C
ha
ng
e 
in
 S
ta
bi
lit
y
15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60
Age
95% CI
Mean
F−test of no difference across age group between 30−50: p=.11 
(c) Emotional stability
−
.6
−
.4
−
.2
0
.2
.4
.6
C
ha
ng
e 
in
 A
gr
ee
ab
le
ne
ss
15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60
Age
95% CI
Mean
F−test of no difference across age group between 30−50: p=.45 
(d) Agreeableness
−
.6
−
.4
−
.2
0
.2
.4
.6
C
ha
ng
e 
in
 E
xt
ra
ve
rs
io
n
15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60
Age
95% CI
Mean
F−test of no difference across age group between 30−50: p=.77 
(e) Extraversion
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different age selection criteria. The first sample does not impose any age restriction, the
second sample excludes households with any child below age 8 and the third sample excludes
families with a child below age 14. The sample size shrinks from 1,881 to 1,443 and 973
with the more stringent age restrictions. However, the average age of husbands is around
40 and the age of wives around 38 in all three samples. The labor market participation of
husbands is also similar across the three samples. As is typically found, husbands spend
more time in the labor market than do their wives. The employment rate for males is 94%
and the average number of working hours (conditional on working) is around 44 hours per
week.
The key differences across the three samples are observed in female labor market partici-
pation and reported housework time. The average housework hours of husbands decreases
from 23.11 hours in sample 1 to 18.19 hours in sample 2 and 14.92 hours in sample 3. The
average housework hours of wives decreases from 43.27 hours in sample 1 to 27.87 hours in
sample 2 and 20.27 hours in sample 3. These decreases are mainly caused by the reduction
of the time spent with children. As shown in table 42, the average time spent with children
is 9.12 hours for husbands and 20.89 hours for wives. The time spent with children shrinks
to 4.10 and 7.15 hours in sample 1 to 1.47 and 1.89 hours in sample 2. Wives with older
children spend fewer hours caring for children and have a higher labor force participation
rate, both at the intensive and extensive margins. The employment rate increases from 72%
in sample 1 to 85% in sample 1 and 88% in sample 3. The average working hours increases
from 30.16 hours in sample 1 to 33.48 hours in sample 2 and 36.29 in sample 3.
In all three samples, the distributions of wives’ working hours and housework hours are
more dispersed than that of husbands’. Their accepted wages are also lower. In general,
the time allocations described in our paper using the HILDA dataset are consistent with
patterns described in Del Boca and Flinn (2012); Del Boca et al. (2014) for US Panel Study
of Income Dynamics (PSID) data (the 2005 wave).
We use the sample of households without children below age 8 (sample 2) as the primary
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estimation sample. However, for comparison purposes, we also provide in the appendix
estimation results based on the more restricted sample (sample 3).
With regard to personality traits and cognitive ability, Table 3 shows significant gender
differences but similar patterns across the three samples. On average, men have lower
scores on agreeableness, extraversion and conscientiousness compared with women. Gender
differences in openness to experience and emotional stability are less significant. In our
sample, wives have higher cognitive scores than husbands.
We estimate a preliminary OLS regression to examine the relationship between measured
personality traits and log wages (for those who were working) and their relationship with
labor participation decisions. The regression results with log wage as the dependent variable
are shown in the first two columns in Table 43. We find for both that men and women that
education and cognitive ability increase earnings. In addition, conscientiousness increases
wages for men. In the last two columns in Table 43, the dependent variable is labor force
participation. Higher education and cognitive scores are associated with higher rates of labor
force participation for both men and women. Openness to experience tends to decrease labor
force participation for both men and women. Conscientiousness is associated with higher
rates of participation but only for women.
3.3.2. Assortative Matching of Personality Traits
Although our paper does not explicitly model the marriage market, we are able to examine
marital sorting on personality traits and cognitive scores in our sample. Figure 21 displays
the scatter plots of spousal personality traits as well as cognitive abilities. We observe a
strong positive assortative matching in the cognitive ability dimension with a correlation
equal to 0.34. Among the “Big Five” personality traits, emotional stability and openness
to experience are the traits that exhibit the most significant pattern of positive sorting
(correlation larger than 0.1), whereas agreeableness has a less strong positive sorting pat-
tern. There is no significant correlation in the extraversion and conscientiousness traits of
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Table 42: Key variables in HILDA, means and (standard errors)
Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3
Full sample Excluded households Excluded households
with dependents < 8 with dependents < 14
Variable Male Female Male Female Male Female
Age 40.00 37.86 41.17 39.20 40.04 38.12
(6.41) (7.21) (6.56) (7.65) (7.30) (8.72)
Employment 0.94 0.72 0.94 0.85 0.94 0.88
(0.24) (0.45) (0.24) (0.35) (0.24) (0.32)
Hourly Wage 30.10 25.49 29.52 24.85 29.06 25.33
(15.02) (13.91) (14.60) (12.46) (15.99) (14.63)
Working hours 44.08 30.16 44.10 33.48 44.03 36.29
(9.84) (13.25) (9.54) (12.31) (9.70) (13.14)
Housework 23.11 43.27 18.19 27.87 14.92 20.27
(15.83) (25.54) (12.86) (17.59) (10.62) (13.48)
Time with Children 9.12 20.89 4.10 7.15 1.47 1.89
(9.89) (23.64) (6.49) (11.16) (3.64) (5.83)
Education 13.22 13.31 13.16 13.22 13.17 13.37
(2.38) (2.38) (2.38) (2.40) (2.37) (2.44)
Other Income 335.0 - 333.7 - 311.9 -
(251.4) - (256.9) - (251.0) -
Obs. 1,881 1,881 1,443 1,443 973 973
Average values of personality traits and cognitive ability
Cognition 0.13 0.23 0.12 0.23 0.13 0.22
(0.70) (0.66) (0.70) (0.65) (0.70) (0.66)
Openness 4.37 4.24 4.39 4.23 4.41 4.27
(0.96) (0.98) (0.96) (0.99) (0.95) (1.00)
Conscientiousness 5.09 5.29 5.11 5.34 5.12 5.38
(0.94) (1.00) (0.93) (0.98) (0.94) (0.98)
Extraversion 4.32 4.65 4.29 4.63 4.31 4.61
(0.99) (1.13) (1.00) (1.15) (0.99) (1.14)
Agreeableness 5.22 5.74 5.20 5.73 5.20 5.70
(0.85) (0.76) (0.85) (0.76) (0.85) (0.77)
Emotional Stability 5.14 5.18 5.15 5.19 5.14 5.15
(1.00) (0.99) (0.97) (0.98) (0.96) (0.99)
(1) Both employment and hourly wage are conditional on being employed. (2) The other income is the
pooled household income other than labor earnings.
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Table 43: The Effects of Personality on Earnings and Labor Market Participation
Log Hourly Earning Labor Market Participation
Males Females Males Females
Openness -0.027 -0.013 -0.023*** -0.040***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.008) (0.010)
Conscientiousness 0.050*** 0.027 0.013 0.034***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.007) (0.010)
Extraversion 0.009 0.023 0.005 0.019
(0.013) (0.012) (0.006) (0.008)
Agreeableness -0.040* -0.041* 0.006 0.001
(0.017) (0.020) (0.008) (0.013)
Stability 0.011 -0.006 -0.002 -0.014
(0.015) (0.016) (0.007) (0.010)
Education 0.053*** 0.065*** 0.007* 0.023***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004)
Cognition 0.124*** 0.064** 0.057*** 0.067***
(0.020) (0.022) (0.010) (0.015)
Exp 0.031** 0.016* 0.004 0.007
(0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004)
Exp2/100 -0.080*** -0.045** -0.010 -0.020
(0.024) (0.023) (0.016) (0.012)
Notes:Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The potential experience is calculated by “Age - 6 -
education years” as a standard approach in the literature.
* Statistically significant at the .05 level; ** at the .01 level; *** at the .001 level.
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Table 44: Responses to the “fair share” question
Percentage(%) Male Female
Much More(1) 1.80 19.89
A bit More(2) 12.54 37.98
Fair Share(3) 58.21 36.87
A bit Less(4) 25.09 4.78
Much Less(5) 2.36 0.49
Correlation -0.379
husbands and wives. There is also strong positive marital sorting on cognitive ability.
3.3.3. Other Variables: Fair Share
Despite the important role played by the by the Pareto weight in cooperative models of
the household, there is no direct measurement proposed in the literature. The HILDA
data provide a fairly high quality record of household activities. We consider the following
question, completed by the respondent in the self-completion portion of the questionnaire,
to be potentially related to the household allocation rule: “Do you think you do your fair
share around the house?” The respondent has the option of choosing: (1) I do much more
than my fair share. (2) I do a bit more than my fair share. (3) I do my fair share. (4) I do
a bit less than my fair share. (5) I do much less than my fair share.
The distribution of fair share choices for both men and women is shown in table 44. The
majority of husbands report that they do a fair share of housework, while the majority of
wives report doing more than their fair share. The significantly negative correlation between
men and women’s report indicates that a better condition for the husband implies a worse
condition for the wife, consistent with a Pareto weight interpretation.
We do not make direct use of the fair share variable in estimation. Rather, as described
below, we will examine how simulations based on the estimated model relate to the fair
share variable as a way of examining support for the model.
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Figure 21: Assortative matching of personality traits and cognitive ability
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3.4. Econometric Implementation
As previously noted, a household i is uniquely characterized by the vector Sm,f (i) =
(λim, δim,wim, yim, θim, expim, eduim, cim, aim)
⋃
(λif , δif ,wif , yif , θif , expif , eduif , cif , aif ).
14 Given
the vector Sm,f (i), the equilibrium of the game that characterizes the time allocations of
the household is uniquely determined.15 The log-wage equation for males and females com-
prising household i is specified:
lnwim = γ0m + γ1mθim + γ2meduim + γ3mcim + γ4mexpim + γ5mexp
2
im + εim
lnwif = γ0f + γ1f θif + γ2f eduif + γ3f cif + γ4f expif + γ5f exp
2
if + εif
This specification is treated as a standard Mincer equation with additional personality trait
θif and cognitive ability cif components. The potential working experience term expij is
defined as age − 6 − edu. The disturbances (εim, εif ) are assumed to follow a joint normal
distribution:
 εim
εif
 ∼ N

 0
0
 ,
 σ2εm ρσεmσεf
ρσεmσεf σ
2
εf


where σεm denotes the standard deviation of the male’s wage, σεf denotes the standard
deviation of the wife’s wage, and ρ denotes the correlation of the wage disturbances.
The model incorporates household heterogeneity in preferences and in the production tech-
nology by assuming the parameters, (λm,λf ,δm, δf ) are drawn from a joint distribution
Gu(S
u
m,f ), where the u subscript denotes the fact that these parameters are unobserved to
the analyst, although they are assumed known by both spouses. The distribution Gu is para-
14{λim,δim,λif , δif } are the unobserved preferences and production technology of household i drawn
from distribution Gu(S
u
m,f ). {wim,yim,wif ,yif } are wages and other incomes in the household. Finally,
{θim, expim, eduim, cim, aim, θif , expif , eduif , cif , aif } are personality traits θ, potential working experience exp,
education attainment edu, cognitive ability c and age a for both spouses m and f in household i .
15As noted above, in the noncooperative case, there is the possibility of two equilibria existing, one with
the husband supplying time to the market and the wife not, and the other in which the wife works in the
market and the husband does not. We use the convention that the one in which the male supplies time to
the market is the one that is implemented.
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metric, although it is “flexible” in the sense that it is characterized by a high-dimensional
parameter vector. The distribution is created by mapping a four-dimensional normal dis-
tribution into the appropriate parameter space using known functions. Define the random
vector x4×1 ∼ N(µ1, Σ1), where µ1 is 4 × 1 vector of means and
∑
1 is a 4 × 4 symmetric,
positive-definite covariance matrix. The random variables (λm,λf , δm, δf ) are then defined
using the link functions
λm =
exp(x1)
1+exp(x1)
λf =
exp(x2)
1+exp(x2)
δm =
exp(x3)
1+exp(x3)+exp(x4)
δf =
exp(x4)
1+exp(x3)+exp(x4)
(3.1)
The joint distribution of preference and production technology parameters, (λm,λf , δm, δf ),
is fully characterized by 14 parameters.
We assume that the household Pareto weights may depend on education, cognitive scores
and personality traits as well as the ages of both spouses through the following parametric
specification:
α(i) =
Qm(i)
Qm(i) + Qf (i)
, (3.2)
where
Qj(i) = exp(γ6j + γ7jθj(i) + γ8jeduj(i) + γ9jcj(i) + γ10jaj(i)), j = m, f .
The coefficients of γ7j ,γ8j ,γ9j ,γ10j capture the effects of personality traits, education, cogni-
tive ability and age on the Pareto weight of the husband in household i . The Pareto weight
of the wife is simply 1−α(i), the weights are both positive and normalized so as to sum to
1.
Dividing both the numerator and denominator of (3.2) by Qf (i), we have
α(i) =
Q̃(i)
1 + Q̃(i)
,
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where
Q̃(i) = Qm(i)/Qf (i)
= exp(
10∑
k=6
[γkmzkm(i)− γkf zkf (i)]),
where the index k runs over all of the characteristics included in the α(i) function, and
where z6j(i) = 1, z7j(i) = θj(i), z8j(i) = ej(i), z9j(i) = cj(i), and z10j(i) = aj(i). We note
that as long as the values of zkj(i) differ for husbands and wives in a sufficiently large number
of households, the parameters γkm and γkf are separately identified. With regard to the
constant terms, only the difference γ6m − γ6f is identified.
We compute the elasticity of husband’s Pareto weight α(i) with respect to his personality
traits θm(i) as
ηm(i) =
∂α(i)
∂θm(i)
θm(i)
α(i)
, (3.3)
and the elasticity of wife’s Pareto weight 1−α(i) with respect to her personality traits θf (i)
as
ηf (i) =
∂(1− α(i))
∂θf (i)
θf (i)
(1− α(i))
, (3.4)
for each household. In section 5 below, we will present the distribution of these elasticities
for the five-dimensional personality traits included in the Pareto weight function.
3.4.1. Identification
The model described in section 2 is not nonparametrically identified, for reasons related
to those given in Del Boca and Flinn (2012). It is useful to discuss identification in that
model to see what the complicating factors are here. Del Boca and Flinn (2012) condition
their analysis on both spouses being employed, which means that wages are observable.
Del Boca and Flinn (2012) show that it is possible to nonparametrically identify the joint
distribution of (λm,λf , δm, δf ,wm,wf , ym +yf ) given (hm, τm, hf , τf ,wm,wf , ym, yf ) under the
assumption that all households behave noncooperatively (Nash equilibrium). They show
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that such a model is saturated, i.e., there are the same number of parameters to estimate
as there are data points. A cooperative version of this model adds an additional parameter,
either a scalar or a function, to select a point on the Pareto frontier that corresponds to the
household’s allocation. With this addition, the model is under-identified; to remedy this,
the authors impose the assumption that α = 0.5. If one is willing to assume either that all
households use the value α = 0.5 or that spouses reach a cooperative outcome where each
obtains no less utility than they would in the Nash equilibrium, then cooperative models
are also nonparametrically identified.16
The most important difference between the problem in Del Boca and Flinn (2012) and ours
is the introduction of wage equations that are both independent objects of interest and that
are required to correctly account for nonrandom selection into the labor force for husbands
and wives.17 These wage equations take the generic form
lnwim = γ0m + γ1mθim + γ2meduim + γ3mcim + γ4mexpim + γ5mexp
2
im + εim
lnwif = γ0f + γ1f θif + γ2f eduif + γ3f cif + γ4f expif + γ5f exp
2
if + εif
We know that the sample selection problem leads to inconsistent OLS estimates of γkj , k =
0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, j = f ,m if only using observations with observed wages, because in general
E (εij |θij , eduij , cij , expij) 6= 0 for j = m, f . The selection mechanism that operates jointly
on (εim, εif ) is a rather complex one in our decision-making framework. Moreover, the
parameters of the wage function that we attempt to estimate are just a subset of the
parameters characterizing the household’s decision problem and choices.
Under our model specification, the data generating process (DGP) depends on the observed
16In the latter case, individual utility is first computed assuming the weight α = 0.5. At this outcome, if
one spouse has a lower utility than in the Nash equilibrium, their weight is increased until that spouse is
made indifferent between the cooperative and Nash equilibrium outcome. This means that in the population,
a mass of households will have a weight of α = 0.5, namely those households for which the participation
constraint does not bind, with a distribution of ex post values of α not equal to 0.5 for households in which
the participation constraint is binding.
17Allowing for spouses being out of the labor market in the Del Boca and Flinn (2012) model would have
required the introduction of wage equations and would have also resulted in the model being no longer
nonparametrically identified (even given an assumed value of the Pareto weight α).
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characteristics of the husband and wife, and Gu, the distribution of preference and produc-
tion technology parameters, and Fε, the bivariate normal distribution of (εm,εf ). Draws from
Gu and Fε along with the observed values of state variables {θm, θf , am, af , edum, eduf , cm, cf , expm, expf },
determine the household’s preference and production technology {λm,λf , δm, δf }, the wage
offers {wm,wf }, and the household’s value of α. Based on these state variable realizations,
each of the household’s four choices are determined (which are the labor market {hm, hf } and
housework time allocations {τm, τf } of each spouse given the endogenous equilibrium choice).
We denote all of the unknown parameters to be estimated by Ω. The model generates a
joint conditional distribution over the endogenous variables AE ≡ (wm,wf , hm, hf , τm, τf )′
given the vector of observed exogenous covariates AC and the parameter vector Ω,
Q(AE |AC , Ω).
This distribution cannot be expressed in a closed-form, but it is straightforward to sim-
ulate it by taking a large number of draws from Gu and Fε. The conditional distribution
Q(AE |AC , Ω) is the basis of the estimator described in more detail in the following subsec-
tion.
If the selection criteria sorting households into cooperation and spouses into labor market
participation were less complex, it would be possible to employ a maximum likelihood es-
timator directly constructed from the conditional distribution Q(AE |AC , Ω) for each house-
hold. Parameter identification is relatively straightforward to analyze in such a case simply
by determining whether the first order conditions are linearly independent. When using
moment-based estimators, as we do, typically it is not possible to explicitly demonstrate the
identification of all of the model parameters. The hope is that by including enough sample
statistics, all of the model parameters will be identified and precisely estimated. Moments
of the data are chosen, mh(AE ,AC ), h = 1, ...,H where H is at least as large as the dimen-
sionality of the parameter space, given by #Ω.18 For example, one of the moments used in
18In our case, we use 85 moments to identify 54 parameters #Ω = 54. Appendix 3.8.3 provides a list of
moments used in estimation.
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forming the estimator is the proportion of wives in the sample with characteristics aC ∈ AC
who are in the labor market, in which case m(AE ,AC ) = N
−1∑N
i=1 χ[hf (i) > 0; aC ∈ AC , Ω],
where χ is the indicator function and N is the number of households in the sample. In gen-
eral, there does not exist a unique deterministic solution Ω̄ such that M = M̃(Ω̄). Instead,
we define a distance function, D(M̃(Ω),M), and the minimum distance estimator of Ω is
given by
Ω̂ = arg min
Ω
D(M̃(Ω),M).
Whether or not the model is “well-identified” using a particular vector of sample moments is
often determined after estimation has been attempted. Different sets of moments can yield
different point estimates and associated standard errors in small samples, but it is seldom
possible to determine an “optimal” vector of moments to use in a reasonably complex
estimation problem. A specific parameter is said to be precisely estimated if the ratio of its
point estimate to its estimated standard error is large in absolute value. In our case, it is
almost never the case that this ratio of the parameter to its standard error is close to zero.
3.4.2. Model Estimation
We estimate the model using a relatively standard Method of Simulated Moments ap-
proach. Given a set of parameters, we repeatedly draw from the distributions of house-
hold preference parameters, production function parameters, and potential wage offers,
(δrm,λ
r
m,w
r
m, δ
r
f ,λ
r
f ,w
r
f ), R times for each household. Combined with other observed vari-
ables
(ym, θm, cm, am, edum, expm, yf , θf , cf , af , eduf , expf ), we solve for the time allocation of the
household (hrf , τ
r
f , h
r
f , τ
r
f ) within the selected equilibrium. Model parameters are estimated
by choosing the parameters that minimize the quadratic distance function,
Ω̂ = arg min
Ω
(M̃NR(Ω)−MN)′WN(M̃NR(Ω)−MN),
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where WN is a positive definite weighting matrix. The NR subscript on M̃ signifies that
these population analogs are computed from R simulations for each of the N households
in the sample. Under standard conditions used to obtain consistency of GMM estimators,
plimN,R→∞Ω̂ = Ω for any positive definite W . We compute the weighting matrix WN follow-
ing Del Boca et al. (2014) using a resampling method.19 The weight matrix is the inverse
of the diagonal of the bootstrapped covariance matrix of MN :
W = P−1
 P∑
p=1
(MpN −MN)(M
p
N −MN)
−1 .
Standard errors associated with the parameters Ω̂ are obtained using the standard asymp-
totic formula for generalized method of moments estimators.
3.4.3. Principal Component Analysis
Because many of the model parameters are associated with personality traits, the moments
used in estimation need to capture the relationship between choices, outcomes and person-
ality traits. There are five traits, each of which can take on values ranging from 1 to 7. To
specify the moments in a parsimonious way, we first apply principal-components analysis
(PCA) to the five personality trait variables to obtain linear combinations of traits that are
used in estimation.20
We do the PCA separately for husbands and wives and, for each, retain the first two prin-
cipal components, which have eigenvalues greater than 1. They are shown in Table 45. For
the first component, the most crucial loadings are conscientiousness, agreeableness and emo-
tional stability (.517, .543 and .493) in the male case. For women, all traits except openness
19We resample the original N observations a total of P times (where P = 100), and compute the vector of
sample characteristics at each simulation s, which is given by MpN .
20Principal components is a statistical procedure that converts a set of possibly correlated variables into
a set of linearly uncorrelated variables called principal components. The transformation is defined so that
the first principal component has the largest possible variance (accounts for as much of the variability in
the data as possible), and each succeeding component has the highest variance possible under the constraint
that it is orthogonal to the preceding components.
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Table 45: Principal-components analysis for five dimensional personality traits
Male Female
1 2 1 2
Eigenvalues 1.47 1.22 1.59 1.18
Variance 29.4% 24.5% 31.8% 23.5%
Openness to experience 0.144 0.771 0.087 0.820
Conscientiousness 0.556 -0.086 0.511 -0.066
Extraversion 0.363 -0.168 0.466 -0.009
Agreeableness 0.543 0.407 0.456 0.408
Emotional stability 0.493 -0.452 0.553 -0.397
to experience contribute almost equally to the first component. For the second component,
loadings are concentrated on openness to experience for both males and females (.788 and
.789). We then discretize the first two principal components into three levels (low, middle
and high) and construct moments conditioning on these components and categories.21
3.4.4. Selection of Sample Characteristics
We estimated the above parameters by matching the following six groups of moments: (1)
proportion employed; (2) average working hours ; (3) average housework hours; (4) average
wage for the employed workers; (5) standard error of male’s log wage and female’s log
wage; (6) fraction of working hours in certain intervals; (7) fraction of housework hours in
certain intervals; (8) Covariance between men and women’s time allocations; (9) Correlation
between men and women’s accepted wages. We calculated moments 1-7 for husbands and
wives separately. For moments 1-4 we use marginal moments conditional on education level
(college, no college), principal component 1 range (low, middle and high) and principal
component 2 range (low, middle and high). The remaining moments are unconditional. In
total, there are 85 moments. A detailed description can be found in Appendix 3.8.3.
21The cut-offs to assign observations to the low, middle and high categories correspond to the 33rd and
66th percentiles.
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3.5. Estimation Results
3.5.1. Model Estimates
Table 46 reports the estimated model parameters. Part 1 (the upper panel) displays the
coefficient estimates associated with personality traits in the wage offer function and their
impact on the Pareto weight for husbands and wives. Given our specification, we obtain
a certeris paribus effect of personality traits on log wages, conditional on education and
cognitive ability. Personality traits are also likely to be important at younger ages in
shaping education choices and cognitive skills. There is evidence that attending college
also influences the evolution of personality traits. (e.g.Todd and Zhang (2017)) We cannot
use our static model to fully examine the influence of personality traits over an individual’s
lifetime as they operate through various channels at different ages. Rather, we use the model
to examine the role played by personality traits in determining household interaction, wages
and labor supply, above and beyond that of other characteristics, such as education and
cognitive ability.
The parameter estimates show that the education coefficient (conditional on the other in-
cluded variables) is somewhat larger for women (0.0673) than for men (0.0538). Personality
traits are important determinants of wage offers for men but individually are not statistically
significant determinants for women. Of the personality traits, conscientiousness significantly
increases male wage offers and agreeableness significantly lowers wage offers. Cognitive abil-
ity increases wage offers for both men and women. The wage return for cognitive ability is
twice as high for men (0.12) as for women (0.06).
Table 47 reports F-statistics and associated p-values from Wald tests for the joint statistical
significance of the five personality traits in the wage equations and in the pareto weights
for both men and women. We reject the null that personality traits are not significant in
all cases.
The estimated parameters that determine the Pareto weights are shown in Table 46. The
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Table 46: Parameter estimates
Part 1 Male Female
Estimates S.E. Estimates S.E.
Log wage equation
γ0m 2.2467 (0.1448) γ0f 2.1326 (0.2008)
γ1m(Opn) -0.0256 (0.0217) γ1f (Opn) -0.0141 (0.0152)
γ1m(Cos) 0.0504 (0.0132) γ1f (Cos) 0.0259 (0.0336)
γ1m(Ext) 0.0087 (0.0089) γ1f (Ext) 0.0146 (0.0199)
γ1m(Agr) -0.0446 (0.0215) γ1f (Agr) -0.0171 (0.0212)
γ1m(Stb) 0.0091 (0.0133) γ1f (Stb) -0.0392 (0.0243)
γ2m(Edu) 0.0538 (0.0108) γ2f (Edu) 0.0673 (0.0143)
γ3m(Cog) 0.1230 (0.1073) γ3f (Cog) 0.0610 (0.0620)
γ4m(Exp) 0.0294 (0.0085) γ4f (Exp) 0.0163 (0.0066)
γ5m(
Exp2
100 ) -0.0786 (0.0450) γ5f (
Exp2
100 ) -0.0447 (0.0290)
σ(εm) 0.6366 (0.0713) σ(εf ) 0.8571 (0.1000)
ρ 0.7548 (0.1542)
Pareto Weight
γ6m − γ6f -0.2616 (0.0685)
γ7m(Opn) -0.1406 (0.0396) γ7f (Opn) -0.2390 (0.0429)
γ7m(Cos) -0.0776 (0.0205) γ7f (Cos) 0.1393 (0.0275)
γ7m(Ext) 0.0651 (0.0407) γ7f (Ext) 0.0412 (0.0394)
γ7m(Agr) -0.3630 (0.1099) γ7f (Agr) -0.2739 (0.0755)
γ7m(Stb) 0.1322 (0.0480) γ7f (Stb) 0.0052 (0.0060)
γ8m(Edu) 0.1391 (0.0288) γ8f (Edu) 0.0631 (0.0215)
γ9m(Cog) -0.6623 (0.1064) γ9f (Cog) -0.2805 (0.2935)
γ10m(Age) 0.0401 (0.0187) γ10f (Age) 0.0945 (0.0317)
Part 2 Preference and Production Parameters
Mean (µ) Co-variance (σ2)
λm 0.3621 0.0123 0.0092 -0.0008 0.0016
S.E. (0.0145) (0.0024) (0.0028) (0.0007) (0.0006)
λf 0.3372 0.0092 0.0099 0.0019 -0.0009
S.E. (0.0132) (0.0038) (0.0051) (0.0012) (0.0006)
δm 0.1395 -0.0008 0.0019 0.0072 -0.0002
S.E. (0.0221) (0.0007) (0.0012) (0.0058) (0.0016)
δf 0.1953 0.0016 -0.0009 -0.0002 0.0170
S.E. (0.0190) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0016) (0.0100)
160
Table 47: Joint Wald test for the explanatory power of “Big-five” personality traits in the
wage equation and in the bargaining equation
Null Hypothesis F − value p − value
Wage (Male) γ1m = 0 137.8 0.000
Wage (Female) γ1f = 0 35.3 0.000
Bargaining (Male) γ5m = 0 169.6 0.000
Bargaining (Female) γ5f = 0 872.1 0.000
Pareto weights for both men and women are significantly influenced by personality traits,
education and cognitive ability. Extraversion and emotional stability have a ceteris paribus
positive effect on the Pareto weight, whereas openness to experience and agreeableness have
a negative effect. Conscientiousness increases the Pareto weight for women but decreases
it for men. Age increases the Pareto weight for both men and women and cognitive ability
decreases it.
When particular personality traits have negative ceteris paribus effects on the Pareto weight,
it does not mean that individuals with higher values of these traits necessarily have a
lower household Pareto weight. This is because it is the the relative difference between
spouses rather than the absolute value that determines the overall Pareto weight. With
assortative matching on traits, individuals with high scores on certain traits are likely to
have spouses with high scores on the same traits. We will further explore the importance
of this assortative matching in affecting the degree of household cooperation below.
To better understand how personality traits of both spouses affect the Pareto weight, we
calculate {ηm(i), ηf (i)}, the elasticity of Pareto weights with respect to their personality
traits separately, following equation 3.3 and 3.4 described in the last section. Figure 22
displays the distribution of ηm(i) and ηf (i). In general, personality traits demonstrate
significant asymmetric effects on Pareto weights. Among all personality traits, agreeableness
is the most important trait in determining the Pareto weights. The average elasticities of
agreeableness are -0.861 for men and -0.880 for women. That is, a percent increase of the
husband’s agreeableness decreases his Pareto weight (α) by 0.861%. A percent increase in
wives’ agreeableness decreases her Pareto weight (1− α) by 0.880%.
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Figure 22: The distributions of both ηm(i) and ηf (i)
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Table 48: The fraction of households playing cooperatively along with Pareto weight α
α Fraction Obs.
[0.10,0.20) 0 11
[0.20,0.30) 0 59
[0.30,0.40) 0.243 169
[0.40,0.50) 0.618 280
[0.50,0.60) 0.694 359
[0.60,0.70) 0.266 293
[0.70,0.80) 0.068 205
[0.80,0.90) 0 65
[0.90,1.00] 0 2
Total 0.387 1,443
Note: all Pareto wights α are within range [0.1,1]. The mean and S.D. of α are 0.555 and 0.151.
Next, we explore how the Pareto weight affects the possibility of a household adopting a
cooperative allocation. Table 48 displays the fraction of cooperative households for different
values of α. Although α assumes values from 0 to 1, the Pareto weights of most households
lie in the range [0.20,0.80], indicating that spouses in most households share fairly equal
weights. Also, we observe that households are more likely to adopt a cooperative interaction
mode when the Pareto weight is close to 0.5. Around 61.8% and 69.4% of households choose
to play cooperatively when α ∈ [0.40, 0.50) and α ∈ [0.50, 0.60), whereas none of households
play cooperatively when the value of α is extreme (α > 0.80 or α < 0.20).
We next describe the estimated distribution of the spousal preference and production pa-
rameters {δm, δf ,λm,λf }. Figure 24 (a) shows the marginal distributions of the preference
and production parameters. The distribution of husbands’ leisure preferences and the dis-
tribution of wives’ leisure preference are similar. The husbands’ production parameter
distribution is more left-skewed than wives’; males are estimated to be less efficient in
producing public goods than females.
Figure 24 (b) plots the bivariate distribution of spousal preference and production pa-
rameters. There is a strong relationship between both the preference (λ1 and λ2) and the
production parameters (δ1 and δ2) over most of the support of the distribution. That is, hus-
bands and wives exhibit a substantial degree of positive assortative matching with respect
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Figure 23: Histograms of spousal production and preference parameters
(a) Husbands’ preference parameters λm (b) Wives’ preference parameters λf
(c) Husbands’ production parameters δm (d) Wives’ production parameters δf
to both preference and production characteristics, although the sorting on the production
parameter is less pronounced. For husbands, there is a weak positive correlation between
the preference and production parameters as seen in figure 24(b) - subfigure (c). For wives
(figure 24(b) - subfigure (d)), there is little evidence of a systematic relationship between
productivity and preference parameters. Although the sample used for our estimation dif-
fers from that used in Del Boca and Flinn (2012), the estimated unobserved preference and
production distributions are similar.
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Figure 24: Bivariate relationships between production and preference parameters
(a) Spousal preference parameters
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(b) Spousal productivity parameters
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(c) Husbands’ primitive parameters
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(d) Wives’ primitive parameters
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3.5.2. Goodness of Model Fit
The goodness of model fit is shown in tables 49, 50 and 51. Table 49 shows the mean labor
participation rate, accepted wage, working hours and housework hours. All moments are
conditional on education levels and on ranges of values of the first and second principal
components. The model captures well the proportion working, the average wages for work-
ers, the average hours for workers and the hours of housework by education level (low or
high) for the different categories.
Table 50 shows the fit of the time allocation distribution, where time is divided into three
intervals, chosen so that the number of observations in each interval is roughly equal. Al-
though the model reproduces the distribution of household hours fairly well (both for men
and women), it under-predicts the number of individuals with working hours in the middle
interval. This underestimation is caused by non-smoothness of working hour distribution,
as many people report working hours equal to 40. The fraction of men’s working hour in
(40,46) is only 0.157, which is much close to our simulation.
3.5.3. External Validation
As previously noted, we use the “fair share” question as a way of examining the validity of
the model’s implications. To determine a fair share reference point, we use the estimated
model to simulate housework time allocations under the case where husbands and wives
have equal pareto weights. We compare the housework hours implied by the model with
α = 0.5 to that reported by the household. If the “fair share” question is informative, then
individuals who report “I do much more than my fair share” should be observed to do more
housework than their “fair share ” and vice versa.22
Table 52 reports the housework hours and Pareto weight for both spouses categorized by
22A household’s optimal time allocation may change over time with changes in job opportunities as well
as the number of children, and respondents’ interpretation of fair share might be one that views allocation
over a span of time. Given that our model is static, though, we interpreted the response to the “fair share”
as relating to the present time.
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Table 49: Sample fit of husbands’ and wives’ wages and time allocations (mean level)
Probability work > 0 hours Wages if work (avg.)
Male Female Male Female
Simulated Data Simulated Data Simulated Data Simulated Data
Education
Low 0.937 0.917 0.821 0.790 24.003 21.688 15.505 14.709
High 0.969 0.966 0.887 0.909 30.869 31.058 27.414 27.912
First Principal Component
Low 0.927 0.925 0.859 0.790 26.473 26.304 20.667 19.587
Middle 0.961 0.943 0.859 0.882 26.174 25.064 20.638 21.634
High 0.966 0.949 0.844 0.878 28.832 26.56 21.524 20.936
Second Principal Component
Low 0.950 0.950 0.828 0.858 27.321 25.675 19.615 20.817
Middle 0.950 0.933 0.857 0.868 27.617 26.331 20.945 20.645
High 0.951 0.934 0.877 0.825 26.516 25.887 22.306 20.752
Hours worked if work (avg.) Hours of housework (avg.)
Male Female Male Female
Simulated Data Simulated Data Simulated Data Simulated Data
Education
Low 40.511 42.765 25.416 23.379 18.545 18.651 25.479 26.747
High 43.197 44.58 38.610 37.847 17.713 17.637 30.096 29.266
First Principal Component
Low 40.163 43.82 31.322 27.811 18.151 18.052 28.207 27.785
Middle 40.814 43.829 31.959 30.389 18.639 18.180 26.792 27.342
High 44.207 43.135 31.028 31.675 17.713 18.358 27.662 28.518
Second Principal Component
Low 42.464 44.421 29.291 29.243 17.511 17.526 28.544 27.650
Middle 42.289 43.2 32.337 30.867 18.654 19.102 26.184 27.871
High 40.415 43.148 32.714 29.831 18.349 17.940 27.950 28.115
Table 50: Sample fit of husbands’ and wives’ wages and time allocations (distribution)
Male Female
Simulated Data Simulated Data
Working Hours
[0,40] 0.420 0.501 [0,24] 0.400 0.356
()40,46) 0.161 0.157 (24,38) 0.219 0.238
[46,60] 0.420 0.342 [38,60] 0.381 0.406
Housework Hours
[0,11) 0.301 0.322 [0,16) 0.295 0.311
[11,20) 0.337 0.321 [16,34) 0.382 0.349
[20,56] 0.360 0.357 [34,56] 0.322 0.340
S.D. of log wages
S.D. 0.334 0.364 S.D. 0.360 0.351
Corr 0.686 0.410 0.686 0.410
‘
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Table 51: Sample fit of covariance matrix of time allocation
Correlation Working (M) Housework (M) Working (F) Housework (F)
of Hours Sim Data Sim Data Sim Data Sim Data
Working (M) 1.000 1.000 -0.092 -0.123 -0.092 -0.123 0.077 -0.029
Housework (M) -0.092 -0.123 1.000 1.000 0.093 0.105 0.127 0.106
Working (F) 0.204 0.243 0.093 0.105 1.000 1.000 -0.421 -0.374
Housework (F) 0.077 -0.029 0.127 0.106 -0.421 -0.374 1.000 1.000
Table 52: The average housework hours categorized by “fair share” question
Male Female
Fair Housework Relative Number Housework Relative Number
share hours difference of obs. hours difference of obs.
Much More(1) 31.38 10.86 26 35.00 3.72 287
A bit More(2) 21.34 0.97 181 28.30 -1.15 548
Fair Share(3) 18.64 -2.21 840 25.15 -4.75 532
A bit Less(4) 15.55 -5.55 362 17.78 -14.01 69
Much Less(5) 8.68 -13.80 34 9.29 -15.36 7
Note: “Relative difference” column displays the relative difference between the actual household hours and the
simulated housework hours when setting Pareto weight α = 0.500.
“fair share” question. The column “Relative Difference” displays the difference between
the actual housework hours and the simulated housework hours under the Pareto weight
set equal to 0.5. When individuals report doing more than their “fair share”, the actual
housework hours are larger than the simulated hours, and when the opposite is true the
individual tends to work less time in the household than the simulated hours.
3.5.4. Wage Decomposition
We next do a series of wage decompositions to understand the importance of education
and personality traits in explaining gender gaps in accepted and offered wages. In our first
decomposition, we decompose the mean log wage gap into five sources:
logw̄m − logw̄f︸ ︷︷ ︸
mean wage gap
= γ0m − γ0f︸ ︷︷ ︸
unexplained part
+ (γ1mθ̄m − γ1f θ̄f )︸ ︷︷ ︸
explained by traits
+ (γ2mēm − γ2f ēf )︸ ︷︷ ︸
explained by education
+ (γ3mc̄m − γ3f c̄f )︸ ︷︷ ︸
explained by cognition
+ (γ4m ¯expm − γ4f ¯expf )︸ ︷︷ ︸
explained by experience
+ (γ5m ¯exp
2
m − γ5f ¯exp
2
f )︸ ︷︷ ︸
explained by experience2
+ (ε̄m − ε̄f )︸ ︷︷ ︸
selection bias
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Table 53: The decomposition of gender wage gap
Offered Wage Accepted Wage
∆γ0 0.1142 0.1142
Education -0.1819 -0.1869
Conscientiousness 0.1195 0.1200
Openness -0.0529 -0.0528
Stability 0.2502 0.2495
Agreeableness -0.1337 -0.1338
Extraversion -0.0306 -0.0308
Cognitive 0.0006 0.0012
Experience 0.3220 0.3271
Experience2 -0.2109 -0.2165
∆ε 0 -0.0303
Total 0.1931 0.1610
Table 53 shows the gender wage gap attributable to these different sources. The gap in
accepted wages is 16.10%, while the gap in offered wages is 19.31%. As was seen in Table
46, females receive a slightly higher return for their educational attainment than males.
Education narrows the offered-wage gap by 18.19 percentage points and the accepted-wage
gap by 18.69 percentage points. However, the female advantage in the return to education
is largely offset by a relative disadvantage in the return to potential work experience. Work
experience increases the offered-wage gap by 11.11 percentage points and the accepted-wage
gap by 11.06 percentage points. Among the “Big Five” personality traits, conscientiousness
and emotional stability are the most important two traits contributing to a widening of the
wage gap (11.95 percentage points and 25.02 percentage points for the offered-wage gap).
Agreeableness, on the other hand, narrows the gender offered wage gap by 13.37 percentage
points. The impact of openness to experience and extraversion in explaining the log wage
gap is not significant. In total, personality traits explain 15.25 percentage points of the
offered log wage gap. Their combined contribution to explaining the gender gap is the
same magnitude as the contribution of education and working experience. Cognitive ability
explains only a small fraction of the wage gap.
Figure 25 plots the distributions of both offered wages and accepted wages. Female workers
are on average more selective than male workers; that is, a lower fraction of females (85.2
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Figure 25: Distributions of accepted wages and offered wages
(a) Male’s offered wage and accepted wage (b) Female’s offered wage and accepted wage
percent) accepts the offered wage and works in the labor market. Male workers’ accepted
wages are on average 1.63 percent higher than offered wages, whereas female workers ac-
cepted wages are on average 4.45 percent higher than offered wages. For this reason, the
gender gap in accepted wages is smaller than the gap in offered wages.
Table 53 shows that personality traits and education levels are both important to explaining
gender wage gaps. Wage gaps can arise either because women have on average different
traits and/or because women receive different payoffs in the labor market for their traits
(as was evident in Table 46). We next explore whether and to what extent the gender
gap is explained by differences in observed traits or differences in the market valuation
of those traits. Following Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973), we perform the following
decomposition:
γ1mθ̄m − γ1f θ̄f = γ1m(θ̄m − θ̄f )︸ ︷︷ ︸
personality difference
+ (γ1m − γ1f )θ̄f︸ ︷︷ ︸
coefficient difference
The first term is interpreted as the part of the log wage differential due to differences in
traits, and the second term is the difference arising from gender differences in the estimated
coefficients associated with those traits. The decomposition results are reported in table
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Table 54: The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition for personality traits, education and working
experience
Total Due to Due to
difference characteristic coefficients
Constant 0.1142 0.1142 0.0000
Education -0.1819 -0.0032 -0.1787
Conscientiousness 0.1195 -0.0117 0.1313
Openness -0.0529 -0.0040 -0.0489
Stability 0.2502 -0.0003 0.2506
Agreeableness -0.1337 0.0236 -0.1573
Extraversion -0.0306 -0.0029 -0.0277
Cognitive 0.0006 -0.0138 0.0144
Experience 0.3220 0.0596 0.2624
Experience2 -0.2109 -0.0516 -0.1593
Total 0.1965 0.1098 0.0867
54.
In general, gender wage gaps are largely explained by gender differences in labor market
evaluations of characteristics (education, personality traits and potential working experi-
ence). For example, the differences in personality traits mean values explain 0.44 percentage
points of the offered wage gap, but the differences in trait premia/penalties explain 8.67
percentage points. The gender difference in the valuation of emotional stability widens the
offered wage difference by 25.06 percentage points and is the most important single factor
to explain the gender wage gap. Another important factor is the male-female difference in
the premium for conscientiousness, which widens the offered wage gap by 13.13 percentage
points. In contrast, the gender difference in the valuation of agreeableness shrinks the gen-
der wage gap by 15.73 percentage points. The contributions of other two traits - openness
to experience and extraversion - in explaining gender differences in wage offers are minor.
3.6. Counterfactual Experiments
3.6.1. Comparing Different Modes of Interaction between Spouses
We next examine how household behaviors differ in the cooperative and noncooperative
regimes by using the estimated model to simulate behaviors that would result if all house-
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Table 55: The new allocations under different forms of interactions
Gender Participation Housework Working Accepted Wage Utility
rate hours hours wages Gap
Baseline Males 95.2% 18.2 41.7 27.2 15.2% 5.45
Females 85.0% 27.5 35.0 23.3 5.50
Cooperative Males 95.9% 22.0 46.7 27.1 21.5% 5.48
Females 92.7% 32.5 43.5 22.8 5.49
Non- Males 93.6% 16.0 37.5 27.2 13.6% 5.42
cooperative Females 80.2% 24.6 31.9 23.7 5.47
Note: The average working hours To be consistent with the previous wage decomposition, the wage gap here is defined
as log Wm − log Wf
holds interacted in a cooperative or noncooperative manner. We compare the time allo-
cations and outcomes to our baseline model, where we found that 38.4 percent of sample
households choose to cooperate. As seen in Table 55, under the cooperative regime, both
men and women supply more hours to market work and to household work than in the
baseline case. The working hours for men and women increase on average by 5.0 and 8.5
hours, respectively, while housework hours increase by 3.8 hours and 5.0 hours. The gap
in accepted wages increases from 15.2 percent in the baseline model to 21.5 percent in
the cooperative regime. In the noncooperative regime, both men and women supply fewer
hours to the labor market and to household work and devote more hours to leisure. The
accepted wage gap is largest under the cooperative regimes, and the average utility levels
for men under this regime is also the highest. The accepted wage gap is lowest under the
noncooperative regime and the average utility values are also lowest. This indicates that
reducing the observed gender wage gap is not necessarily welfare improving.
The explanation for the different time allocations under cooperative and noncooperative
regimes is intuitive. For any set of state variables characterizing the household, when both
the public good K and the private good l are valued by husbands and wives, the household
will produce more of the public good in the cooperative equilibrium. The Nash equilibrium
is inefficient in that neither spouse takes account of the fact that by spending more time in
the market and housework they will increase the welfare of their spouse, and so leisure is
over-consumed relative to its efficient level. In any efficient equilibrium (i.e., whatever the
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value of α), more K will be produced than in the Nash equilibrium. Because both labor
supply, that generates income, and housework time are inputs in the production of K , both
will generally increase. The reservation wage of either spouse will be lower for each spouse
in the cooperative equilibrium. There is an increase gender wage gap in part because women
are now willing to work at lower wages. Although the cooperative allocation is always an
efficient equilibrium, it does not guarantee that both husbands and wives are able to attain
a higher welfare level simultaneously compared with their baseline levels. In our case, the
cooperative allocation improves men’s utility but hurts women’s utility on average. This
also explains why the cooperative equilibrium is not chosen by all households.
3.6.2. The Effect of Positive Assortative Matching
According to Figure 21 and Figure 24(b), married couples display positive assortative match-
ing on both unobserved preference and production parameters as well as on observed person-
ality traits and cognitive abilities. We perform two counterfactual experiments to measure
the effect of positive assortative matching on the gender wage gap. In the first, we ran-
domly assign males and females from the original sample to form new households, and we
refer to this environment as one of “pure random matching.” In the second experiment, we
preserve the education and the age of the matched spouses but reshuffle the personality
traits of households. The comparison of these two experiments to the baseline scenario
allows examination of the effects of positive sorting on cooperation and on household time
allocation.
Table 56 suggests that eliminating positive assortative matching between spouses generates
significant effects on labor force participation rates and wage gaps. In the pure random
matching experiment, the labor participation rate of males and females decreases by 10.5
and 10.1 percentage points, and the accepted wage increases by $1.0 for men and by $1.3
for women. As a result, the gender gap in accepted wages shrinks from 15.2 percent in the
baseline case to 13.4 percent in the pure random matching case. Meanwhile, the “limited”
random matching experiment displays a very similar effect. The labor participation rate
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Table 56: The counterfactual experiment of random match
Gender Participation Housework Working Accepted Wage Cooperative
rate hours hours wages Gap Fraction
Baseline Males 95.2% 18.2 41.7 27.2 15.2% 38.7%
Females 85.0% 27.5 35.0 23.3
Pure random Males 84.7% 18.5 42.5 28.2 13.4% 32.6%
matching Females 74.9% 26.9 38.7 24.6
Limited random Males 85.2% 18.6 42.3 28.2 13.1% 33.1%
matching Females 75.2% 26.9 38.7 24.7
of males and females decreases by 10.0 and 9.8 percentage points, and the gender wage
gap decreases to 13.1%. The driving force behind these results in both experiments is the
decrease numbers of cooperative households. The reason is that extreme Pareto weights
are easier to generate when matching is random, resulting in a lower fraction of cooperative
households. When households adopt noncooperative behaviors, they obtain less utility from
the public good. Consequently, they choose to work fewer hours and gender a lower level
of public goods. Thus, labor force participation rates also fall (especially for females). By
comparing the two counterfactual experiments (random match and limited random match),
we can ascertain that the effect of age and education sorting on cooperation is relatively
small.
3.6.3. Equalizing pay opportunities
Lastly, we use our model to simulate household time allocations and wage outcomes that
would result if women were paid according to the male wage offer equation. That is, women
may still receive different wage offers from men because their personal attributes differ, but
their education, personality traits, and cognitive skill are valued in the same way in the
labor market as they are for men.
As seen in Table 57, when men and women have the same wage offer equation, then women
have better opportunities in the labor market on average. Women choose to spend more
hours and men fewer hours doing market work. In terms of housework, women decrease
their housework hours relative to the baseline and men increase their housework hours. In-
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Table 57: The new allocations under equal pay experiment
Gender Participation Housework Working Accepted Wage Cooperative
rate hours hours wages Gap Fraction
Baseline Males 95.2% 18.2 41.7 27.2 15.2% 38.7%
Females 85.0% 27.5 35.0 23.3
Equal pay Males 90.9% 19.3 38.3 27.4 -2.45% 38.8%
Females 92.0% 25.9 39.2 28.1
terestingly, when women and men have the same wage offer functions, the accepted wages
for women are on average similar to the accepted wages for men. The gender wage gap in ac-
cepted wages changes from 15.2 percentage points in the baseline model to -2.45 percentage
points in this “equal pay opportunities” simulation.
Figure 26 displays the distributions of offered wages and accepted wages in both the baseline
and the counterfactual models. In the baseline model, the female’s wage distribution is more
left-skewed than male’s wage distribution, indicating that the offered wages and accepted
wages are lower for women than for men. However, this gap is totally eliminated and under
the equal pay opportunities simulation.
3.7. Conclusions
In this paper, we study the role of personality traits in household decision-making, specif-
ically with regard to decisions about time allocation to housework and market work and
the implications for gender wage disparities. First, we find that personality traits are sig-
nificant determinants of household Pareto weights for both men and women. Second, we
find that personality traits are also statistically significant determinants of offered wages
for both men and women. Males receive a positive return for being conscientious and a
negative return for being agreeable. For women, the individual personality traits are not
statistically significant but they are jointly significant. Overall, the effect of personality
traits on the wage equation is comparable to the effect of education and potential work
experience. Third, an Oaxaca-Blinder type decomposition analysis shows that the gender
wage gap largely is attributable to gender differences in market valuations of traits rather
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Figure 26: Distributions of accepted wages and offered wages
(a) Offered wages in baseline model (b) Accepted wages in baseline model
(c) Offered wages in equal pay experiment (d) Accepted wages in equal pay experiment
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than to differences in the levels of those traits. Male-female differences in the return to con-
scientiousness and emotional stability emerge as the most important factors contributing
to a widening of the wage gap. Differences in the return to agreeableness and to education
contribute to a narrowing of the wage gap.
The model we estimated allows households to choose to behave cooperatively or noncoop-
eratively, with personality attributes potentially affecting household Pareto weights. We
find that 38.7 percent of households behave cooperatively. Cooperation leads a household
to assign a higher value to public goods that require both monetary and time investments
to produce. This leads both men and women to supply a greater number of hours to the
labor market and to housework than they would under a noncooperative regime. Observed
wage gaps are higher under a cooperative regime but utility is also higher.
We also document positive assortative matching of men and women with regard to education
and personality traits. The assortative matching tends to lead to higher levels of cooperation
than would be observed under random matching of personality types. Simulation results
show that eliminating the positive sorting decreases the gender gap of accepted wage from
15.2 percent to 13.5 percent, largely because of the reduction in the proportion of households
behaving cooperatively.
We use the model to simulate time allocations that would result if women would receive the
same wage offer equation as men. Simulation results show that women would work about
4.2 hours more per week and the accepted wage gap would be eliminated, with women
having 2.45 percent higher wages than men.
There are several ways that our analysis could be extended in future work. First, we
focused on individuals age 30-50 who do not have children under the age of 8 living in
their home. Children and their effects on housework and labor supply decisions could be
explicitly incorporated into the model. Second, our model viewed the household decision
as a static decision at each age, but it could be extended to an explicit dynamic life-cycle
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framework.
3.8. Appendix
3.8.1. Comparison of estimated parameters based on restricted sample 1 and restricted sam-
ple 2
In this appendix, we compare the estimation results obtained using the sample that excludes
the households with any child age less than 8 (sample 1, the one that was used in the
estimation for the paper) and the results obtained using a more restrictive sample that
excludes households with any child age less than 14 (sample 2). The left panel in table
58 displays the key differences between the two samples. When restricting the sample to
households without dependents below age 14, the housework time of both spouses is reduced.
The average housework hours of husbands decreases from 18.19 to 14.29, and the average
hours of wives decreases from 27.87 to 20.27. For females, the reduction in housework time
is associated with an increase in hours supplied to the labor market. The working hours in
sample 2 are 3 hours more than that in sample 1.
The differences in the parameter estimates reasonably reflect different features of these two
samples. Sample 1 also has different home production technology (δ1,δ2) that generates
a greater male-female division of labor. Woman appear to be relatively more efficient in
the home sector when children are young compared to when children are older. Therefore,
we observe more hours of home production but fewer hours for market labor supply for
females in sample 1. The greater division of labor also is associated with a higher degree of
household cooperation. Our estimation shows that 38.7% households choose to cooperate
in sample 1, whereas only 19.3% households cooperate in sample 2.
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Table 58: Estimated parameters under two alternative estimation samples
Data Sample 1 Sample 2 Parameters Sample 1 Sample 2
Male Working Hours 44.10 44.03 λm 0.3625 0.3584
S.D. (9.54) (9.70) (0.1109) (0.1220)
Housework 18.19 14.29 δm 0.1367 0.1201
S.D. (12.86) (10.62) (0.0755) (0.0744)
Female Working Hours 33.48 36.29 λf 0.3365 0.3289
S.D. (12.31) (13.14) (0.0960) (0.1123)
Housework 27.87 20.27 δf 0.1936 0.1416
S.D. (17.59) (13.48) (0.1237) (0.1103)
Note: while we only show selected estimates for sample 2 in this table, the full list of parameters is available upon
request.
3.8.2. Algorithm used to solve and select equilibrium under non-cooperative regime
1. We solve the optimal allocation (h∗m, h
∗
f , τ
∗
m, τ
∗
f ) without constraint using the best re-
action arrays (Rm,Rf ):
Rm(h
∗
m, τ
∗
m)(hf , τf ) = arg maxhm,τm λm ln lm + (1− λm) lnK
Rf (h
∗
f , τ
∗
f )(hm, τm) = arg maxhf ,τf λf ln lf + (1− λf ) lnK
2. If h∗m and h
∗
f are both non-negative, this is the equilibrium with inner allocation.
3. If either h∗m < 0 or h
∗
f < 0, then the equilibrium is a boundary case.
(a) Guess and verify the case when female is out if labor force hf = 0
i. Guess: the allocation (ĥm, τ̂m, 0, τ̂f ) with the constraint female is out of labor
force
ii. Verify: whether this allocation (ĥm, τ̂m, 0, τ̂f ) is an equilibrium by inserting(
ĥm, τ̂m
)
into Rf (h̃f , τ̃f )(ĥm, τ̂m). It is truly an equilibrium if and only if
h̃f ≤ 0
(b) Guess and verify the case when male is out if labor force hm = 0
i. Guess: the allocation (0, τ̂m, ĥf , τ̂f ) with the constraint female is out of labor
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force
ii. Verify: whether this allocation (0, τ̂m, ĥf , τ̂f ) is an equilibrium by inserting(
ĥf , τ̂f
)
into Rm(h̃m, τ̃m)(ĥf , τ̂f ). It is truly an equilibrium if and only if
h̃m ≤ 0
(c) If only one in (a) and (b) is an equilibrium, choose this one.
(d) if both (a) and (b) are equilibria, we choose the one female is out of labor force.
(ĥm, τ̂m, 0, τ̂f )
3.8.3. List of Moments used in Estimation
This appendix provides a list of the moments used in estimation. Each moment is based
on all the households in the estimation sample, so that the N is the same value for each of
the moments (N is same for males and females as they are husbands and wives). In each
case, we use indicator functions to select particular subsets of the sample. For example, the
average wage for the males in the sample is the fraction of individuals who are male and
who are working times the average wage for those individuals plus the fraction of individuals
who are not male or not working times zero.
Husband’s employment rate for sub-groups
1.I (Husband’s Work Hours > 0)I (Education = High) 2.I (Husband’s Work Hours > 0)I (Education =
Low) 3.I (Husband’s Work Hours > 0)I (First principal component ≤ rank(33%)) 4.I (Husband’s
Work Hours > 0)I (rank(33%) <First principal component≤ rank(66%)) 5.I (Husband’s Work Hours
> 0)I (rank(66%) <First principal component) 6.I (Husband’s Work Hours > 0)I (Second principal
component≤ rank(33%)) 7.I (Husband’s Work Hours> 0)I (rank(33%) <Second principal component
≤ rank(66%)) 8.I (Husband’s Work Hours > 0)I (rank(66%) <Second principal component ) Wife’s
employment rate for sub-groups 9.I (Wife’s Work Hours > 0)I (Education = High) 10.I (Wife’s
Work Hours > 0)I (Education = Low) 11.I (Wife’s Work Hours > 0)I (First principal component≤
rank(33%)) 12.I (Wife’s Work Hours > 0)I (rank(33%) <First principal component≤ rank(66%))
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13.I (Wife’s Work Hours > 0)I (rank(66%) <First principal component) 14.I (Wife’s Work Hours >
0)I (Second principal component≤ rank(33%)) 15.I (Wife’s Work Hours > 0)I (rank(33%) <Second
principal component≤ rank(66%)) 16.I (Wife’s Work Hours > 0)I (rank(66%) <Second principal
component)
Husband’s average wage for sub-groups
17. Husband’s average wage I (Husband’s Work Hours > 0)I (Education = High) 18. Husband’s aver-
age wage I (Husband’s Work Hours> 0)I (Education = Low) 19. Husband’s average wage I (Husband’s
Work Hours > 0)I (First principal component≤ rank(33%)) 20. Husband’s average wage I (Husband’s
Work Hours > 0)I (rank(33%) <First principal component≤ rank(66%)) 21. Husband’s average wage
I (Husband’s Work Hours > 0)I (rank(66%) <First principal component) 22. Husband’s average wage
I (Husband’s Work Hours > 0)I (Second principal component≤ rank(33%)) 23. Husband’s average
wage I (Husband’s Work Hours > 0)I (rank(33%) <Second principal component≤ rank(66%)) 24.
Husband’s average wage I (Husband’s Work Hours > 0)I (rank(66%) <Second principal component)
Wife’s average wage for sub-groups
25. Wife’s average wage I (Wife’s Work Hours > 0)I (Education = High) 26. Wife’s average wage
I (Wife’s Work Hours > 0)I (Education = Low) 27. Wife’s average wage I (Wife’s Work Hours
> 0)I (First principal component≤ rank(33%)) 28. Wife’s average wage I (Wife’s Work Hours >
0)I (rank(33%) <First principal component≤ rank(66%)) 29. Wife’s average wage I (Wife’s Work
Hours > 0)I (rank(66%) <First principal component) 30. Wife’s average wage I (Wife’s Work Hours
> 0)I (Second principal component≤ rank(33%)) 31. Wife’s average wage I (Wife’s Work Hours >
0)I (rank(33%) <Second principal component≤ rank(66%)) 32. Wife’s average wage I (Wife’s Work
Hours > 0)I (rank(66%) <Second principal component)
Husband’s average working hours for sub-groups
33. Husband’s average working hoursI (Husband’s Work Hours > 0)I (Education = High) 34. Hus-
band’s average working hoursI (Husband’s Work Hours > 0)I (Education = Low) 35. Husband’s av-
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erage working hoursI (Husband’s Work Hours> 0)I (First principal component≤ rank(33%)) 36. Hus-
band’s average working hoursI (Husband’s Work Hours> 0)I (rank(33%) <First principal component≤
rank(66%)) 37. Husband’s average working hoursI (Husband’s Work Hours > 0)I (rank(66%) <First
principal component) 38. Husband’s average working hoursI (Husband’s Work Hours > 0)I (Second
principal component≤ rank(33%)) 39. Husband’s average working hoursI (Husband’s Work Hours >
0)I (rank(33%) <Second principal component≤ rank(66%)) 40. Husband’s average working hoursI (Husband’s
Work Hours > 0)I (rank(66%) <Second principal component)
Wife’s average working hours for sub-groups
41. Wife’s average working hours I (Wife’s Work Hours > 0)I (Education = High) 42. Wife’s av-
erage working hours I (Wife’s Work Hours > 0)I (Education = Low) 43. Wife’s average working
hours I (Wife’s Work Hours > 0)I (First principal component ≤ rank(33%)) 44. Wife’s average
working hours I (Wife’s Work Hours > 0)I (rank(33%) <First principal component ≤ rank(66%)) 45.
Wife’s average working hours I (Wife’s Work Hours > 0)I (rank(66%) <First principal component) 46.
Wife’s average working hours I (Wife’s Work Hours > 0)I (Second principal component ≤ rank(33) 47.
Wife’s average working hours I (Wife’s Work Hours > 0)I (rank(33%) <Second principal component
≤ rank(66%)) 48. Wife’s average working hours I (Wife’s Work Hours > 0)I (rank(66%) <Second
principal component)
Husband’s average housework hours for sub-groups
49. Husband’s average housework hours I (Education = High) 50. Husband’s average housework
hours I (Education = Low) 51. Husband’s average housework hours I (First principal component≤
rank(33%)) 52. Husband’s average housework hours I (rank(33%) <First principal component≤
rank(66%)) 53. Husband’s average housework hours I (rank(66%) <First principal component) 54.
Husband’s average housework hours I (Second principal component≤ rank(33%)) 55. Husband’s
average housework hours I (rank(33%) <Second principal component≤ rank(66%)) 56. Husband’s
average housework hours I (rank(66%) <Second principal component)
Wife’s average housework hours for sub-groups
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57. Wife’s average housework hours I (Education = High) 58. Wife’s average housework hours
I (Education = Low) 59. Wife’s average housework hours I (First principal component ≤ rank(33%))
60. Wife’s average housework hours I (rank(33%) <First principal component ≤ rank(66%)) 61.
Wife’s average housework hours I (rank(66%) <First principal component) 62. Wife’s average
housework hours I (Second principal component ≤ rank(33%)) 63. Wife’s average housework hours
I (rank(33%) <Second principal component ≤ rank(66%)) 64. Wife’s average housework hours
I (rank(66%) <Second principal component)
Moments for the distribution of time allocation
65. Prob. of husband’s working hours in [0,40]
66. Prob. of husband’s working hours in (40,46]
67. Prob. of husband’s working hours in (46,60]
68. Prob. of husband’s housework hours in [0,11]
69. Prob. of husband’s housework hours in (11,20]
70. Prob. of husband’s housework hours in (20,56]
71. Prob. of wife’s working hours in [0,24]
72. Prob. of wife’s working hours in (24,38]
73. Prob. of wife’s working hours in (38,60]
74. Prob. of wife’s housework hours in [0,16]
75. Prob. of wife’s housework hours in (16,34]
76. Prob. of wife’s housework hours in (34,56]
77. Corr. between husband’s working hours and wife’s working hours
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78. Corr. between husband’s working hours and wife’s housework hours
79. Corr. between husband’s working hours and husband’s housework hours
80. Corr. between husband’s housework hours and wife’s working hours
81. Corr. between husband’s housework hours and wife’s housework hours
82. Corr. between wife’s working hours and wife’s housework hours
83. S.D. of husband’s log wageI (Husband’s working hours > 0)
84. S.D. of wife’s log wageI (Wife’s working hours > 0)
85. Corr. between wife’s wage and husband’s wage
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